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ABSTRACT 
It is commonly believed about sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that the region has a comparative 
advantage in primary resources as reflected by its high share of primary exports to total 
exports. In acknowledging the region's comparative advantage, the study tries to put the 
determinants from the Wood and Mayer (1998, (999) (W-M) Heckscher-Ohlin based model 
in the context of two relatively diversified countries (South Africa and Mauritius) and two 
commodity-export-dependent countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria and Cote d' Ivoire). 
The study finds that the skill and land resource measures used in the W -M (1998, 1999) 
thesis do not explain why Nigeria, having a similar level of skill per worker ratio to South 
Africa, has not diversified. Further, Mauritius having relatively the highest skill per land 
ratio specialises in low-skill textiles and clothing, while South Africa specialises in the more 
human capital-intensive "other manufactures" group. The other measure, a low land per 
worker ratio that explains Mauritius' relatively higher share of manufacturing exports, also 
fails to apply to Nigeria. The thesis thus concludes that the W-M land and skill measures 
could only be rough proxies in determining comparative advantage in manufacturing exports. 
However, employing the Dutch disease hypothesis recognises the potential of land abundance 
as a natural resource, namely minerals in South Africa, oil in Nigeria, and cocoa in Cote 
d' !voire. The Dutch disease is a dynamic process of structural economic and political 
development that will penn it an understanding of why natural resource abundant countries do 
not have a comparative advantage in manufacturing, at least in the short to medium tenn. 
The study therefore investigates commodity dependence and the Dutch disease effects to 
examine whether primary resource- based industrialisation offers an escape from 
underdevelopment. It establishes that South Africa, a mineral resource rich country, 
diversified based on a broad mineral-energy-complex (MEC) reinforcing the notion that land 
abundant countries will first invest in capital-intensive primary resource processing. 
However, the thesis concludes that in Nigeria and Cote d'!voire where external shocks are 
more predominant probably because of single commodity export reliance, the manufacturing 
sector lags behind more due to resource and spending effects that a natural resource boom 
generates in these economies. 
ii 
Due to the implications of external and endogenous effects linked to single commodity 
dependence and comparative advantage in natural resources, this study stresses important 
policy questions about how developing countries such as Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire should 
adopt a harmonious blend of exchange rate policy, multilateral and bilateral trade agreements 
as well as how they should tackle problems of political Dutch disease. 
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1.1 Background 
CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
The preoccupation with the role of exports in development goes back to the revelations of the 
gains from trade by classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. This has 
led to studies that empirically found a positive correlation between economic growth and 
growth of exports by export-optimists such as Balassa (1977) and Michaely (1977). For 
instance, Balassa (1977: 181) notes that exports bring about growth due to the following 
reasons: 
(i) exports result in resource allocation according to comparative advantage; 
(ii) they allow greater capacity utilisation; 
(iii) they permit exploitation of economies of scale; 
(iv) exports generate technology improvement in response to competition abroad; 
(v) finally, exports contribute to tbe absorption of labour in labour surplus countries . 
Bhagwati (1998), Balassa (1988) and the World Bank (1987,1993) point to the evidence of 
"superexporting" in the first-tier Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of East Asia that led 
to their development. More recently, the success of the second-tier NICs of South East Asia 
(SEANICs) has also been the result of development througb manufacturing exports. 
It is thus believed that exports, manufacturing exports in particular, offer the potential for 
sustainable growth. According to Elbadawi (1999), manufacturing has become regarded as 
important in this respect, because: 
(i) the income elasticity of demand for manufacturing goods is high, therefore their 
demand rises as global income rises; 
(ii) the relatively higher price elasticity of demand and supply for manufacturing 
goods make them less susceptible to price volatility, hence, a small percentage 
change in price brings about a relatively higher percentage change in the 
quantity of exports demanded and the quantity supplied; 
iii) and lastly, dynamic productivity gains in manufacturing are potentially higher 
relative to primary products. 
To elaborate further on iii) above, dynamic effects such as those featured in certain 
manufacturing structures, viz. , firm clusters, also offer advantages. Firm clusters support 
specialised suppliers and offer the benefits of labour market pooling (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
2000). Market pooling occurs when companies absorb excess special ised labour in their 
location. This structure also results in knowledge spillovers due to the interaction of workers 
from different firms in one location, making it possible for companies to expand rapidly. In 
this regard, the absence of manufacturing industries may significantly reduce any possible 
firm clustering. Hence, this might manifest in the loss of backward and forward linkages in 
the economy that could result from specialised suppliers as well as the loss of opportunities 
for the accumulation of knowledge through leaming-by-doing (Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
In addition, manufacturing is believed also to be a sector that absorbs excess labour in the 
first stages . Therefore, most of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with undoubtedly surplus labour, 
could utilise its excess labour in this sector. Further, manufacturing expansion leads to a 
gradual increase in skill demand as a country accumulates more capital (Leamer et aI., 1999). 
This aspect of skill demand that will be considered in Chapter Three, forms an important 
argument of this thesis since this could be a significant source of poor manufacturing export 
performance. 
On the other hand, primary good exports in contrast to manufacturing exports seem to be 
beset with problems. The characteristics of manufactures listed in (i), (ii) and (iii) conversely 
apply to primary good exports. Thus, primary good exports ' relatively lower income 
elasticity of demand is believed to lead to a relative decline in the quantity of primary good 
exports demanded as industrialised countries grow (Azam et aI., 2000; Appleyard and Field, 
200 I). In this respect, the countries that rely on primary good exports can be said not to reap 
the advantages of economies of scale in the long run. 
Also, due to the inelastic price elasticity of demand and supply of primary good exports, there 
are huge price changes relative to the changes in the quantity demanded and supplied in the 
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world market. Dependence on exports of primary products is therefore associated with 
problems of shocks due to the volatility of world demand and price fluctuations. 
It is commonly accepted that countries that depend solely on mineral or oil revenues in 
particular are also faced with the adverse economic, social and political effects dubbed the 
Dutch disease (see Chapter Two) . These setbacks are dynamic and are said to influence 
manufacturing industrial development in the long run (Sachs and Warner, 1995). Hence, it is 
argued that developing countries need to diversify their economies to minimise their 
dependence on primary resources. 
In this regard, most of SSA including those countries endowed with mineral resources 
remains un-industrialised. The exceptions are a few countries with economic performance 
above the region ' s average. For instance, South Africa and Mauritius are middle-income 
countries, while Botswana is an upper middle-income country (Edwards and Schoer, 200 I; 
Sarrafand Jiwanji, 2001). This evident difference in performance forms the key subject of the 
thesis, that there are other strong factors to explain the discrepancies in performance, 
especially in terms of manufacturing exports. 
Africa's economic performance has been the lowest among all regions globally (Collier and 
Gunning, 1999a; ILO, 2000). The gross domestic product (GOP) for sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular, according to Collier and Gunning (1999a), declined by 1.3% in the 1980s. Despite 
an increase of 1.8% in the 1990s, this growth is still 6.2 % below the average for all low-
income developing countries. 
Further, SSA's share in world exports has declined since 1955 resulting in annual trade losses 
of about $65 billion (Ng and Yeats, 1997). According to the ILO (2000) report, the region's 
share of world manufactured exports had fallen to 1.2% by 1990, compared to 3.1 % in the 
mid- 1950s. Africa has not been a part of the global transformation of trade where 80% of 
exports from developing countries are now manufactures (Collier, 2002). 
Nonetheless, the circumstances of Africa should be evaluated against the world economy at 
various periods. Wars and post-war recessions between 1913 and 1945 defined a period of 
import substitution (IS) in industrial countries (ILO, 2000). At that time these countries 
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erected high tariffs and other trade barriers to protect their industries. Simultaneously, Africa 
experienced a drop in commodity prices as a result of decline in demand (lLO, 2000). The 
1945-1960 period, however, according to Collier and Gunning (1999b), was an era of more 
deliberate import substitution characterised by rising capital intensity in the now 
industrialised countries. Furthermore, most of Africa at that time was under colonial rule and 
was not free to pursue independent policies of industrialisation even if it had wanted to. 
Nevertheless, after the uncertainties of political transition in the 1950s, independent African 
countries enjoyed rapid growth during 1960-70, even higher than some Asian countries. This 
was fostered by both the IS industrialisation that began in the 1960s in most of Africa, and by 
the commodity boom of the 1970s (Collier and Gunning, 1999b). However, falling earnings 
as SSA's share of world exports declined in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with rising debt 
servicing, reversed the gains from the windfalls of the previous years (Rimmer, 1995). 
It is thus argued that LDCs ', particularly sub-Saharan Africa's, low share of world exports 
has a negative effect on growth and development (Ng and Yeats, 1997; Colombatto, 1990). 
However, the cause of SSA's poor participation in world trade and her consequent economic 
condition is subject to debate. Proponents of exports as an engine of growth (Lewis, 1980; 
Reidel, 1984) have suggested that external demand for LDCs' exports is the key determinant. 
However those that refute this, instead rely on supply-side faclors as the plausible cause of 
the regions ' dismal export shares (Ng and Yeats, 1997; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Romer, 
1986). Kravis (i 970) argues that competitiveness factors internal to LDCs hinder the mobility 
of resources toward efficient production. Comparative advantage has also been concluded to 
be decisive in determining exports (Wood and Mayer, 1998, 1999). 
The above arguments capture part of the truth. The question that this thesis raises is in which 
direction should SSA go? Does the region's inherent comparative advantage mean that SSA 
is compelled to follow a resource-based industrialisation path fraught with difficulties? For 
Wood and Mayer (1998,1999), SSA needs to increase its share of exports by concentrating 
production in the goods in which it has comparative advantage. They hold that the natural 
endowment neoclassical model explains the region 's comparative advantage (see Chapter 2). 
This is evidenced from the export composition of SSA, which constitutes mainly primary 
products. Therefore, intuitively, it makes sense to begin from comparative advantage theory. 
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For this reason, the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) model serves as a basis for analysis . 
Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) employed the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory in determining 
regional endowments and expected export structure. Primary goods thus form most of SSA's 
exports while skill-intensive goods make up most of the region's imports. According to 
Wood and Mayer (1998,1999), countries such as South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire have more 
than 4 sq. km per 100 workers, comparable to Latin America (LA), and therefore are 
characterised as being relatively land abundant. These countries will thus be expected to 
export primary products . Only a high ski ll per worker will enable these land abundant 
countries to process a good proportion of their primary products. In such cases a relatively 
high share of processed primary products in total primary product exports will be found. A 
land abundant country that has a relatively high ski ll per worker ratio is also expected to have 
a relatively high share of manufacturing exports. 
Conversely, where the land per worker is below 4 sq. km per 100 workers, a country is 
anticipated to have a lower share of primary products in total exports. Coupled with a high 
skill per worker, the share of total exports of manufactures will also be relatively high. For 
instance, Nigeria and Mauritius, both with similar land per worker below 4 sq . km per 100 
workers, like that of the NICs, would be expected to have high shares of manufactures in total 
exports. 
The peculiarity with the case studies in this thesis is that South Africa and Nigeria both are 
rich in mineral resources and are said to suffer from the Dutch disease (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1998; Fidel Ezeala-Harison, 1993). While Nigeria's small land per worker ratio places her at 
a high potential for manufacturing exports, actual exports of manufactures are very low, but 
South Africa, however, is a relatively "good performer" in manufacturing exports. It is this 
discrepancy that Chapter Two will detail as due to the crude measures (land per worker and 
skill per worker) employed in the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) model in determining 
export performance. Both these ratios do not take account of the quality of land and ski ll 
across countries . Further, these measures fail to incorporate the effects of, for instance, 
mineral and oil wealth in the cases of South Africa and Nigeria respectively. 
It is also probable that ski ll demand may be tied to the quality of land. This argument takes 
into consideration that the disparity in skill between countries with different mixes of 
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endowments, viz., skill abundant-land scarce, and ski ll scarce-land abundant, may be due to 
low demand for skill in the latter. The suggestion that SSA should follow its natural 
endowments and apply laissez-faire policies to trade then becomes questionable (see Chapter 
Three) . By doing so, sub-Saharan African countries that are land abundant will therefore 
neglect developing and harnessing their human ski ll. Policy direction then becomes another 
significant factor in development in such countries. 
The question that then arises is whether sub-Saharan Africa, notably the "poor performers" in 
manufacturing exports in this case study, could ever develop a comparative advantage in 
manufactures. More specifically, should the countries of the region follow resource-based 
industrialisation or attempt to diversifY into higher value added sectors? 
1.2 Aim ofthe research 
This research focuses on four countries in SSA, i.e., South Africa, N igeria, Mauritius and 
Cote d'ivoire. The primary goal of the thesis is to highlight the disparities between the "good 
performers" and the "poor performers" in manufacturing exports outlined above. This builds 
on the Wood and Mayer (1998 ,1 999) model, wh ich examines Africa's performance from a 
comparative perspective. An attempt will be made to explain this comparative performance 
by reviewing traditional trade theory of comparative advantage on which the Wood and 
Mayer (1998) model is based. The Wood and Mayer (1998,1999) model provides a useful 
framework for analysis. However, as noted in the last section, it uses only rough proxies for 
relative factor abundance such as land/worker and skill/worker ratios. The model also does 
not explore the importance of policies, infrastructure and institutional fitness. Therefore, new 
trade theory and the Dutch disease hypothesis will also be reviewed to see how they relate to 
empirical evidence from SSA, notably for South Africa, Nigeria, Cote d'!voire and Mauritius. 
Secondly, in order to shed light on why most SSA countries have failed to engage in 
learning-by-doing and why their shares of manufacturing are so low, the core model of the 
Dutch disease and aspects of political Dutch disease will be considered in detail. This will 
add to an understanding of the peculiar resource re-allocation that takes place in the 
economies of mineralloil rich countries such as South Africa and Nigeria. 
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1.3 Thesis plan 
This thesis will undertake a comparative statistical and institutional analysis on the structure 
of exports of a four-country panel from sub-Saharan Africa namely, South Africa, Mauritius, 
Nigeria and Cote d'ivoire. This method has been chosen over econometric analysis, since the 
quality of data does not always justify formal quantitative analysis, which is the case of the 
data from some of the countries under study. The method will involve using a case study 
approach to assess sectoral performances of the countries and to determine the deterrents to 
growth while referring to the growth paths of comparable countries. Variables such as export 
shares, manufacturing value added (MV A), the real effective exchange rate (RER) and the 
terms of trade (TOT) will be examined. 
Chapter Two begins with the theories that form the basis of the research question on SSA's 
export structure and manufacturing export performance. The H-O theory and the Wood and 
Mayer (1998, 1999) variant are critically discussed to analyse their application to SSA. 
Further, non-market factors that may be impediments to SSA's efforts to diversify will be 
touched on briefly. In addition to this, dynamic factors offered by the new trade theories as 
well as the details of the Dutch disease core model will be considered to elaborate on more 
realistic influences that primary product dependence has on the government, civil war, and 
social and human capital development. 
Taking a historical perspective, Chapter Three will attempt to address the importance of 
endowments as well as the government's role in the development paths of the countries under 
study. This chapter will also survey relevant empirical studies on the South East Asian NICs 
and Latin America. Further, development patterns in these regions will serve as international 
comparisons. 
Comparisons of the countries under study by economic size, economic performance and 
sectoral characteristics will be analysed in Chapter Four. In order to highlight the revealed 
comparative advantage of each country, this section will focus on the export structure of 
South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius and Cote d'lvoire. In addition to this, data on economic 
freedom and human development factors will be examined to compare endogenous 
components in the four countries that may reveal any differences between the "good 
perfonners" and the "poor performers" with respect to manufacturing exports. 
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The fifth chapter will survey aspects of the macroeconomies of the four countries. This is 
done in order to emphasise any differences regarding the impact of commodity export price 
fluctuations through the TOT and the RER of the countries and to link them to commodity 
price instability. This chapter also aims to try to determine the impact of single commodity 
dependence on the political economy. 
The conclusion in Chapter Six will consider the implications of traditional endowment 
theory, the Dutch disease hypothesis and the new trade theory for development in the context 
of the case studies. The chapter will offer suggestions for policy to foster the economic 
performance of the countries . 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE DUTCH DISEASE 
2.1 Introduction 
Africa's poor economic performance was noted in Section 1.1. Average income per capita is 
lower than at the end of the 1960s and in 1997, real income in terms of purchasing power 
parity averaged one-third less than in South Asia, making Africa the poorest region in the 
world (World Bank, 2000). 
Further, it was cited in Section 1.1 that massive annual trade losses have been experienced 
particularly by SSA, due to the decline in its share of world exports since 1955. While 
manufacturing export shares in other regions increased significantly that of SSA had fallen to 
1.2% by 1990 compared to 3.1% in the mid-1950s (ILO, 2000). Elbadawi (1999) points out 
that sub-Saharan Africa only managed to export about 2.9% of her GOP during the 1990s. It 
is believed that Africa has not been a part of the global transformation of trade where 80% of 
exports from developing countries are now manufactures (Collier, 2002). The commodity 
boom of the 1970s brought about rapid growth to most ofSSA, however this was followed by 
a sharp contraction that deteriorated economic growth (Collier and Gunning, 1999b; Rimmer, 
1995). 
The cause of SSA's poor participation in world trade and the region's consequent economic 
condition has been explained by a variety of factors. The problems of primary good exports 
considered in Chapter One are a major issue connected to SSA's trade perfonnance. It is due 
to these problems that diversify ing into manufacturing exports is believed to bring about 
improved world export shares. However, neoclassical comparative advantage theory like that 
used in the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) model suggests that the sub-Saharan African 
region in general lacks the endowments necessary for manufacturing exports. Comparison 
with the relatively "good performers" in manufacturing exports in Section 1.1 leads this 
chapter to look into other theories. 
Against this backdrop, the aim of this chapter is to review the traditional theories of 
comparative advantage, particularly the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory and its extension by 
Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) in the sub-Saharan African context. The chapter will 
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critically assess the lessons of these theories for the growth and development path of 
countries such as those in SSA. 
In the light of the various shortcomings of these theories, the chapter will examine the Dutch 
disease concept, and particularly the implications of natural resource abundance and resource 
booms for the growth and development of the manufacturing sector and manufactured 
exports. The lessons of the new trade theory based on economies of scale and imperfect 
competition for the policies of developing countries will also be briefly considered. 
Section 2.2 will look at the essence of neoclassical trade theory while Section 2.3 will show 
the workings of the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) model. Section 2.4 will distinguish 
between different development approaches implied by the theory. Deviations from the static 
assumptions of the H-O theory will be dealt with in Section 2.5. Subsequently, in Section 
2.6, the problems of the Dutch disease and its political aspects will be considered. Finally 
Section 2.7 concludes the chapter by synthesising the preceding discussion to see how the 
lessons of the theory can be applied to the problems of sub-Saharan Africa. 
2.2 Neoclassical Trade Theory 
Eli Heckscher (19 19)1 and Bertil Ohlin's (1933) work resulted in the well-known neoclassical 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory. The theory holds that a country will have a comparative 
advantage in a good when that good's production is relatively intensive in the factor with 
which the country is relatively well endowed (Husted and Melvin, 200 I). 
Subasat (2003: 150) lists the main assumptions of the theory as follows: 
I. commodities are freely mobile internationally; 
2. all countries use the same technology in production; 
3. factors of production are mobile domestically but immobile internationally; 
4. tastes are the same in all countries; 
5. there are no economies of scale; 
6. there is perfect competition in all markets; 
7. there are no transportation costs; 
8. all resources are fully employed; and 
9. countries have different relative factor endowments and thus different factor prices. 
I The English translated article "The effect of foreign trade on the distribution of income" can be found in Flam 
and Flanders (1991). 
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Basic H-O theory explains the pattern of trade in terms of two goods and two factors, labour 
and capital. Technology is assumed to be constant and identical across countries. Therefore, 
producers have ready access to the choice of method of producing any of the goods. 
Production of a good is either labour or capital-intensive depending on the relative proportion 
of the factor used. Furthermore, there are no factor intensity reversals, so that one good 
remains labour-intensive relative to the other at all factor price ratios. 
These assumptions lead to the result that the labour-intensive good, for example, is relatively 
cheaper to produce in the labour abundant country, which wi ll then specialise in this good 
and export it in international trade. 
The trade and development policy implications of the H-O theory result wi ll be considered 
further below, but before doing so it is worthwhile to outline how the H-O approach allows 
consideration of the impact of factor growth and/or technological change on the welfare 
andlor per capita income levels of a small open economy. This is explained by the 
Rybczynski theorem. The theorem (Rybczynski, 1955) states that growth in a factor will, at 
constant relative commodity prices, increase the output of the good intensive in that factor 
and decrease absolutely the production of the good intensive in the other factor. There are 
important implications for welfare iflabour force growth is unaccompanied by capital growth 
or technological change. Adverse terms of trade effects may aggravate the outcome in cases 
where countries are large in the market for the product in question. These situations are best 
explained with reference to Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the case of a labour abundant country that is small and thus cannot 
influence world prices . Therefore, world price remains constant at PO. Subsequently, if the 
country experiences all increase in its supply of one factor (a non-neutral growth), sayan 
increase in labour, at a constant world price PO, the production possibility frontier (PPF) will 
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Figure 2.1: The effect of an increase inlaboux stock 
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Source: Husted and Melvin (2001). 
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shift such that there is an increased output of S (the labour-intensive product) and a decrease 
in the output of the capital-intensive good T, other things constant. A biased growth occurs 
in other words because an increase in labour will shift the PPF out asymmetrically more 
along the axis of the labour-intensive good. Initially production is at XO, which sh ifts to the 
new production point at XI. The peculiarity of the Rybczynski effect is that under the small 
country assumption relative prices and technology remain constant. 
Therefore, for the capital-labour ratio to remain unchanged at the new equilibrium in both 
industries, the capital-intensive sector must release some capital to be used with the new 
labour (Appleyard and Field, 2001: 196). 
The Rybczynski effect brings about an ultra-protrade production effect, whereby a country 
participates more in trade if the labour-intensive good is the export good. An ultra-antitrade 
effect will result if the labour-intensive good is the import good (Appleyard and Field, 
2001:195). 
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Figure 2.2 : Immiselising growth 
T 
XI 
o s 
Source: Husted and Melvin (2001) 
The H-O theory assumption of constant returns to scale, however, has welfare implications 
when considering the Rybczynski theorem. This assumption means that an increase in both 
factors of production leads to an equal proportionate increase in output. However, with only 
one factor (labour) increasing as the Rybczynski theorem suggests, this will lead to a less 
than proportionate increase in output. Thus an increase in the labour force results in an 
increase in income less than if all the inputs have also grown equally. The resulting effect is 
a fall in per capita income, thus a decline in a country's welfare. 
Consider now the case where a country is large enough to influence world prices. By 
changing its exports or imports and hence also influencing the international terms of trade 
(TOT), the assumption of constant world price falls. In such an example, biased economic 
growth such as that discussed in the small country case may also bring about negative welfare 
changes tied to TOT changes. This effect is known as immiserising growth. Bhagwati 
(1958:201) was the first to argue that under certain circumstances economic expansion might 
lead to a sufficient deterioration in the terms of trade to offset the beneficial effect of growth 
and reduce the real income of the growing country. In a large country case only, decline in 
per capita income such as that explained in the small country case, is further deteriorated by a 
worsened TOT. 
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Figure 2.2 assumes a country abundant in labour, large enough to affect world prices . 
Initially, production of good S is at Xl. At a constant price the country's consumption 
possibility line is TOT! and its welfare level is represented by CIC I. Consumption is at CI 
with TOTI terms of trade. When this country experiences labour force growth, biased 
production of the labour-intensive good S occurs, and hence its export supply to the rest of 
the world increases. Due to the Rybczynski effect, production in the industry with the scatce 
factor, capital, will decline, thereby generating an increased demand for imports . This 
process will alter the international TOT when an oversupply of S on the world market leads 
to its price decline. The significance of this is a welfare effect as the country moves to a 
lower TOT2, consuming less at a new indifference curve CIC2. 
The implications that can be drawn from H-O theory are that resource differences between 
countries are the reason for trade. Therefore, when countries exploit their natural 
endowments, this will ensure an efficient allocation and production of resources in attaining 
comparative advantage and hence economic growth. This therefore serves as an incentive for 
greater international trade participation of countries . What this also suggests is the 
liberalisation of trade and hence laissez-faire government policies towards trade. 
However, primary-ex port-led growth based on endowment in primary resources has its 
setbacks. First, as mentioned earlier in Chapter One, primary exports ate vulnerable to price 
shocks due to world demand fluctuations . Therefore, the macroeconomies of such exporting 
countries face economic instability. As a result, developing countries would experience 
unstable export earnings. Second, it is believed that primaty-export-Ied growth leads to the 
concentration and over- supply of primary commodities in the international market. With the 
effect of immiserising growth the result is that the terms of trade would be worsened for 
commodity exporting countries when prices of such exports are lower relative to their 
imports. It is rather argued that developing countries should diversify their production base 
to facilitate development. 
The static framework based on the restrictive assumptions made earlier is thus insuffici ent for 
analysing the developing country context. It is important to consider both positive and 
negative dynamic effects, and to look at the lessons of new trade theory in the developing 
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country context. Furthermore, in the context of countries like Nigeria and South Africa we 
need to look at the Dutch disease theory. Before doing so, however, it is useful to consider 
the Wood and Mayer (1998,1999) application of the H-O framework, as it has been applied 
specifically to the problems of sub-Saharan Africa with which this thesis is concerned. 
2.3 The Wood and Mayer model 
A variant of the H-O theory, the Wood and Mayer (1998,1999) (W-M) model, assesses the 
relative endowments of skill and land to determine regional patterns of trade. The model is 
explained using human and natural resources as factor inputs whose supplies affect export 
structure. Wood and Mayer (1998) argue that Africa cannot compete in manufacturing 
exports due to its current comparative advantage in natural resources and unskilled labour 
relative to other regions. 
While they have modified a number of the H-O assumptions, they maintain the plausible 
assumption that all goods are ranked the same in terms of relative factor intensities in the 
trading countries . For example, agriculture will always use more land relative to the skill 
input in contrast to manufacturing. Therefore, the skill to land ratio in agriculture will be 
expected to be lower than in the latter. 
2.3.1 Factors of production 
Capital of all kinds is taken as given because of its international mobility. Based on this, if a 
country has a comparative advantage in some area it will obtain capital needed to develop it 
either from domestic savings or from overseas. Also, countries face similar costs of capital 
due to domestic capital markets being linked to international capital markets. Therefore, in 
contrast to the H-O model, the W-M model views differences in capital abundance not to be a 
source of comparative advantage among countries (Wood and Mayer, 1998; 1999). 
Skill and labour are two separate factors of production, which are also mobile to an extent, 
but only a limited skilled workforce of the world is mobile with the more skilled labour 
having greater mobility. Skill, otherwise termed human capital, is taken to be the measure of 
a combination of education, training and experience. Labour is the number of people in the 
workforce, and land is the total land area that refers to natural resources of all kinds. 
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The resource measures are the skill to land and the skill per worker ratios. These measures 
are important as they point to the relative costs of factors that form the source of comparative 
advantage. The ratio skill to land, derived from a measure of ski ll per worker and land per 
worker, points to a country 's comparative advantage in either manufactured or primary 
exports. On the other hand, to explain differences in processed primary to unprocessed 
primary export ratios in a country, the skill per worker ratio is used. This is calculated from 
the average number of years of schooling of the adult population over 15 years (Wood and 
Mayer, 1998; 1999). 
2.3.2 Export categories 
In examining comparative advantage the W-M model broadly distinguishes exports of narrow 
manufactures (NM), unprocessed primary products (NP) and processed primary products 
(PP). For Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999), it is important to distinguish processed primary 
products from manufactures. Therefore, they refer to the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) of manufacturing goods (categories 5-8 less 68) as Narrow 
Manufactures (NM). They thus refer to a proportion of the International Standard Industry 
Classification (lSIC) of manufactures as processed primary si nce this include goods that use 
large inputs of local raw materials. Unprocessed primary products in the W-M model are 
those goods in the state in which they leave the farm, which the lSIC classify as agriculture 
and mining. Figure 2.3a summarises the three broad export classifications. 
Eight export categories and sub-divisions are presented in Figure 2.3b. The idea is that 
distinguishing and defining these exports into the various categories allows for identifying 
factor intensities, as Section 2.3.3 below2 will explain. 
The category of narrow manufactures is separated into high-skilled (NMH) and low-ski lled 
(NML) manufactures. Broad primary agriculture (BPA) and broad primary metals and fuels 
(BPM) constitute both the processed primary agriculture and metal (PP A, PPM) and their 
non-processed categories (NPA, NPM). Furthermore, processed and non-processed 
agriculture could either be 'static' (PPS or NPS) or "dynamic" 3 (PPO or NPO). 
2 The empirical results of Wood and Mayer's modelling for Africa will be examined in Chapter 3. 
1 Dynamic refers to items whose income elasticity of demand is greater than one. 
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Figure 2.3a: Summary of export category 
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Figure 2.4: Relative factor intensities 
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2.3.3 Relative factor intensities 
PP 
NP 
The ranking of the export categories (see Figure 2.3b) places NMH as the most skill-intensive 
followed by ppo, PPM and then NML, which are all broadly of similar skill-intensity. It 
therefore follows that both dynamic agricultural products and minerals require more skill than 
unprocessed static agricultural products, because these are processed and processing is 
carried out in factories . 
Figure 2.4 shows the relative factor intensities of the export categories . Manufacturing does 
not require as much land compared to agriculture but will use more skill to land. Therefore, 
it requires a more educated labour force. 
Mining however, is viewed as having a similar requirement to manufactures but its ratio of 
skilled wages to land rent is low as in agriculture. Manufacturing (NM) and processed 
primary (PP) accordingly have similar skill per worker but PP employs more land (because it 
depends on the availability of natural resources). 
Similarly, unprocessed primary (NP) products and their processed counterparts (PP) use the 
same land per worker ratios for they both depend on natural resources, but PP requires more 
skill per worker and low input of labour. Finally, serv ices and narrow manufactures have 
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similar land intensity, but the former is relatively less skill-intensive (Wood and Mayer, 
1998: 8; 1999). 
This said, the W-M model indicates that a country whose ratio of land per worker is low is 
expected to have a high share of manufactures to processed primary products in total exports. 
Its share of services 4 can be expected also to be relatively high. However, for relatively high 
shares of manufactures and services in total exports, a country with a low land to worker ratio 
requires a relatively high skill to worker ratio. Conversely a high share of primary products 
in total exports is due to a high land to worker ratio. When processed primary exports are 
relatively more than unprocessed primary exports, this only points to a high skill per worker 
ratio since both categories, i.e., unprocessed primary and processed primary exports require 
high land per worker. 
In conclusion, the W-M thesis is simply a variant of the H-O model. It analyses the 
components of exports that substitute for international factor mobility to determine 
comparative advantage. Simply put, it suggests that the inherent components or 'natural' 
abundance of specific factors of production will lead to their full employment and therefore 
the efficient production of associated goods in a region. Consequently, the model implies 
that Africa will never be able to compete in narrow manufacturing exports because of the 
region's natural resource abundance combined with low skill. Thus, exploitation of these 
natural endowments will determine the direction of speciali sation. To this, Subasat 
(2003: 153) argues that: 
this is no better than predicting that someone who has medical training will be likely to practice 
medicine or that someone practicing medicine must have medical training. 
More importantly, some of the endowments are not "endowments" as such since they can be 
produced. Capital can be created or, as in Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999), is freely mobile, 
and labour can be educated and trained. Wood and Mayer (1998, (999) have defended the 
latter arguing that since the concern is with relative comparative advantage, given that skill 
acquisition is not static, constant shifts in ski ll accumulation may maintain the skill gap with 
4 However, different types of services have different relative factor intensities. For example tourism is more 
land-intensive than financial services (Wood and Mayer, 1998). 
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regions that lag behind. However, to observe a labour-intensive (natural resource endowed) 
country export manufactures (natural resources) is merely stating the obvious. Rather, 
development requires a move from labour-intensive production to that of capital-intensity 
(Subasat, 2003: 153). [n that respect, it is the nature of development to move from [abour-
intensive production to capital-intensive production. 
Further, the assumption that capital is given stands to be challenged by endogenous growth 
theorists' arguments of market and governments failure that could raise the cost of 
technology transfer (Lall, 1992; See Section 2.4.2). 
In addition, skill measured by years of schooling does not consider the quality of schooling 
across countries or the sources of skill acquisition. If a distinction is made between human 
capital and other forms of capital then other processes of skill acquisition come to mind. For 
example, processes such as on-the-job-training and research and development (R&D) impact 
on the accumulation of knowledge and thus, human capital accumulation. [n the light of this, 
some new trade theories, such as those discussed in Section 2.5 become relevant for SSA. 
These factors among others such as infrastructure and institutional fitness have policy 
implications for SSA. In the light of this, policy becomes an important impetus in driving 
comparative advantage. 
As pointed out in Section 1.2, the W-M (1998,1999) model provides a useful framework for 
analysis. However, proxies for relative factor abundance such as the land/worker ratio ignore 
land quality. The W-M model is still based on most of the static assumptions of the H-O 
theory. Their model does not adequately take account of the effects of natural resources in an 
economy, for example, the predominance of minerals and oil in South Africa and Nigeria as 
well as agricultural resources in Cote d'Ivoire because it uses land area as a measure of 
natural resources. Therefore, in Section 2.6, the Dutch disease model has been chosen to 
explai n the relevance of natural resources for structural economic changes. Subsequent 
sections will also highlight other factors more in line with the case of developing countries. 
2.4 Endogenous growth theory approach to development 
The implication of endogenous growth theory for development strategies will be examined in 
this section in contrast to the neoclassical framework. Endogenous growth theory argues that 
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technology is due to factors explained within the economic model and not assumed to happen 
as in the neoclassical model. The endogenous growth theorists' approach is thus toward 
development and to assign a central role to endogenous technological effort in acquiring new 
technology, adapting it to the developing economy and exploiting it through manufacturing 
(Lall, 1992). This is in contrast to the conventional neoclassical approach. The latter is 
based on "getting prices right", reducing protection, freeing international flows of capital and 
technology, and cutting back on government intervention in economic activity (Lall, 1992); 
this implies that government intervention should be "neutral" and thus limited to R&D, 
education and functions that support the market. In other words, the distinction between the 
two frameworks in policy terms is between "functional" (in the neoclassical case) and 
selective intervention, where the latter (favoured by endogenous growth theorists) promotes 
certain industries or technologies over others. 
2.4.1 Incentives and market failure 
The essential justification for selective intervention is market failure. It is argued that since 
endogenous growth theorists' approach is to assign a central role to endogenous technological 
effort, their concern then is with market failures that may hinder the acquisition, adaptation, 
improvement and functioning of technology in the economy (Lall, 1992). 
In the neoclassical framework, markets provide a correct set of prices that yie ld the 
appropriate incentives for economic agents. For markets to operate there needs to be 
functional intervention in, for example, education and a legal system. However, Rodrik 
(2000b) argues that a much broader set of institutions is required to generate the correct 
incentives . Institutions are defined as "a set of humanly devised behavioural rules that 
govern and shape the interactions of human beings in part by helping them to form 
expectations of what other people will do" (Rodrik, 2000b: 4). Thus institutions of the legal 
framework are required to support industrial activity and property rights . In this regard, 
industrial institutions could serve to promote interfirm linkages in production or technology, 
support small enterprises and provide training and restructuring. 
Further, non-market incentives such as social insurance could bring about social stabili ty and 
employment (Rodrik, 2000b). In addition, another dimension to consider is democracy. The 
latter creates a more participatory and open government and enables the consensus to take on 
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policy adjustments decisively. Democracy also provides for the voice of the people to be 
heard in, especially, ethno-linguistic societies. There has, however, been some controversial 
debate on this latter issue with regard to lobbying groups along ethnic divisions and 
competing demands from the government (see, for example, przeworski and Limongi, 1993). 
Nonetheless, government activity in welfare i.e., investment in health, nutrition and education 
of society, to buffer economic uncertainties in this regard could correct non-market institution 
failure too (Rodrik, 2000b). 
Neoclassical economics, by allowing for the correction of some market failure, seems to 
provide the basis for quite a lot of intervention, as Stiglitz points out (World Bank, 1997). 
This includes infant industry argum ents, due, for example, to market failure as a result of 
firm-level lack of investments. However, infant industry arguments are usually seen as 
selective, and Krueger, (1990) argues that government failures can be much worse than 
market failure. 
Krueger (1990) notes that in the 1970s to early 1980s government failures were revealed in 
large-scale corruption in most developing countries. She points out that, firstly, failures of 
commission brought about inefficient and wasteful investment projects and government 
expenditure that led to high deficits amid inflation (Krueger, 1990). Secondly, failures of 
omission became apparent in the deterioration of transportation and communication facilities, 
maintenance of fixed nominal exchange rates and failure to maintain existing infrastructure. 
With regard to selective policies, industrial regulation employing policy tools such as tariffs 
or subsidies and import protection has been used to promote small firms , to prevent large 
firms from expanding, to prevent concentration or to preserve employment and force 
industries to specific locations (Lall , 1992). However, excessive industrial regulation and 
protection could also frustrate development of capabilities and create a less open economy. 
The nature of selective intervention could also facilitate rent seeking, lead to misuse of trade 
policy tools to benefit government enterprises, and lead to picking winners without merit in 
the absence of quality control. 
It could be argued, however, that the debate has moved beyond whether markets or 
governments fail. Both seem to be acknowledged by both sides. The question has become 
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more one of selecting appropriate policies that reflect the specific problems of any given 
environment (such as the problems associated with mineral-dependent growth - see Section 
2.6), and the distinction between functiona l and selective intervention tends to break down. It 
cannot be said a priori whether poor growth is due to general market failures (and other 
"functional" matters such as poor infrastructure) or whether markets are functioning but the 
economy needs to move to a higher more multi factor productivity growth-intensive path (as 
in Japan). Clearly, Nigeria is a good case to examine (see Chapters 3-5), because general 
market failures and a particular dynamic path (mineral dependence) have interacted. It is 
these kinds of questions that Dutch Disease and associated theories examined later in this 
chapter deal with (see Section 2.6). 
2.4.2 Non-market factors 
Various authors cite a number of sources of so-called non-market failure, which, they argue, 
have affected the growth and development path of African economies. Bloom and Sachs 
(1998), for example, refer to the constraint on agriculture and the effect on health of adverse 
climatic factors (the "curse of the tropics"). 
Transportation cost is another factor that is influenced by geographic location. In the 
presence of poor infrastructure high transport costs may impact significantly and deter export 
growth when countries are land-locked. Low population density, according to Collier and 
Gunning (I 999a), also tends to increase costs of transportation and poor market integration. 
Countries with low population density, especially in Africa, have also been linked to a much 
higher ethno-linguistic diversity that has been associated with civil wars. 
More prominently, Africa's fragmentation into small states during colonisation has been cited 
as important in the lack of success of development efforts (Collier and Gunning (I 999a). The 
resulting small domestic markets, in addition, are not attractive to investors due to the lack of 
scale economies. Kremer (1993) adds that small populations have also been associated with 
a low incidence of discoveries and technological innovation. 
Although such non-market factors can only contribute to a partial explanation of sub-Saharan 
Africa's current economic problems, they do provide an indication of the kinds of functional 
investment necessary for markets to work better. 
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2.5 New trade theories 
The evolution of new trade theory emanates from discrepaocies with the assumptions of the 
endowment theory of comparative advantage as well as the arguments brought up in Section 
2.4. The new trade theories attempt to explain the pattern of trade with a different emphasis, 
other than relative endowments, thereby refuting most of the neoclassical trade theory 
assumptions. This set of theories emerged in response to the so-called Leontief Paradox, as 
well as the limitations of the static framework of traditional trade theory, aod the inability of 
neoclassical theory to explain the importance of intra-industry trade. 
The well-known Leontief Paradox (Leontief, 1953) unveiled fai lings of H-O theory from 
empirical evidence about U.S. export data. Exports were shown to be of relatively labour-
intensive goods instead of capital-intensive goods as expected. Keesing's (1966) human skill 
theory attempted to explain this. He argued that differences in endowments and intensities of 
skilled and unskilled workers should rather be the emphasis. Hence, countries with relatively 
large endowments of skilled labour would have a comparative advantage in products that are 
relatively intensive in skilled labour. Therefore, with regard to the U.S. data of that time, 
U.S . labour-intensive goods could be explained by their skill content as skill-intensive goods. 
This argument, however, still appears to rest on an essentially static H-O framework, whereas 
more dynamic theoretical explanations began to emerge with the so-called technology 
theories of trade. Raymond Vernon's (1966) product life cycle theory attempted to shed light 
on the contradiction found in U.S. exports. Simply put, according to th is theory, 
technological innovation of manufactured goods could lead to an initial comparative 
advantage in a product. When a country first invents a product, in the early stage it therefore 
has a comparative advantage in that product. As the product matures it undergoes 
standardisation and with time other countries may acquire the technology to produce it 
themselves for export. The assumption that technology is constant and at all times identical 
for trading partners therefore falls away . In addition, the product cycle theory allows for 
economies of scale and international mobility of capital and managerial skill, and has clear 
relevance for both developed and developing countries. In contrast to the static H-O theory, 
such technology theories allow for the idea of dynamic comparative advantage, an approach 
that holds appeal in the light of empirical evidence (Appleyard and Field, 200 I: 161-164). 
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An important early alternative trade theory to shed light on the occurrence of trade in similar 
products between countries is the similarity of preference theory, which offers a demand side 
explanation of trade. According to Linder (1961), industries in countries produce goods 
preferred by the consumers of that country. However because some consumers would prefer 
slightly different alternative products, they would choose to consume the other country's 
goods. It follows also that countries with similar standards of living or per capita income will 
tend to consume similar types of goods. 
Although it has been argued that tastes do not differ greatly, at least among middle or high-
income countries (Appleyard and Field, 200 I: 165), the relevance of the Linder explanation of 
trade and its implications for trade policy in the sub-Saharan African context is not likely to 
be significant. 
There is more debate, however, about the relevance of the new trade theory based on 
economies of scale and imperfect competition for trade and industrial policy in the 
developing country context (Greenaway, 1991; Krugman, 1989; Alam, 1994). One major 
contradiction of neoclassical trade theory predictions is that the global direction of trade 
showed that the largest trade flows were seen to be between countries with simi lar production 
and similar endowments (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000: 82-83; Husted and Melvin, 2001: 
129-130; Subasat, 2003). 
Krugman and Obstfeld (2000) attempt to explain this phenomenon by pointing out that most 
markets can influence prices and therefore have monopolistic elements. This automatically 
contradicts the perfectly competiti ve market assumed in H-O theory. They further add that if 
free trade and liberalisation tend to expand markets, firms will experience economies of scale 
instead of the assumed constant returns to scale. The presence of economies of scale, 
together with the existence of product differentiation (due to consumers' " love of variety") 
allows for countries to specialise in different varieties of manufacturing products, which leads 
to intraindustry trade between countries. Such trade would not reflect traditional comparative 
advantage but rather how similar countries are. 
Since intraindustry trade is most prevalent among countries with high and similar per capita 
incomes and similar factor endowments, the question arises about the relevance of these 
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theories in the developing country context and their implications for trade and development 
policy. Greenaway (1991: 166-167) notes the existence of intraindustry trade in both North-
South and South-South trade, and its growing importance as industrialisation proceeds 
(Cattaneo, 1998: 115). The trade policy implications for developing countries are less clear, 
however. 
Krugman (1989) argues that the new trade theory may provide new arguments for 
government intervention (and perhaps trade protection) via the Hrent extraction" or "import· 
protection-as-export-promotion" arguments' . Whether most developing countries would be 
in a position to exploit these arguments is another matter'. By contrast, Alam (1989) and 
Greenaway (1991) argue that the new trade theories reinforce the argument for open trade 
policies, as they provide evidence of additional gains (associated with differentiated products 
and attainment of economies of scale), which were not obtainable in the traditional 
framework (Cattaneo, 1998: 139). 
2.6 The thcory of the Dutch disease 
Dutch di sease theory has an appeal in the sub-Saharan African context for it explains the 
structural dynamics in a resource rich country. The term Dutch disease refers to the adverse 
effects on Dutch production of natural gas di scoveries of the 1960s through appreciation of 
the Dutch real exchange rate (Corden, 1984: 358; Krugman, 1987: 49; Husted and Melvin, 
200 I: 292-293). The Dutch disease is the consequence of export booms that set up complex 
effects that actually retard other sectors of the economy. The peculiarity of thi s phenomenon 
is that, it unambiguously affects the manufacturing sector, as some studies (Stijns, 2003; 
Sachs and Warner, 1995) discussed in later chapters will show. According to Corden ( 1984), 
the Dutch disease can be argued also as referring to the use of the booming sector revenues 
for social services and industrialisation that are not sustainable and politically difficult to 
reduce. Lewis (1984) also draws attention to the issues of political economy or of public 
policy bias that mineral rich countries face . More recently, Lam and Wantchekon (2003) 
discuss what they term political Dutch disease as government's inflated allocative or 
distributive power due to resource rents. 
j The former refers to the use of tariffs, for example, to shift profits from a foreign oligopoiistic firm. The latter 
is an extension of the standard infant industry argument to a context of imperfect competition. 
6 They may be applicable to countries such as South Africa, Brazil or the second-tier NICs. but far less so to 
many poor sub-Saharan African countri es. 
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Carden's (1984) core model will be analysed below to explain the resource reallocation that 
occurs due to economic booms. The model is centred on two distinct effects of a boom: the 
spending effect and resource movement effect from the lagging sector (L) and the non-
tradeable sector (N) to the booming sector (B). 
In the model, sector B is an energy or mineral sector, while L is that which produces non-
boom exportables and importables. Even though manufacturing will be mentioned as 
referring to L, it is not restricted to only manufacturing industry but could also be a tradeable 
agricultural sector. On the other hand, the non-tradeable sector, interchangeably referred to 
as services in the discussion, is one whose domestic prices are not determined by world 
market prices but by domestic demand and supply conditions. The services industry and 
construction would fit this description as well as possibly some protected local 
manufacturing, import-substitution industries or subsidised imports sectors. 
The core model assumes a framework in a small open economy with two traded goods from 
two sectors, i.e. the booming sector and the lagging sector both facing world prices. A third 
good, from the non-tradeable sector is only affected by domestic prices. Output in each 
sector is produced by a factor specific to that sector and by labour L, which is mobile between 
the three sectors so as to equalise its wage employment in all sectors. All factors are 
internationally immobile. W is the wage and Rb is rent from the booming sector, while RI 
and Rn are rents from the lagging and the non-tradeable sectors respectively. 
The model ignores the monetary economy and works on a real economy where all goods are 
used for consumption only. It is set on the assumption of full employment therefore there are 
no distortions in commodity and factor markets. Trade is also balanced such that national 
output is always equal to expenditure. The terms of trade is also assumed to be given and 
only the real exchange rate, here defined as the relative price of non-tradeables to traded 
goods prices, is allowed to vary. 
Carden (1984: 360) postulates that a boom could come from three sources: (I) a once-far-all 
exogenous technological improvement in B; (2) a windfall discovery of new resources, such 
as an increase in the supply of the specific factor; (3) B produces only for export, and there 
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has been an exogenous price rise of its good on the world market relative to the price of 
imports. In the simple case described below, the core model is that of a boom due to an 
exogenous technological improvement in B. According to Cordon and Neary (1982) this 
could readily be applied to other sources of the boom, including the effects of terms of trade 
shocks in sub-Saharan Africa, the third case of an exogenous price increase of the good in B. 
However, whatever scenario is employed, the resource and the spending effects are 
distinguished (see Figure 2.5). 
The boom's impact on factor demand and the level of profitability in the manufacturing 
sector will also be focused on. 
2.6.1 Spending effect 
The core model considers the spending effect and the resource effect in isolation . Us ing 
Fig. 2.5, Pn on the vertical axis depicts the various prices of quantities of non-trade ables, N. 
Figure 2.5: The core model : spending and resource movement effects 
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The downward sloping D curve is the demand for N, which increases as Pn decreases, 
assuming non-tradeables is a normal good and expenditure is always equal to income. The S 
schedule denotes supply of N at different prices. The S curve is a derivative of the 
transformation curve between N and the two tradeables. 
To isolate the spending effect, the model assumes that the booming sector does not use any 
labour and therefore the boom has no effect on the demand for labour from the other sectors. 
This assumption allows for the focus to be exclusively on demand-side effects as between N 
and L. Thus, as income increases in the booming sector it is spent directly by factor owners 
or indirectly through tax collection and spent by government. If the income elasticity for N is 
positive, demand shifts from Do to Dl pushing up the price ofN relative to Band L that are 
g iven by world prices. The rise in the relative price of non-tradeables to tradeables (real 
appreciation) thus shifts demand away from N to Band L. However, real appreciation will 
subsequently draw resources (mobile labour) from L into N. Although the rise in price shifts 
demand (relatively) away from N, the overall effect raises the output ofN, i.e., at point c 
(Corden, 84:360). This effect is called indirect de- industrialisation. 
2.6.2 Resource effect 
Now to consider the resource effect separately, first the real exchange rate (price ofN relative 
to tradeables) is held constant, and then allowed to vary later. At a given wage rate, a boom 
in sector B raises profitability in the sector and causes a rise in marginal productivity of 
labour. As a result, this increases the demand for labour in B. Consequently, labour will 
move out of Land N into B causing a fall in employment in both sectors . This has two 
effects. Firstly, at a constant real exchange rate, the movement of labour out of L into B 
lowers output in L causing direct de-industrialisation. Secondly labour moves out ofN into B 
at a constant real exchange rate. This causes lower output ofN and thus an upward shift of 
So to Sf. The lower output in N creates an excess demand for N, the price of which must rise 
to restore equilibrium. Real appreciation therefore occurs in addition to the real appreciation 
caused by the spending effect. This further draws labour away from L into N causing more 
indirect de-industrialisation and supplements the direct de-industrialisation as a result of 
movement oflabour from L to B. 
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The final output ofN is lower than initially if the resource effect dominates and higher when 
the spending effect is dominant. What is unambiguous is that the output of L falls due to the 
effects of direct and indirect de-industrialisation on the L sector. 
2.6.3 Effects of a boom on factor incomes: effect on real wage and profitability 
Corden and Neary (1982: 831) explain the effects of the boom on the real wage through the 
demand for labour. When a boom occurs in B, the wage W in terms of traded goods due to 
the increase in the demand for labour must rise. When resource movem ent alone is 
considered, a fall in the output ofN will also raise the wage in terms ofN. Therefore, the real 
wage in terms of a consumption basket of both tradeables and non-tradeables must rise as a 
result of resource movement. 
There is however ambiguity in the effect of the boom on the real wage with the spending 
effect. The spending effect raises the output ofN, and hence the wage with respect to N must 
fall. Since the wage in terms of traded goods must rise due to real appreciation as a result of 
the spending effect, the real wage may rise or fall because of the spending effect. Corden and 
Neary (1982: 831) consider that when both the spending and resource movement effects are 
taken into account, the effect on the real wage is uncertain. A fall in the real wage is most 
likely when the spending effect is stronger and if the share of services (N) is relatively higher 
in wage earners) consumption. 
Since demand for labour is a function of the wage with respect to the price of that sector's 
output, the returns to the specific factor would thus be a measure of the impact of the boom 
on profitability of the sectors. Profitability in L must fall unambiguously, as a result of the 
boom. The spending effect brings about a rise in the profitability of N since the wage with 
respect to N falls. However, a fall in output of N as a result of the resource effect will raise 
the wage in terms ofN, leading to the sectors' decline in profitability. In the booming sector, 
the resource effect must raise profitability. The spending effect will however prevent the 
specific factor in the booming sector from benefiting due to the fixed world price of the 
sector's good. The resulti ng real appreciation due to the spending effect will nonetheless lead 
to a fall in the output of traded goods. 
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It is recognised that non-profitability and de-industrialisation in L relative to the other sectors 
may not necessarily take place if manufacturing is capital-intensive and therefore less 
susceptible to wage rises (Carden and Neary, 1982: 832). It is thus possible that capital is 
mobile between manufacturing or some capital-intensive industries in the traded sector, and 
services. Hence, manufacturing could draw resources from other non-profitable traded 
industries or from services in the longer tenn. In this case some of the non-boom tradeable 
industries' output in the lagging sector may expand, as will be explained in the next model, 
even though overall output contracts. 
In this model, the services (N) and manufacturing (L) sectors share a pool of capital but the 
energy sector has its specific factor. Labour L is assumed to be mobile between the three 
sectors. L and N behave like a miniature H-O economy, and the assumptions of the H-O 
theory apply. Figure 2.6 below demonstrates the resource movement between Land N. The 
left side depicts a relationship between the equilibrium wage rate and the price of services 
that is dependent only on the technology (factor intensities) between the two sectors. This is 
an upward sloping curve, which demonstrates the capital-intensity of manufacturing relative 
to services. Subsequent explanation of the model follows. 
To eliminate the spending effect a zero income elasticity of demand is assumed. At A, the 
initial wage rate is woo A boom in B draws labour from Land N due to the resource effect. 
Here, the Rybczynski effect applies when at constant prices the relatively capital-intensive 
manufacturing sector increases its output as a result of augmented capital usage. This is as a 
result of increased wages due to less labour being available. This gives rise to pro-
industrialisation. The output of the relatively labour-intensive services falls from OG to OG' 
and a drop in supply fromXs taX's . Wage rises to wi and the price of services rises at point 
F'. The spending effect however shifts the demand curve outward, raising the price of 
services and squeezing manufacturing output. 
Carden (1984) details another application that wi ll be of interest to the analysis of Nigeria in 
later chapters. It is a model often applied to oil booms where the booming sector does not 
participate in the domestic factor market and is thus an enclave. Stijns (2003) remarks that it 
is often pointed out regarding oil booms that one should expect resource movement effects to 
be shadowed by spending effects because of the "enclave economy" characteristics and high 
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capital intensity of oil exploitation activities. In this case, there will be no resource 
movement and its associated direct de-industrialisation, but only the spending effect due to 
the boom. The resource reallocation that takes place will be between non-tradeables and the 
lagging sector in terms of real appreciation. Nonetheless, whatever variation of the model is 
used, real exchange rate appreciation is thought to be the principal mechanism of operation of 
the Dutch disease (Stijns, 2003). 
Figure 2.6: Core model with a mini H-O economy 
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2.6.4 Unemployment, the balance of trade and the exchange rate constraint 
The core model gives room for a more realistic situation by recognising that the assumption 
of full employment, which is shown by labour reallocation between sectors, could be 
replaced in real ity by unemployment. This is useful to apply to the context of LDCs, which 
in reality have surpl us labour. In this case therefore, the real wage could be sticky 
downwards in the profitable N sector, causing unemployment. Labour in L may also demand 
higher wages as in the booming sector, further exacerbating unemployment (Corden, 1984). 
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A fall in real wages would bring about adjustments but any wage resistance in addition to 
ris ing prices in N generates more unemployment. 
Where balanced trade is ruled out, generally an energy price boom brings about a trade 
surplus and an influx of foreign currency. To the extent that the foreign exchange rate is 
constant or falls, the inflationary effect due to increased income and spending creates an 
adverse effect on the domestic currency (Lewis, 1984: 163). Currency appreciation will hence 
aggravate the increased spending. According to Stijns (2003 :7), mineral states have been 
documented to spend their mineral revenues lavishly on numerous development projects and 
programmes. Hence, the marginal propensity to spend on non-tradeables is high. Also, since 
the price of imported tradeables is given, imports become relatively cheaper with the 
resulting real appreciation. As a result, import-competing manufacturing industries are 
squeezed out further. Tradeable manufactures that could have been exported become 
uncompetitive as a result of the domestic inflation. 
To the extent that some industries in L may be cap ital-intensive as in the miniature-
Heckscher-Ohlin model above, output in such industries could increase due to the labour 
drawn out of these industries, causing pro-industrialisation . Increased demand for capital-
imports in L may be met as a result of currency appreciation. [n addition to the demand 
pressures on imports due to the spending effect, pro-industrialisation will however be limited 
due to a foreign exchange constraint. This is brought about when export revenues are quickly 
spent. 
Roemer (1985) has pointed out also that in developing countries the characteristics of the 
lagging sector or the non-tradeable sector are fuzzy. The lagging sector includes export 
agriculture and food production, both of wh ich can be labour-intensive, and import 
substituting manufacturing that may be cap ital- intensive. Non-tradeables may include 
capital-intensive utilities and transport services, along with petty trading which are the most 
labour-intensive, as well as household and personal services. Identifying the sectors may not 
be so clear. Furthennore, many LDCs have protected their manufacturing industries and also 
some basic food, through tariffs and quotas such that importable goods have become non-
tradeables. Thus the long-term impact of the Dutch disease cannot be generalised. 
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Nonetheless, these cases have been taken into consideration in the varied core models, 
making it appealing to the context of resource rich developing economies. 
2.6.5 Implications ofthe Dutch disease and political Dutch disease 
The Dutch disease has implications for economic development, particularly in resource rich 
countries. As Sachs and Wamer (1995) put it, if it is supposed that manufacturing has such 
attributes as positive externalities from learning-by-doing and backward and forward linkages 
to the economy (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000), then one could say that the shrinkage of this 
sector would be a cause of futile diversification efforts in resource dependent countries. The 
wage rate increase becomes a significant issue in the employment of labour, particularly in 
labour-intensive sectors since the energy/mineral sector is capital-intensive. 
According to Corden (1984), since a large part of the rent in the booming sector goes to the 
government through taxes, the magnitude and direction of government spending becomes 
important. He adds that the adverse effect of the Dutch disease on economic growth raises 
arguments for government intervention. Firstly based on the infant industry argument, if the 
Lagging sector experiences decumulation of human and physical capital during the boom due 
to negative externalities, lack of information or imperfections in the capital market, the 
government could step in and protect it. The second reason for government intervention is to 
prevent rent and income losses in the lagging sector, the booming sector may be taxed and 
the revenue used to subsidise losing factors in the former. The third is the employment 
argument, whereby real wage resistance in the lagging sector may be handled better by 
subsidising employment directly. Corden (1984: 375) stresses that if it is desired to protect 
the lagging sector, the first-best method is to subsidise the output of that sector directly, 
perhaps financing the subsidy from taxes levied on the specific factor of the booming sector. 
Against this he argues that two popular protectionist approaches are inferior. One is 
exchange rate protection, the result of which could bring in excess accumulation of foreign 
capital. The other is to increase ordinary protection by raising tariffs or tightening import 
quotas to avoid loss to import competing industries. 
Lewis (1984: 166) states that there are social and political aspects of the Dutch disease. An 
example would be wage followership that exerts pressure on the government when labour in 
other sectors demands wages as determined in the booming sector. It makes matters worse 
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when the government and unions in the home country use wages in the booming sector as a 
standard (Roemer, 1985: 244). This may lead to an entrenched high-wage labour aristocracy 
and growing underemployment among those not able to find jobs in the modern sector. 
Wage fol lowership could also change financial incentives such as private and public 
incentives to accumulate human capital in education and training due to wages being 
artificially high (Lewis, 1984). 
Furthermore, according to Lam and Wantchekon (2003), influx of foreign currency from the 
booming sector and the subsequent appreciation of the domestic currency could adversely 
affect public decisions. They argue that political Dutch disease could consolidate the elite's 
allocative power or distributive influence. Gylfason (2001) agrees that rent-seeking 
activities, the struggle for huge resource rents, may lead to a concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of elites. He adds, with stunted or weakened democracy and 
slow growth, once in power, the government may use the rent to placate its political 
supporters and thus secure its hold on power. According to Gylfason (2001), for example, 
tariff protection or other favours to producers at public expense creates competition for such 
favours among the rent seekers. Thus, the use of state enterprises in the extractive sectors 
appears to pose particular problems for the transparency of natural resource revenues 
(Swanson, Oldgard, and Lunde, 2003: 55). 
Also, there is often pressure for large government development projects with huge capital and 
skill often requiring expatriate labour that most likely go unchecked as a result of limited 
capacity of government. Therefore, this makes a case against the selective interventionist 
approach due to the power of the government influencing policy decisions that are often sub-
optimal (Lall, 1992). 
Coupled with imperfect or missing markets, lax competition policy and weak legal 
institutions, one can imagine how social capital could be affected by rent-seeking activities 
with huge resource rents. Corruption in businesses and in government eventually could erode 
business ethics and societal trust in the home country and may lead to elevated perception of 
risk by private investors in the whole region. 
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It is also believed (Bannon and Collier, 5: 2003; Ross, 2003: 32) that some civil wars are to 
be blamed on resource richness. Ross (2003: 32) argues that an opposition party or a rebel 
group may offer resource wealth as 'booty futures' to private investors to aid them topple a 
current government. War itself would thus debilitate any social capital and the capacity to 
accumulate human capital in education and health care due to the associated poverty. 
The Dutch disease concept thus covers endogenous aspects of development and explains the 
economic structural changes that occur due to resource wealth. Laissez-faire policies of free 
trade, which are believed to allow a country's 'natural allocation' of endowed resources to 
lead to efficient production and hence export of the good, may not work for those countries 
with a comparative advantage in primary resources. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Given the positive correlation between trade, especially in manufacturing exports, and 
development, this chapter laid the theoretical trade foundation of the thesis. 
A review of the neoclassical H-O theory pointed out that although its basic assumptions are 
farfetched, its welfare and growth implication for countries that trade according to their 
comparative advantage have useful considerations with regard to commodity dependent 
countries. 
The Wood and Mayer ( 1998, 1999) model however, extends the H·O application to argue 
that SSA is at a disadvantage for manufacturing diversification due to the region's low skill 
per worker. Increasing ski ll may give the region comparative advantage in processed primary 
exports, however, due to its high land per worker ratio its comparative advantage lies in 
mainly unprocessed primary exports. 
The reasons for poor economic performance were presented for both endogenous growth 
theory and neoclassical approaches to development. The former argues for government 
selective intervention where the role of technology is significant in growth based on the 
market failure argument. The neoclassical approach, despite likely government failure, 
favours incentives for better functioning of the market, i.e., institutional, legal, and social 
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incentives. Both are vali d, however, the issue is rather how efficient policies are geared to 
the specific economic environment. 
The new trade theories also offer insights on how countries could benefit from dynamic 
comparative advantage by acquiring technology of mature and standardised products from 
other countries. There are however, limitations of imperfect competition, economies of scale, 
international mobility of capital, and managerial skills in the context of developing countries. 
Still, with regard to imperfect competition, government could intervene to extract rents from 
oligopolistic firms and to protect infant industries. 
The Dutch disease hypothesis, on the other hand, states that among other causes, an energy or 
mineral resources rich country could experience adverse effects on other sectors of the 
economy when the price of energy/mineral resources rises (applicable to other natural and 
primary resources). This occurs through a spendi ng and resource effect that will lower the 
output of the manufacturing and or the agriculture sector(s). 
There also tends to be political Dutch disease in such countries where governments have 
allocative power and access to resource wealth. This latter situation is worsened as social 
unrest and military coups destabilise the economy further. 
All the theories reviewed have useful implications. However, while for instance, the Wood-
Mayer (I998) model, based on H-O theory, stops at explaining comparative advantage in 
skill, land and labour it does not explain how the quality of land can affect skill acquisition 
required for economic development. The Core model, despite its use of some neoclassical 
assumptions for the simple case, is nevertheless flexible in explaining real situations 
compatible to the developing countries that are resource rich. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DEVELOPMENT PATH OF RESOURCE RICH COUNTRIES IN 
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF SOME 
OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction 
Studies by Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999), Wood and Berge (1997), and Wood and Owen 
(1997) have explained the high share of SSA's primary resources in its exports as reflected in 
the region's comparative advantage. SSA's trade pattern is attributed mainly to exports of 
unprocessed primary goods and skill-intensive imports. This conforms to traditional 
neoclassical theory of comparative advantage. It is thus believed that for most of the last four 
decades most of the countri es in SSA have depended solely on their natural resources 
(Collier, 2002). 
Thus, given the natural endowment of primary resources, this also implies that SSA's 
development path is inherent. However, resource richness, as pointed out in the previous 
chapter, is more often than not fraught with structural and socio-political problems of the 
Dutch disease phenomenon (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; Lewis, 1984; Sachs and 
Warner, 1995; Askari and Jaber, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Lam and Wantchekon, 
2003). Should SSA therefore follow her development path and rely on resource-based 
industrialisation? 
By reviewing existing empirical work, this chapter will attempt to address the importance of 
endowment in the development paths of the countries under study based on both the W-M 
(1998, 1999) country classification and Leamer et.al.'s (1999) definition of endowments. This 
chapter argues that the measure of land per worker used in classifying Nigeria as a labour 
abundant country is contradicted by Nigeria's pattern of development. This contradiction will 
also be highlighted in the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand in Section 3.4 . The 
issues of wages, skill or human capital accumulation and economic linkages to the economy 
and infrastructure brought up in Section 3.2 will make connections to the discussion in 
Section 2.6 on some of the Dutch disease effects of natural resources. The type of 
development path could also be said to serve as a diagnosis of natural resource effects on the 
demand for skill influencing the emergence of manufacturing. 
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Brief development experiences of South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius and Cote d'ivoire will be 
compared with those of international examples from the second-tier South East Asian newly 
industrialising countries (SEANICs) and Latin America (LA). This is in order to highlight the 
peculiar development paths of the countries with reference to their endowments, as well as 
the implications of their successes and failures. 
3.2 Differences in development paths of countries 
With this said, Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez and Schott (1999), applying H-O theory, use three 
production factors or endowments, i.e., land, labour, and capital to explain the expected 
development outcomes of countries. In contrast to Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999), they 
differentiate the qualities of these endowments. For instance, land is distinguished into 
cropland, or as having metal and fuel resources. Capital is also differentiated into human and 
physical capital. 
The difference in classification ofa country compared to the Wood and Mayer (1998,1999) 
model is apparent when the quality of endowment is considered. For instance, as Section 
3.3.1 will argue, Nigeria has an atypical economic development path when considered as 
labour abundant according to Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999). This is because they used land 
area as a measure of natural resources . When natural resource abundance is considered, in 
this case oil, Nigeria may be better classified as natural resource rich as her development path 
suggests (see Section 2.3.3 and 2.6). Also, Section 3.4 will show tbat the availability of arable 
land and natural resources in the SEANICs places Malaysia and Indonesia as land abundant 
and Thailand as moderately land abundant (Leamer et. ai, 1999: 32). In the case of the 
SEANICs, there is ambiguity in their development paths, since both capital-intensive primary 
resource processing and labour-intensive manufactures have emerged. Therefore, the 
argument that natural resources slow the emergence of manufactures due to low skills 
demand becomes questionable when looking at the SEANICs' development pattern. 
Leamer et al. (1999: 19-21) argue that the development path of a labour abundant country 
with very little natural resources starts off with peasant farm ing, wood-working and 
handicraft. With increased capital accumulation a labour abundant country will experience a 
shift of labour from the handicraft and woodworking sectors into manufacturing. Handicraft 
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and wood working is moved to a more formal setting, i.e., to factories for apparel production 
in the case of handicraft. The absorption of labour when more is needed comes only lastly 
from farms, where land is eventually consolidated for capital-intensive permanent crop 
farming. Deeper capital accumulation is manifested in augmented capital-intensive 
manufacturing such as the machinery and chemicals sectors, and capital-intensive extraction 
of any meagre natural resources. Leamer et a1. (1999: 20) state that this process is 
accompanied by an elevated need for a more educated workforce. Coupled with the decline 
in the rate of return to capital, wages for "raw labour" (unskilled labour) will gradually 
increase in a labour abundant country with increased capital-intensive production. Human 
capital development is fostered earlier in this type of economy. 
On the other hand, a land abundant resource rich country begins with abundant under-
cultivated land with peasant agriculture and unsophisticated "harvesting" of natural 
resources. Capital accumulation shifts the country towards more capital-intensive extraction 
of its abundant resources. Capital accumulation also has the effect of moving farmers out of 
peasant agriculture, which is labour-intensive and leads to the consolidation of lands into 
farms for crops such as grains, fruits and vegetables. In contrast to labour abundant 
countries, the consolidation of farms and mechanisation comes with declining wages for "raw 
labour". It is thus capital and unskilled labour that generates wealth in the initial stage of 
capital accumulation (Leamer et. al 1999: 20). Although resource abundance supports high 
wages, capital accumulation is designed to economise on tbe labour input in certain sectors 
such as the low skilled agricultural sector (Leamer et. aI., 1999: 20). This is to maintain low 
wages to compete with labour abundant countries with meagre primary resources that are 
already in the market for those agricultural products. Intuitively, human capital accumulation 
in this sector degenerates. A land abundant country therefore, will have a low education 
incentive and thus, low demand for skilled labour associated with the initial stage of 
development. Further accumulation of capital in a land abundant country is accompanied by 
more capital-intensive processing of natural resources, e.g. pulp and paper manufacturing, 
and agri-business. In the final stage, when capital accumulation has been substantial, 
development for this particular economy should move it into the production of very capital-
intensive machinery manufacturing and chemicals. 
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The crux of this difference between the two development paths, according to Leamer et. al 
(1999) is that a labour abundant country has a development path that gradually raises the skill 
requirement and the emergence of manufacturing. On the other hand, a land abundant-
resource rich country is short of the skilled labour it requires for the later stage when capital 
accumulation is substantial for the production of machinery and chemicals. This suggests that 
manufacturing will develop much later in land abundant, resource rich countries. 
Skill , unlike land and natural resources, is therefore not an endowment that just happens to 
be. The mix of resources (land, labour and capital) of a country suggests a peculiar 
development path and to some extent explains the demand for skill. This in turn determines 
human capital accumulation. Therefore, to say that SSA cannot compete in manufacturing 
exports because the region is relatively natural resource abundant with relatively low skill per 
land, dismisses the diagnosis of why skill is scarce in SSA, the economies of which differ in 
endowment mix. This has implications for selective policy. 
3.3 Empirical classification: South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Mauritius 
How then do endowments fit with the notion of development paths of the countries under 
study? As noted in Chapter One, Wood and Mayer's (1998: 26-40) findings place South 
Africa and Cote d'Ivoire as having abundant land due to their land per worker ratios being 
higher than 4 sq. km per 100 workers. In this category only South Africa is relatively 
endowed with the skill to land ratio (within 50 person-years of schooling per square 
kilometre, YS/sq.km) expected for higher shares of manufactured and processed primary 
products in total exports. Based on 1990 data, Wood and Mayer (1989,1999) found that the 
manufacturing export share was over 60% in South Africa. Actual manufacturing export 
share was just 3.7% points less than predicted for South Africa observed from the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) data. Thus, South Africa is a "good performer" in 
manufacturing exports. In addition, an over performance in processed primary exports, i.e., 
actual exports exceeding the predicted exports, was found for the same country. In contrast, 
Cote d'Ivoire's share of manufacturing exports in total exports was found to be lower than 
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between endowment and type of exports 
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20% at 15 points less than expected. In addition, the actual share of processed primary 
products in total primary exports were 13 points higher than expected. 
Mauritius is classified as being a land scarce country according to the criterion of less than 4 
sq. km per 100 workers. With relatively the highest skill/land endowment in Africa of2000 
YS/sq.km comparable to that of the NICs, Mauritius according to the 1990 W-M (1989, 
1999) data had a relatively high proportion of manufacturing in its total exports also greater 
than 60% (Wood and Mayer, 1998: 37). Nigeria is also a land scarce, labour abundant 
country according to Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999). However, its actual share of 
manufactures is under 5%. Despite a skill per land ratio within 50 YS/sq.km similar to South 
Africa's, manufacturing exports share in Nigeria is 28% points lower than predicted and its 
share of processed primary exports was 9% points lower than predicted (Table 8, Wood and 
Mayer, 1998: 31). 
Figure 3.1 above integrates, in summary, the notion of endowment and skills demand. It 
argues that endowments influence the development path of a country. Furthermore, one can 
add that if the argument for the characteristics of manufacturing goods mentioned in Chapter 
One stands true, then the relatively early development of manufacturing exports, i.e., apparel 
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and footwear in labour abundant countries, will develop linkages associated to manufacturing 
in the economy relatively quicker. In contrast, land abundant, resource rich countries 
establish their processed natural resources as exports and the type of linkages to the rest of 
the economy may be different and not associated to labour-intensive manufacturing like that 
of the labour abundant countries. 
To reiterate from Chapter One, the backward and forward linkages of manufacturing, due to 
external economies of scale, have the advantage of developing other sectors of the economy, 
particularly infrastructure. Consequently, labour abundant economies can be expected to 
develop these attributes quicker as they move into manufacturing production earlier. 
Nevertheless, in resource rich countries, both agricultural and mining sectors could also 
impact on backward and forward linkages. For example, agricultural exports can link 
backward to fertiliser, farm implements and fuel suppliers; food processing, textiles, leather 
goods and certain chemicals form forward linkages (Roemer, 1985: 245-6). In mineral and oil 
exporting economies, given that more capital-intensive processing emerges earlier in their 
development (Leamer et aI., 1999), it is thus expected that steel, electricity, and high 
technology and machinery sectors needed to develop the source sectors will form backward 
linkages (Askari and Jaber, 1999). Smelting, mineral processing and oil refining link forward 
(Askari and Jaber, 1999) as will be shown later in the case of South Africa (see Section 
3.3.1). However, due to the low demand for skill and hence, its accumulation, the 
establishment of these linkages in mineral and oil rich countries could be challenged as a 
result of the low level of human capital, the accumulation of which has been delayed at the 
first stage of capital accumulation. This latter problem is more apparent in the case of 
Nigeria and Cote d 'lvoire, as data in Chapter Four will point out. 
3.3.1. Development path ofland abundant countries 
This section will give a sketch of the development experiences of Cote d'Ivoire, South 
Africa, Nigeria and Mauritius. This will serve as a comparison in line with the Leamer et al. 
(1999) development path hypothesis. The section will also argue that even though Nigeria's 
land per worker is small, her development path is that of a land abundant country tied to 
natural resource abundance. 
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In Rapley's (1993: 13) account of Cote d'Ivoire: 
The role assigned to Cote d'Ivoire in the colonial economy (of French West Africa) gave it an 
edge over other sub-Saharan African countries. It was an exporter of cash crops to France and 
thus by this virtue, infrastructure investment tended to be near the coastal regions. 
The suitable soil and coastal climate conditions for plantation agriculture made Cote d'Ivoire 
the choice for French settler planters. These settlers were deemed to have influenced the 
mode of production, introducing capitalist farming (Rapley, 1993: 23-29). 
The old class system based on chiefdom and reciprocal obligation was replaced by the French 
administration with that of employment and remuneration. Some of those employed on farms 
left to obtain their own farms adopting the new farming technology and improving upon it. 
An Ivorian planter bourgeoisie that was to exploit Cote d'Ivoire 's comparative advantage was 
formed in this way. Commodity export revenues to the Cote d 'Ivoire government gave 
special consideration to bourgeoisie interests by introducing policies to protect the latter's 
emerging agro-industries. 
In South Africa, Western capitalism, as recounted by Kenny (1997), started off with the 
Dutch East India Company ousting the Portuguese as the dominant power in the Cape. It was 
not for the mineral wealth, that was unknown at the time, but rather because the Cape was a 
settlement station for their ships. 
Before the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa, the economy was dependant on 
wool exports and arable production for the limited market at the Cape (Kenny, 1997). 
According to Kenny (1997), gold mining then dominated the South African economy 
between 1886 and 1914 and henceforth was to change the country's structure into a typical 
modern economy. He argued that capital growth rose in relation to the labour force, and 
services and manufacturing output increased. 
A pool of labour was readily available to prospective capitalists in Cote d'Ivoire (Rapley, 
1993: 30-33). Cote d'Ivoire cocoa plantations and the government's migration policies tied to 
land ownership attracted migrant workers from neighbouring countries in the north to work in 
the southern region where the cocoa farms are located (Bax, 2004; Crook, 2002). In South 
Africa by contrast, labour was forced through laws such as the poll tax that put pressure on 
African farmers to provide mines with cheap labour (Kenny, 1997). In addition, white 
44 
farmers fearing competition from enterprising black farmers pressured politicians to put in 
place laws that would protect them at the expense of the latter. This highlights the difference 
in labour relations between Cote d'Ivoire, an agricultural economy, and South Africa, which 
was a mineral rich economy. 
The autocracy of the apartheid governments over time in South Africa allotted the privilege 
of land to the Europeans and used policies, even after the gold discovery, to favour 
themselves at the expense of Africans (Schneider, 2000). Influx control and residential 
segregation and other legislation restricting the mobility of blacks (Fryer and 
Vencatachellum, 2002) can be described as the concentration of economic and political 
power and distributive influence in the hands of the government (Lam and Wantchekon, 
2003; Gylfason, 2001). This may be thought of as a manifestation of political Dutch disease, 
previously discussed in Section 2.6.5, associated with mineral wealth. Many inequalities 
arose in the form of restrictions on black labour that limited mobility, training, education and 
the size of the domestic market. It has been argued that land abundant countries would tend 
toward maintaining low wages and thus will have a low incentive to educate unskilled labour 
(see Section 3.1). 
Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa thus started off with subsistence agriculture, with the latter 
turning to mining eventually and the former diversifying into cash crop and agri-business. In 
Cote d'Ivoire, French settlers introduced mechanised farming and cash crops for exports to 
France. The accumulation of capital moved the economy to agro-industry specialisation. In 
South Africa, however, labour was moved from subsistence farming to the mines. Clearly 
mining development was favoured over agriculture. This process seems to accord with 
Leamer et aI's (1999) first phase of development for land abundant countries with cropland 
and mineral resources. 
As regards how linkages in the economy develop according to the types of endowments (see 
Section 3.2 above), the development of infrastructure by the state of Cote d'Ivoire over the 
two decades after independence sought to connect the production of crops in the north to 
factories and to the coast in the south. A good transport system thus also aided in moving 
labour that came mostly from the north to the south. In the mineral economy of South Africa, 
however, railways served to connect white agricultural areas to the ports and urban markets. 
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According to Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 109), later, state investment extended to providing 
fuel pipelines and telecommunication facilities to the mining core sector. 
In addition, various agencies can be thought of as having promoted linkages in the economy 
of Cote d'lvoire. Agencies such as Fonds de Garantie des Credite Accordes aux Entreprises 
lvoiriennes (FGCEI) served the purpose of assisting and diversifying capital investment in 
agriculture. Office de Promotion de l'Entreprise lvoirienne (OPEl) or the Office for lvorian 
Enterprise Promotion consulted with entrepreneurs and also linked foreign capitalists with 
domestic businesses. Cote d'lvoire, with its endowment of cropland, does not seem to show 
an atypical development path of a land abundant country. Capital accumulation has moved it 
to capital-intensive agri-business as further empirical analysis on production and exports will 
show in Chapter Four. 
The advent of mining made the South African state, in the words of Kenny (1997), passively 
respond to the rent-seeking behaviour of pressure groups with the most political muscle. Fine 
and Rustomjee (1996: 91-98, 168) suggest that industrial policies of South Africa stemmed 
from mining and subsequent industries resulted with peculiar corporate structures that they 
termed the mineral-energy-complex, MEC. According to them, established government 
corporations such as Eskom expanded electricity generation; ISCOR produced steel and 
Sasol I and II enhanced the MEC's demand for liquid fuel (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). 
They add that from these, private corporations were linked to form the various industries of 
the MEC with a dominant tariff protection and conglomerate ownership that extends to the 
manufacturing and financial sector (Fine and Rustomjee, 96:1996). South Africa, therefore, 
appears to have readily established forward linkages connected to mining. 
Despite the social and economic inequality in South Africa, Moll (1991) considers that: 
South Africa after 1945 had a tense but stable political system, an advanced socia-economic 
environment for capitalist development with access to skilled immigrants and foreign markets. 
A large supply of low-wage African labour was also available for low skill work. The trade, transport 
and communication systems were among the best in the Developing World. In terms of physical 
resources, the mining sector earned foreign exchange. South Africa also had cheap coal for power and 
enough good land for sufficient food and export agricultural products. 
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With regard to manufacturing, Schneider (2000) states that the pursuit of local manufacturing 
stemmed from the Pact government in 1924. The hostility of various groups to mining 
interests, and the need to commit to local economic development pushed manufacturing via 
import substitution industrialisation (lSI) in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, South Africa's development is argued to have by-passed labour utilising sectors 
and is currently capital-intensive in production (Moll, 1991; Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). If 
that is the case then this would conform to Leamer et al. 's, (1999) model of development. To 
investigate this further, sectoral MV A and capital investment will be analysed in Chapter 
Four and Five. 
In Nigeria, however, prior to independence private capital was small scale, mainly in 
commerce, residential property and finance, with very little local agricultural or landed 
wealth (Forest, 1993). Small farmers provided for the rural economy and brought in most of 
the export earnings. Farming production was on a small scale, dependent on family labour, 
kin and clients. In contrast to Cote d'Ivoire's indigenous capitalist development Forest 
(1993 :26) cites that: 
Capitalist agriculture was restricted by the colonial power via political alliance with traditional 
authorities by way of taxation, the mobilisation of labour for public works and the acquisition of land 
for government and commercial purposes. Indigenous capital expanded in export trade but there was 
very little industrialisation due to the colonial banking monopoly, which only advanced credit to 
foreign enterprise. 
Agricultural exports in the 1950s formed the main source of Nigeria's revenue and provided 
the dynamics for growth in the economy. Petroleum exploitation started in 1908 when a 
German company, Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, drilled fourteen wells in Lagos (Faiola, 
1987). It was not until the 1960s that serious exploration was undertaken by Shell, Mobil 
Exploration Nigeria Incorporated, Tennessee Nigeria Incorporated, Gulf, and Eastern and 
Standard Oil of New Jersey (Olayiwola, 1987:79). 
The pattern of development from agriculture to oil exploitation points to the development of 
Nigeria's comparative advantage in natural resources. Nigeria from all indications should be 
expected to be classified as a land abundant (resource rich) country and not as labour 
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abundant as Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) have categorised it. Nigeria is a land abundant 
country, given the development pattern of natural resource exploitation. The second phase of 
capital accumulation, according to the development path hypothesis, is expected to move 
Nigeria towards mechanised farming and increased capital-intensive oil extraction. 
Theoretically, agricultural land would be consolidated for permanent crop farming (which is 
mechanised) and further accumulation of capital would lead to greater capital-intensive 
processing of natural resources. 
What resulted in Nigeria however, is indicative of the social and political aspects of the 
Dutch disease dealt with in Chapter Two. An unequal interdependence promoted by the trade 
pattern in Nigeria during the colonial period persisted (lkein, 1990:63; FaIola, 1987:124). 
For instance, Forest (1993:21) writes that before 1960 the western region was the richest by 
virtue of cocoa production, early access to western education, the location of industrial 
development and the presence of the capital and major port Lagos. The western region also 
had the most revenue allocated since it had the most agricultural activity, taking over 30% 
statutory revenues in 1954/55. 
As a result of the political divide in terms of ethnic groups and a centralised government, 
patronage arose amongst the Nigerian bourgeois to seek wealth and protect their ethnic 
groups. Forest (1993:21) postulates that this was to shape the socially conditioned values with 
a major influence on political behaviour. Forest (1993) also describes the impact of the 
government's position on capital accumulation: 
The educated elite sought after careers in the civil service, which were means of getting access 
to funds and contracts. Here, capital accumulation was facilitated; Energy was focused on 
obtaining control and patronage and much of the capital gained was not put into productive 
enterprise. A close relationship was created between business, elite and the government. This 
was the major determinant that affected the general character and public policy of Nigeria 
(Forest, 1993: 21). 
Industries that had been created in the 1960s in Nigeria under (lSI) were the cigarette 
factories, breweries, textile mills, plywood factory and cotton gins, as well as heavy 
industries in coal mining and cement works (Toyin, 1987: 121). It is worth noting that the first 
industries established seem to be of relative capital-intensity. This is in contrast to the 
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development of labour-intensive sectors such as apparel and footwear expected for labour 
abundant countries if Wood and Mayer's (1998, 1999) categorisation of Nigeria is applied. 
However, Nigeria's development path seems more in accordance with Leamer et al.'s (1999) 
model. Therefore, Nigeria appears to behave as a land (resource) abundant country. 
With regard to infrastructure linkages, Olayiwola (1987:97) argues that sectoral investment in 
transport, communications and electricity only improved part of the economy by subsidising 
the income of urban dwellers. Thus, according to Olayiwola (1987:97), income distribution 
came from rural dwellers to urban dwellers to complement private foreign investment 
particularly in IS industries. This point to similarities with South Africa's unequal 
development of transportation that connected white agricultural areas to ports and markets, 
and fuel pipelines and telecommunication facilities to the mining core sector. 
Nigeria's development path thus differs from that of a country with relatively low land per 
worker ratio, a labour abundant country in other words, because of her exceptional oil 
resources. From agriculture as the mainstay, Nigeria turned to oil exploitation as the main 
source of government revenue contributing over 90% of earnings (World Bank 2002). The 
unsustained domestic industries may be indicative of structural problems of Dutch disease 
with adverse effects on manufacturing. Chapter Four will seek to analyse the production 
pattern linked to other macroeconomic and microeconomic factors that deal with this aspect 
of Nigeria's economy. 
3.3.2 Development path of a labour abundant country 
Mauritius, like Nigeria with cocoa, started as a mono-crop, agrarian economy. It relied 
entirely on sugar cane and its by-products, accounting for 98% of total exports in the 1960s 
(YeungLamKo, 1998). The fact that the sugar plantations were predominantly owned by 
locals is believed to have created a network of local supportive activities and local 
entrepreneurial talent (Lamusse, 1997). Unlike South Africa, Nigeria and Cote d'[voire, it 
seems that local entrepreneurial activity was separate from the ruling government. 
According to YeungLamKo (1998), in the 1960s the bleak unemployment rate, the rapid 
population increase and economic decline prompted the colonial government to diversify the 
economy despite a shortage of management and technical skills and capital for investment 
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purposes. Hence, the government of Mauritius chose lSI that encouraged the establishment of 
import substitution enterprises (ISEs) in edible oil refining and chemical fertiliser firms. lSI, 
however, did not solve the problems, unemployment rose even more, to 20% (YeungLamKo, 
1998). It is no surprise to see that for a labour abundant country with few primary resources 
this type of development goes against what is predicted in Leamer et al.'s (1999) hypothesis, 
since it does not utilise its abundant factor. YeungLamKo (1998) states that the new 
government after independence had noted examples of successful export industries in Puerto 
Rico and Taiwan, which eventually led to the implementation of export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI) strategies. Export-oriented enterprises (EOEs) were founded in 
knitwear, clothes, tuna canning and jewellery manufacturing. Knitwear and clothing 
(apparels) conform to the labour-intensive manufacturing that is expected to emerge first in a 
labour abundant country like Mauritius. The ISEs took advantage of the local market, 
profiting from the available cheap labour and the privileged access of Mauritius into the then 
European Community (EC) market. 
Lamusse (1997) distinguishes the export pattern of ISEs as that which targets small markets 
of neighbouring countries. These markets are specialised and are likely not to be attractive to 
large producers. However, while ISEs targeted specialised markets, EOEs aimed at large 
markets such as Europe and Japan. The use of marketing affiliates is also employed by EOEs 
to infiltrate their markets. The role of the export processing zones (EPZs) in Mauritius will 
be dealt with in this regard, later in Chapter Four. 
Currently, labour shortage in Mauritius is expected to shift firms to more capital-intensive 
production, where examples of such shifts are occurring in the paint and knitwear firms 
(Lamusse, 1997). Furthermore, absorption of labour is now being met with upgrading of 
skills and technology particularly in the paint and knitwear-manufacturing firms. This 
evidence supports the argument that there will be gradual skilled labour demand in the 
manufacturing sector in labour abundant countries as capital-intensity increases in 
production. 
Mauritius shows a development path that conforms to that of a labour abundant country. It 
started from a mono-crop economy and eventually moved to labour-intensive manufacturing 
in apparel production after capital-intensive lSI failed to lower unemployment. Currently, 
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labour has been absorbed into manufacturing and scarcity of labour is moving the country 
toward capital-intensive production and upgrading of labour skill to meet technological 
advancement in production (Lamusse, 1997). 
3,4 International empirical examples: the SEANICs and Latin Ameriea 
The difference in the definition of endowments compared to the W -M (I998, 1999) model 
will also extend to the SEANICs. The discrepancy in the definition of land per worker 
endowment as applied to Nigeria in earlier Section 3.2 also arises here. Jomo and Rock's 
(1998) analysis considered below outlines the industrial development of the South East Asian 
newly industrialising countries (SEANICs), i.e. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Like 
Mauritius, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia have relatively low land to worker ratios 
according to Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999). However, unlike Mauritius with sugar as the 
major primary (agricultural) product, these economies have relatively more primary 
resources, thereby placing them as land abundant in the case of Malaysia, or moderately land 
abundant in the case of Indonesia and Thailand (Leamer et. ai, 1999: 32). A combination of 
high skill per worker also enables Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia to process most of their 
primary resources for exports as well as having a relatively higher export share of 
manufactures (Wood and Mayer, 1998:13-20; Wood and Owen, 1997: 146). 
In Malaysia, for instance, tin and rubber brought in the primary earnings even after 
independence in 1957. By the 1970s, the economy had diversified into crop farming, i.e. oil 
palm, cocoa and tropical hard wood and later petroleum and gas production (see Booth, 
2004). As expected, from Leamer et al. (I999), Malaysia's availability of natural resources 
and crop land made capital available that helped to diversify into capital-intensive processing 
of minerals, oil and crops. The diversification effort also successfully utilised petroleum and 
natural gas revenues, investing it to increase the processing capacity of refineries. Industries 
existed during the colonial period to reduce the transportation cost of exports or imported 
goods. Thus, primary-resource-type linkages such as factories for smelting tin are, processing 
rubber sheets and bottling imported drinks were already established (see Felker, 2003). This 
has enabled the take off of the first stage of lSI and has made it possible for local industries to 
develop even after economic relations with the colonial powers weakened. 
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Similar to Cote d'Ivoire, diversification of agriculture in Indonesia was by way of 
microeconomic policy via sectoral agencies targeted especially towards agricultural markets, 
particularly rice. Markets for inputs credit markets and output markets were deliberately 
directed to encourage investment in rice farming which made the latter available to feed the 
local population. Incentives also existed to redirect farmers into crop farming and later 
plywood for exports. Other selected sectors were the automobile and machinery industries. 
An export oriented incentive system drew manufacturing conglomerates into the manufacture 
of shoes, toys and leather goods as well as processed primary goods. Export promotion of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) has seen a shift in the LNG plants to run between 120% and 
145% capacity. 
In Thailand, growth accelerated also due to both manufacturing and primary commodity 
exports. Textiles, integrated circuits, plastics and shoes were the leading manufactured goods 
and are largely based on foreign investment. Later in the 1980s Thailand's non-traditional 
agro-industrial and labour-intensive manufacturing exports were successfully promoted. 
The SEANlCs started with labour-intensive agriculture and later capital-intensive lSI in the 
primary resource industries from the 1950s up to the 1970s in the case of Malaysia and 
Thailand, and up to the mid-1980s in Indonesia. While EO! began in the mid-1980s in 
Indonesia, EO! policy alongside lSI was implemented from the late 1960s in Malaysia and in 
the 1970s in Thailand. Both lSI and EO! policies sought to diversify the production of 
primary resources and to promote labour-intensive manufactures (Jomo and Rock, 1998; 
Rasiah, 1998). Capital accumulation enabled more capital-intensive processing in the primary 
resource sector since the 1950s (see Felker, 2003). Later EO! policy played a major role in 
the diversification of labour-intensive manufacturing exports. It can thus be argued that trade 
policy played a major role in creating skill demand in manufactures in these countries that 
could have chosen to continue with only resource-based industrialisation (Jomo and Rock, 
1998). 
Selective intervention is thought to have initiated diversification (Jomo and Rock, 1998). For 
instance, government initiatives in the sponsoring of research for new crops and varieties in 
Malaysia contributed to the diversification of the agricultural sector. In Thailand, 
government support in the rice industry stabilised rice prices and generated revenue. Also, 
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investment and relatively modest protection in agro-processing helped sustain industries. In 
Indonesia, the government also captured most of the resource rents from oil. Resource 
endowments hence, were favourably used to avoid balance-of-payment problems (Rasia, 
1998). 
Selective support from the government also encouraged firm savings and reinvestment (see 
Booth, 2004). Subsidiaries or firms linked to foreign multinationals were important in that 
they produced most of the manufacturing exports (Jomo and Rock, 1998). In addition, to 
enhance human capital, supportive institutions in the areas of R&D, education and marketing 
were established as a result of government effort. Organised trade fairs, export promotion 
missions, bilateral government-to-government and private sector involvement also created 
markets for the SEANICs (Jomo and Rock, 1998). 
Unlike the land abundant, resource rich countries that develop from agriculture (primary 
resources) to capital-intensive processing of primary resources, leaping to highly capital-
intensive machinery and chemicals, labour-intensive manufacturing emerges earlier alongside 
natural resource processing in the SEANICs. Even though the SEANICs have been 
categorised as having low land to labour ratios in the W-M (1998, 1999) model, these 
countries, however, show development paths peculiar to resource abundant countries as in the 
Leamer et al. (1999) thesis. On the other hand, the emergence of both sectors, i.e. 
manufacturing and primary resource processing could be due to their combined 
characteristics of being land scarce and moderately resource abundant. 
Another regional development that may be briefly considered is that of Latin America (LA). 
The countries of LA are typically resource rich, land abundant and moderately skilled (Wood 
and Mayer, 1998; Leamer et. al. 1999:8). Like SSA and the SEANICs, the region too had a 
history of colonisation, by Spain and Portugal in the 1400s and the 1500s. Export patterns 
were also similar, with crops and minerals as the major exports to Europe. 
According to Franko (2003), LA 's development history began from subsistence agricultural 
activity. Political Dutch disease in LA emanated in a system of feudal elite control of capital 
and political power. Land holdings were concentrated under the latifimdia system in Spanish 
Latin America and the fasanda system in Brazil. The main sources of revenue were from 
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exports of sugar from Cuba, coffee from Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica, bananas from 
Central America, guano from Peru, cattle from Argentina and silver from Chili (Franko, 
2003). In addition to the political control, LA experienced the Dutch disease problem when 
their commodity exports prices dropped. Lower external demand, for instance during the 
Great Depression, and the subsequent growing international protectionism, further hurt LA 
nations (Franko, 2003:45). 
Most of the countries of LA have had an industrial base for over 100 years, characterised by 
dependence on natural resources akin to that of South Africa's (Dijkstra, 2000; Fine and 
Rustomjee, 1996). Franko (2003) argues that industrialisation in LA may be linked therefore, 
to the increase in foreign investment along with infrastructure in the late 1800s and 1900s. 
He states that industrialisation and the demand in Britain and the United States expanded 
agricultural exports. The rise of the industrial sector in the region has also been ascribed to 
lSI, where basic consumer goods and heavy capital industries in machinery and shipbuilding 
were established in some countries. For example, the auto industry in Mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina became a successfully targeted industry even after lSI (Franko, 2003). However, 
the economies of LA by the 1980s were faced with negative effects of lSI. One of the 
problems was that national manufacturing goods failed to meet international quality standards 
and therefore, became globally uncompetitive (Franko, 2003: 66-68; see also Weiss and 
Jalilian, 2004). 
LA development could be summarised as starting with labour-intensive farming and mineral 
extraction in the early phase of development. Subsequent single commodity booms and 
capital accumulation enabled the countries to invest in industries linked to natural resources. 
Any indication of the emergence of Leamer et al.'s (1999) third phase of economic 
development would be the lSI established capital-intensive sectors in machinery and 
automobile industries. 
Latin America thus, appears to reflect a straightforward explanation of the development path 
hypothesis as shown by its endowment in land and resource abundance. In addition, as 
mentioned elsewhere in Section 3.3, LA's skill per land average within which Nigeria (and 
South Africa) lies (Wood and Mayer, 1998, 1999) reinforces the characteristic of the latter as 
land and natural resource abundant and not land scarce. 
54 
3.5 Conclusion 
The brief historical perspective used in this chapter reveals the pattern of economic 
development of the countries under study. In this context of development paths, as capital 
accumulates, the land abundant (resource rich) countries, i.e. Cote d ' Ivoire, South Africa and 
Nigeria, respectively, moved up to more capital-intensive agri-business, mining related 
activities, and oil exploration in the case of Nigeria each with different linkages to the 
economy. Comparison with LA, also a land abundant region, points to the establishment of 
capital-intensive sectors such as the automobile sector, mechanised machinery and chemicals 
sectors. 
In labour abundant Mauritius and the SEANICs, resource-based industries exist along side 
manufacturing industries. Industries in oil (seed) refining, tuna canning, fertiliser, and 
knitwear and textiles were developed in Mauritius. The SEANICs, when their endowments 
of primary resources are considered, are described rather as land abundant instead of land 
scarce. The availability of primary resources enabled the countries to develop agri-business, 
oil refining and mineral processing. The relatively resource rich Malaysia diversified into 
more capital-intensive permanent crop (rubber) processing and petroleum refining. Thailand 
with cropland, developed capital-intensive agri-business along side labour-intensive textiles, 
circuits, shoes and toys manufacturing. The pattern is similar in Indonesia, which started off 
with subsistence rice farming. Later Indonesia diversified into capital-intensive crop farming 
of plywood, petroleum refining, and the highly capital-intensive automobile and machinery 
manufacturing. 
Nigeria under Wood and Mayer's (1998, 1999) classification of labour abundance has not 
shown a development path of a labour abundant country as well. The unsustained capital-
intensive IS industries in Nigeria also raise questions about the country's resource-based 
industrialisation similar to the SEANICs. There are indications that industrial policy "forced" 
the economies of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand to diversify their resources and to 
establish their manufacturing sectors. 
The endowment-development path hypothesis of Leamer et. aJ. (1999) suggests that countries 
have inherent development patterns tied to their endowments. In the light of this, one can 
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conclude that anticipatory policies that are sector specific may be considered for 
implementation to enhance the successful emergence of the next development stage for 
countries as in the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. 
The Leamer et al. (1999) hypothesis served to refine the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) 
model with regard to the land per worker as a measure of natural resource endowment used. 
By considering the resources of a country, the hypothesis refines the W-M (1998, 1999) 
model discussed in Chapter Two. Therefore, this is appropriate for distinguishing, in 
particular, Nigeria as a land abundant country rather than land scarce due to its resource 
richness. This partially explains Nigeria's departure from the share of manufactures in total 
exports that is expected to be similar to that of Mauritius. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES: ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND EXPORT 
PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three gave a brief overview of economic development in South Africa, Nigeria, 
Mauritius and Cote d'Ivoire. It highlighted the different resource-bas ed-industrialisation 
experiences of these countries and the development through labour-intensive manufacturing 
in Mauritius. 
This chapter will attempt to refine the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) analysis of 
manufacturing and performance that is based on endowments of land per worker and skill per 
land ratios. Manufacturing value added and manufacturing export shares will be assessed in 
Section 4.4 to see which countries perform better in the relatively skill-intensive narrow 
manufactures. This is because the argument that good economic performance is based on the 
success of manufacturing exports relies on relative skill-intensity between the former and 
non-processed primary products (Wood and Mayer, 1998; 1999). Section 4.2 will distinguish 
between the ngood performers ll and the IIpoor performers tr in manufactures and 
manufacturing exports by first examining the broad size and development indicators and the 
endowment criteria under the Wood and Mayer (1998,1999) (W-M) model. This gives an 
indicator of how the countries 'fit' the crude Wood-Mayer hypothesis, and how they diverge 
from it. The rest of the chapter attempts to refine the statistical analysis to consider whether a 
'refined' version of Wood-Mayer is appropriate. In Section 4.3, the Dutch disease 
phenomena will be tested and a comparative analysis will be undertaken to show the 
importance of individual economic sectors in each country by highlighting the economic 
structure, shares of sectoral GDP and sectoral growth trends of the countries. In addition, in 
Section 4.5, endogenous factors including human development factors will also be examined 
in an attempt to understand the difference between the "good performers" and the "poor 
performers" of manufacturing exports further. 
Against this backdrop, GDP has most often been employed as a measure of a country's 
economic size. To compare standards of living, however gross national income (GNI) per 
capita will be included, as well as gross domestic product (GDP). In both cases the 
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purchasing power parities (PPP) will be used to take account of currency differences between 
the countries. The population density per square kilometre (sq. km.), the inverse of the land 
per worker ratio, allows for a comparison in line with the Wood and Mayer (1999) analysis. 
The International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) will be used for sectoral 
contributions to GDP in discussing economic performance and output of the different 
industries. The ISIC is chosen because this classification is based on the type of economic 
activity or type of production. However, to analyse the countries' export shares, the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) of manufacturing will be used. As has been 
mentioned elsewhere in Chapter Three, the SITC classification will be employed to 
differentiate narrow manufactures from processed primary products, in line with Wood and 
Mayer's (1998,1999) argument regarding skill endowment. Since MVA is a function of 
technical efficiency and the investment rate (Soderbom and Teal, 2002), sectoral MV A in 
will be assessed for economic performance in manufacturing. The revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) indices (Table 4.11) will also be compared together with MV A in order to 
connect production performance with global competitiveness. The RCA of a country is a 
number that if greater than one, shows a country's global export specialisation. Due to 
unavailability of more recent data for Nigeria, 2002 figures have been chosen in order to 
allow comparison with the other countries for which data is available. 
4.2 Economic size and per capita income 
The economies of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are diverse in terms of population, land area and 
economic size. Of the four countries in Table 4.1, South Africa has the most area of land 
covering a total of 1,221,040 sq. Its population size in 2002 was 45 million, second to 
Nigeria's 133 million. With a total land area of 910,700 sq.km, Nigeria ranks (R) second 
while Cote d'Ivoire ranks third in total land area and in the size of population. Compared to 
these countries, Mauritius has the smallest land area and a population of just over 1 million. 
Mauritius is thus the most densely populated, followed by Nigeria, then Cote d ' lvoire and, 
lastly, South Africa. 
In 2002, GDP in absolute terms ranged from US$ 113.4 billion for South Africa to US$ 4.7 
billion for Mauritius (see Table 4.1). The country with the highest standard ofliving, i.e., 
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Table 4.1: Population size, density and land area (2002) 
Country South Africa 
Total land area 1,221,040 
(lan2) 
Total Population 45 
(millions) 
Population 37 
density 
(/km2) 
GDP" 113.4 
(billion U.S. $) 
GNI' per capita 9,160 
(PPP, billion 
U.S.$) 
. Rankmg. 1-4, highest to least 
b ODP (current U.S. $) 
C ON! (current U.S $) 
R" Cote d'Ivoire 
1 18,000 
2 17 
4 52 
1 10.2 
2 1,500 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004). 
R 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Nigeria R Mauritius 
910,700 2 2,030 
133 1 I 
146 2 597 
39.5 2 4.7 
800 4 5,940 
GNI per capita, is Mauritius, followed by South Africa. Income per head is lowest in 
Africa's most populous country Nigeria, while Cote d'Ivoire is little short of having twice the 
income per head of the latter. In terms of GNI per capita, which is a broad measure of 
development, South Africa and Mauritius are dramatically "more developed". These two 
countries have GNI per capita more than ten times that of Nigeria and over six times that of 
Cote d'I voire. It has been suggested in Chapter Three that development in all four countries 
had started from the primary sector, with Mauritius and South Africa later diversifying into 
manufacturing. If this pattern of development is related to Table 4.1, the table indicates what 
theory suggests, that resource-based industrialisation has a significant impact on 
development. We see that the countries with land abundance or resource rich, i,e., Cote 
d'Ivoire and Nigeria, are the least developed. However, South Africa is land abundant and 
resource rich but its performance is comparable to that of Mauritius. 
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R 
4 
4 
1 
4 
1 
Also, if one considers population density, the inverse of Wood and Mayer's (1998, 1999) land 
per worker, one observes from Table 4.1 that Nigeria is the second most densely populated 
after Mauritius, but it has the lowest standard of living. Population density is also fairly 
similar in Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa, however GNI per capita is about six times less in 
Cote d'Ivoire. Therefore, land intensity does not correlate with GNI per capita. This is 
probably because using land/worker ratio is a crude measure. This divergence perhaps is due 
to Nigeria being very natural resource abundant, as its development path suggests in Chapter 
Three. However, this does not explain South Africa's performance, being a mineral rich 
country itself. This raises the argument in Chapter Three, that the type of endowment has a 
peculiar effect on development. Correlating Mauritius' economic performance with low land 
per worker, shown by its high share of narrow manufactures, is straightforward while 
Nigeria's can be explained because it is resource rich. High land per worker ratios that are 
expected to explain the low share of manufactures are similarly straightforward in the case of 
Cote d'lvoire but do not clearly explain South Africa's "good" performance. Therefore, 
explaining economic performance in these three countries may be complicated because 
Uland" is a poor proxy for natural resource endowment and thus this suggests that there are 
possibly other important factors to consider in the countries under study. 
Recall that non-market factors (see Section 2.4) such as high transportation cost and poor 
market integration have been linked to countries that have large land areas with low 
population density. Further, the problems of ethnic diversity with possibly higher incidence 
of political and social setbacks that erode social capital have also been associated with 
countries of low population density (Collier and Gunning, 1999a). Section 4.5 will analyse 
how these non-market factors apply to the four countries. However, this is also not clear-cut 
since large land area with low population density characterises one of the "good performers", 
i.e., South Africa. While these do not offer clear-cut explanations, the kind of investment in 
the countries could give an indication to how the markets function in these countries, as 
further discussion in Section 4.5 will show. 
4.3 Four-country study: economic structure and growth performance 
This section will detail the overall economic structure of the four countries based on the ISle 
classification (see Table 4.2). Although this classification does not isolate skill-intensive 
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sectors (Section 4.4 considers the narrow manufacturing sector in more detail), it does 
highlight some relevant interesting structural features and trends, particularly with respect to 
three main sectors, i.e., the manufacturing, agricultural and services sectors. This is done in 
order to shed light on the economic structural changes and to allow an analysis of the 
booming, lagging and non-traded sectors as with the core model of the Dutch disease 
hypothesis in Section 2.6. 
Therefore, as defined in the core model, in this classification agriculture and manufacturing l 
(broad) will be sometimes referred to as the lagging sectors since these sectors' products are 
exported. Services will be taken as the non-traded sector since price in this sector is 
determined domestically. Services include wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, 
transport, real estate services as well as government, financial, professional and personal 
services such as education and health care. Also included in services are imputed bank 
service charges and import duties (World Development Indicators, 2004). The booming 
sector is the mining sector (or the energy sector referred to in Section 2.6) whose price is 
determined by the world price. Mining which is a part of total industry, but is not shown for 
all the countries, will be analysed as the booming sector in Nigeria and South Africa in order 
to test the Dutch disease phenomenon that has been said to adversely affect their economies. 
Although the core model does not use agriculture as a booming sector, an attempt will be 
made to explain Cote d'l voire's structural changes using agriculture as a booming sector in 
that country since its importance in Cote d'lvoire is huge. 
Therefore, the price trends in the booming sectors in Appendix 2 will be considered together 
with sectoral output trends in Tables 4.2a, b and Table 4.3. This is because the core model 
analysis dealt with in Chapter Two is concerned with the price increase in the booming sector 
and its effect on sectoral output changes. 
Table 4.2a and 4.3 present data on sectoral output trends for the countries under study. To 
highlight Nigeria's apparent data inconsistencies, Table 4.2b and Appendix 1, which also 
show sectoral output shares for Nigeria will be referred to as well. 
I The ISle definition includes heavy industry (metal processing) and other primary resource processing sectors. 
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From Table 4.2a, while agriculture and total industry contribute similar amounts to GDP in 
Cote d'Ivoire, the share of agriculture in Mauritius and South Africa is relatively small 
compared to total industry. Total industry shares of GDP in Nigeria and South Africa are 
distinctly higher relative to the other countries. Later discussion will show that the high share 
of industry is mainly due to the high share of manufacturing in South Africa, as it is in 
Mauritius unlike in Nigeria where the large share of industry is attributed to crude oil. 
Sectoral growth trends of output point to a decline in the growth of agriculture between 1990-
2002 compared to 1980-90 in the countries with the lowest shares in agriculture relative to 
other sectors , i.e., South Africa and Mauritius (see Table 4.3). In contrast to these two 
countries, agricultural output growth increased in Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria where its 
proportion of GDP is relatively higher. Manufacturing output growth increased in all the 
countries in the 1990-2002 period compared to 1980-90. However, although Mauritius 
showed positive growth rates, the latter have declined except the growth of services. Only 
Nigeria with relatively the smallest services sector had experienced a decreased output 
growth in services. 
4.3.1 Agriculture 
As noted above, economic performance varies in the agricultural sector in each economy 
(Table 4.2a and 4.3). Although South Africa's agricultural sector is the lowest contributor to 
GDP, it nevertheless plays a significant role in output and employment (EIU, 2001). Maize is 
the most important crop in South Africa and recently, wine exports for niche markets are 
being developed (Economist, 2005). Since 2000 agriculture's contribution was only 3% of 
GDP. The historical importance of agriculture was discussed in Chapter Three. 
Nigeria, however, once had a comparative advantage in agricultural produce that accounted 
for up to 60% of domestic production in 1960 but is now a major importer of food (Fidel, 
1993; EIU, 2005). This sector employed 32% of the labour force in 2002, down from over 
40% in the 1990s (FAO, 2004). Groundnut oil, palm kernel and palm oil, cocoa beans, 
rubber, timber and cotton were the major exports. Now very little cocoa, rubber and palm 
products are exported (EIU, 2005). It has been suggested that the agricultural sector is held 
back by traditional farming methods, an inefficient input supply system and diseases (African 
Business,2002a). However, cocoa production has recently become significant due to a price 
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support policy and favourable weather (EIU, 2005). Later discussion in Section 4.3.4 will 
point to the adverse effect of the Dutch disease and political Dutch disease (see also Chapter 
Five) on Nigeria's biased production in oil. 
The share of agriculture to total GDP in Nigeria, shown in Table 4.2b, conflicts with IMF 
data in Appendix I and data from UNCTAD (Table 4.2a) where agriculture is 31.3% and 
29% of GDP respectively. This therefore shows that interpretation of Nigeria's data will vary 
depending on the data source. Nevertheless, agriculture's share of exports (see Table 4.10) 
seems to reflect its lack of competitiveness, as detailed discussion in Section 4.4 will explore. 
In comparison, Cote d'Ivoire's economy relies mainly on agriculture, which accounted for 
60% of export earnings in 2002, and employed an estimated 60% of the labour force (OECD, 
2004a). A huge jump in growth rate in this sector can be seen in Table 4.3 where average 
annual percentage growth improved from 0.3% between 1980-1990 to 3.4% in 1990-2002. 
The growth improvement in agriculture has been more dramatic than in manufacturing and 
services. An attempt will be made later, to apply the core model hypothesis to understand 
this structural change in Cote d'Ivoire further. Apart from non-processed products, the 
importance of agriculture to GDP links forwards to manufacturing that is based on food 
processing. This sector's fluctuation to external demand makes it a candidate to check for the 
Dutch disease in later discussion below. 
Like in South Africa, agriculture in Mauritius has the lowest share of GDP, employing 14% 
of the work force. Since independence in 1968, Mauritius has developed from a low-income, 
agriculture-based economy into a middle-income diversified economy with annual growth of 
5-6% (Table 4.3). Sugar is however, the centrepiece of agriculture and is tied to fluctuations 
in the weather and of external demand, 
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Table 4.2a Sectoral shares of gross domestic product' at current prices: 
percentage shares of total GDP 
Industrial Activity 
of which': 
Country Year A2ricuIture Total Manufacturing Services 
Cate d'Ivoire 1980 26 20 13 54 
1990 33 23 21 44 
1995 29 20 17 51 
2000 29 20 19 48 
2001 24 22 19 54 
2002 24 22 19 54 
Mauritius 1980 12 26 15 62 
1990 12 32 24 56 
1995 10 33 24 62 
2000 6 32 24 63 
2001 6 32 24 63 
2002 6 31 23 62 
Ni2eria 1980 21 46 8 34 
1990 33 41 8 26 
1995 32 47 5 22 
2000 30 46 4 25 
2001 29 43 4 29 
2002 29 37 11 28 
South Africa 1980 6 48 22 46 
1990 5 40 24 55 
1995 4 35 21 61 
2000 3 31 19 66 
2001 3 31 19 31 
2002 3 31 19 66 
Sourcc:UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002. 2004) 
IGross Domestic Product by kind of economic activity. The major sector being 
agriculturc.manufacturing and services (GDP=lOO%) 
~olal industrial activity comprises manufacturing and mining. The fonner is not the focus and thus, it 
is not indicated. 
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Table 4.2b Nigeria sector contribution to GDP (% total) at current factor cost 
Sector 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Agliculture 40.1 41 40.6 40.4 41.2 
Services 27.9 28.1 28 29.7 28.8 
Cmde oil 11.9 10.7 11.5 10 9.7 
Manufac!ming 5.9 6 6 6.2 6 
Bnilcling and constmction 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.6 
Mining and quanying 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Source: Annual Rep0l1 and Statement of Accounts (Central BMk of Nigeria. 2002). 
especially in the European market (OECD, 2004 d). For instance the effects of Cyclone Dina 
caused the agricultural sector in 2002 to experience a decline in production (OECD, 2004d). 
Nevertheless, agriculture, mainly the sugar sector, constitutes 20% of domestic exports 
compared to 70% two decades ago (African Business, 2003c). 
4.3.2 Industrial activity 
From overall industrial activity, manufacturing will be highlighted because the thesis 
argument relies on the significance of this sector. Mining in Nigeria and South Africa will 
also be looked at, so as to explore the Dutch disease phenomenon later. 
Table 4 .2a depicts Nigeria and South Africa as having relatively larger shares of industrial 
activity in GDP than the other two countries. The growth rates of industry as a whole were 
slower in 1990-2002 than in 1980-90 in Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritius (dramatically so in the 
latter) while Nigeria and South Africa experienced faster growth. 
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Table 4.3: Average annual GDP growth rates (%): constant 1995 prices (US$) 
Industrial Activity 
GDP Agriculture Total Manufacturing Services 
(average 
annual 
% growth) 
Period 1980- 1990- 1980- 1990- 1980- 1990- 1980- 1990- 1980- 1990-
1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 
C6te 
d'Ivoire 0.7 2.8 0.3 3.4 4.4 4.2 3.0 3.4 -0.1 2.0 
Mauritius 6.0 5.2 2.6 0.4 9.2 5.4 10.4 5.3 5.1 6.3 
Nigeria 1.6 2.4 3.3 3.5 -1.1 0.9 0.7 1.2 3.7 2.8 
South Africa 1.0 2.2 2.9 1.2 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.6 2.4 2.8 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank. 2004) 
The growth trend in output of manufacturing in Table 4 .3 points to Mauritius ' manufacturing 
as the fastest growing sector in 1980-90, although this trend had slowed in 1990-2002. In 
contrast, all the other countries had grown in the latter period. As part of the industrial sector, 
manufacturing is comprised of the heavy metals industry, petrochemicals and fertiliser, and 
processed primary products. In contrast to Nigeria's relatively low manufacturing share, in 
South Africa and Mauritius, a large GDP share of total industrial activity comes from 
manufacturing, which has been more than half of total industry (Table 4.2a). With skill per 
land of 2000 person-years of schooling per square kilometre, (YS/sq. km) and 50 YS/sq.km in 
Mauritius and South Africa respectively (see Section 3.3), this is expected in the W-M (1998, 
1999) model. 
The importance of manufacturing in South Africa is due mainly to the engineering and metal 
products, food and tobacco processing, and the car industry along with the spare parts sector 
(Data Monitor, 2004). 
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Figure 4.1: Nigeria, GDP by sectors at national current prices (N) 
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Source: Based on Nigeria: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix (lMF, 2004) 
In Nigeria, textiles, beverages, cigarettes, detergents and cement account for around 60% of 
total manufacturing output (Eru, 2005b). In 2000, textile and food and beverages had the 
highest employment share of 38% and 19% respectively (World Bank, 2002). However, 
production in manufactures was just 
11 % or 6% of GDP in 2002 (Table 4.2a and 4.2b). The manufacturing sector also heavily 
relies on imports and employment is said to be declining fast (EIU, 2005b). 
The industrial sector as a whole is nonetheless the largest GDP contributor in Nigeria, 
probably due to the importance of oil where for example, it was 44.7% of GDP in 2003 based 
on IMF (2004) data, (Appendix 1; Figure 4.1). However, according to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN, 2002a), crude oil made up between 9%-11 % of total GDP from 1998 to 2002 
(see Table 4.2b). The data is dramatically different from the IMF (2004) data, and is 
questionable as with data for the shares of agriculture discussed above. 
From Table 4.10, Nigeria's export structure nonetheless shows crude oil to be more important 
than its GDP suggests from CBN (2002a) data. The significance of oil in Nigeria is reflected 
also in its derived revenues dependent on the world price of oil. For instance, revenue in 
2003 accounted for 85% of the federal government revenue (CBN, 2004). 
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Other minerals mined are coal, iron ore, tin, uranium, phosphate, limestone and marble. 
However, mining and mineral processing experience backlogs. Therefore, production in the 
heavy metal industry, which links to mineral and are mining, is globally insignificant due 
mainly to power failures and obsolete equipment (Country Profile, 1999). These sectors are 
characterised by imports of capital goods and physical investments, and are dependent on 
additional expenditure on imported processing equipment (African Business, 2002a). In 
addition to this, a major problem affecting the heavy industry sector has been associated with 
lack of funds for imported spare parts as well as a shortage of inputs from the refineries that 
slow down the petrochemicals industry. These problems culminate in poor maintenance and 
poor management (African Business, 2002a). 
In Mauritius, growth in the industrial sector, as a whole, has been fuelled mainly by the EPZ 
manufactures and food processing (OECD, 2004b). However, although industrial activity is 
relatively large, GDP average annual percentage growth in manufacturing in the 1999-2002 
period has more than halved to 5.3% from 10.4% ofGDP in the 1980-1990 period, but is still 
higher than the other countries (see Table 4.3). 
Industrial activity in Cote d'Ivoire reflects its endowments seen from the type of 
manufacturing industry, which is mainly based on processing of foods and raw materials such 
as coffee, cocoa, wheat, fruit and vegetable oils, and includes crude oil production and other 
mining activities. Textiles and rubber are also important in the manufacturing sector as well 
as a wide range of industry, including plastics, packaging, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
tobacco, timber, construction and building materials (EIU, 2004c). However, as a result of 
input shortages from the agricultural sector, the industrial sector in Cote d'Ivoire has been 
affected due to the social and political conflict in 2002 as discussed in Section 4.5.4 (EIU, 
2004c). 
4.3.3 Services 
This sector has been defined previously as that which includes various services and the 
financial sector. Its significance relative to agriculture and manufacturing is illustrated hy its 
high contribution to GDP in all the countries (see Table 4.2a). South Africa and Mauritius 
have relatively the highest GDP shares of services in comparison to Cote d'Ivoire and 
Nigeria, where it accounts for over 60% in both economies. All four countries experienced a 
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positive growth in services between 1990-2002. This growth was strongest in Mauritius. 
Observations point to large GDP shares of services in the countries with large GDP shares of 
manufacturing, i.e., South Africa and Mauritius. According to Wood and Mayer (1998, 
1999), this is expected, since the skill requirement in manufactures is similar to services. 
Subsequently, as expected, Nigeria with the lowest GDP share of manufactures also has the 
lowest share of services. 
Mauritius enjoys vibrant financial and business services (African Business, 2003b). The 
country has also diversified into the information, communication and technology (lCT) sector 
owing to its dense network of telecommunication of 235 lines per 1000 inhabitants (OECD, 
2004b). 
In Cote d'Ivoire, services, as seen in Chapter Three, playa crucial intermediary role in the 
production and marketing of agricultural and manufactured products. The services sector 
employed 11.5% of the labour force and accounted for over one third of GDP in 2000 (Trade 
and Development Case Studies, 2003). However, poor business climate and transport 
problems have debilitated the services sector as a result of the conflict in 2002 (EIU, 2004c). 
Nevertheless, services have grown to 54% ofGDP in 2002 (Table 4.2a). 
Nigeria's services sector, however, is relatively the smallest at 28% of GDP in 2002, 
compared to 54%, 62% and 66% of GDP in Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius and South Africa 
respectively. The size of the sector has been linked to grave problems of poor management 
especially in the financial sector as well as under-capitalisation and dwindling foreign 
exchange business probably due to uncertainties and the high risk associated with the volatile 
macroeconomy (see Chapter Five) . Tourism is also debilitated by the problem-ridden 
accommodation (EIU, 2004c). 
In contrast, South Africa's services sector makes a significant contribution to GDP of over 
60% (Table 4.2a). Services is driven by an advanced financial sector that has significant 
employment potential, and an active retail sector (Economist, 2005). 
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4.3.4 Structural change and the Dutch disease 
To apply the Dutch disease hypothesis explained in Chapter Two, Appendix 2 will be 
referred to for price trends of the commodities. In the classic Dutch disease case, output falls 
in the lagging sector(s) (manufacturing andlor agriculture) as a result of resource and 
spending effects (see Section 2.6). This is due to a decline in profitability as wages rise and 
labour moves out of the lagging and non-tradeable sectors into the booming sector causing 
direct de-industrialisation or de.agriculturalisation. Subsequently, the rise in income in the 
booming sector when spent on services increases demand for the latter. This raises the price 
of services and thus its profitability relative to tradeable products from the lagging sector, the 
prices of which are determined in the world market. As a result of real appreciation, labour 
moves from the lagging sectors into services causing indirect de-industrialisation or de-
agriculturalisation when output of the lagging sector(s) decline further. Therefore, if the 
spending effect is stronger, the expected outcome is higher output of services than the initial 
period. The inverse is the case if the resource effect is stronger. Output in the lagging sector 
unambiguously falls. 
However, output in the lagging sector(s) may not necessarily decline when the variant Dutch 
disease with a mini H-O economy and the Rybczynski effect is taken into account (see 
Section 2.6). In this case, the lagging sector(s) and the non-tradeable sector behave as a mini 
H-O economy due to their differences in capital and labour intensities. Thus, a resource 
effect that draws labour out of the lagging sector into services may increase output in the 
former. The increase in output in the lagging sector with less labour is explained by the 
Rybczynski effect. Basically, capital usage increases in the lagging sector as a result of 
decreased capital employment if the lagging sector is capital-intensive relative to services. 
With this said, for South Africa, increasing price trends in minerals, ores and metals and gold 
will be taken as a booming period for these resources from 1990-2003 (see Appendix 2 for 
commodity price trends). Although an increase in international price does not necessarily 
constitute a rise in domestic production or increase sales value to create a boom in any given 
country, the mining production indices for South Africa in Appendix 3 generally point to an 
increase in the percentage change of mining production in more or less the same period. To 
analyse the data from Table 4.3 with regard to the boom therefore in South Africa, it can be 
expected that a boom will draw labour away from the other sectors into the booming mining 
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sector. This resource effect may cause an increase in wages in the economy due to the 
demand rise for labour. Employment and output in services and the lagging sectors may 
therefore drop. However, if a rise in income in mining, through a spending effect, is expected 
to increase demand for services, real appreciation will make services more profitable relative 
to the lagging sectors. In Chapter Three, we have seen how agricultural labour was 
substituted by mining labour. The mineral-energy-complex (MEC) has also been linked to 
conglomerate ownership that extends to the fmancial sector (Fine and Rustomjee, 96: 1996). 
It is thus possible that booms in the mining sector may compete for agricultural labour and 
may positively affect services, given that the financial sector is the backbone of South 
Africa's service sector. 
Actual observation from Table 4.3 shows an increased growth in services and de-
agriculturalisation. Growth of the manufacturing (lagging) sector has increased only 
marginally. What seems plausible in this case is to argue that labour drawn from the 
manufacturing sector might have led to an augmented usage of capital in capital-intensive 
manufacturing as in the Dutch disease model with a mini H-O economy (Rybczynski effect). 
For instance, it is likely for there to be growth in South Africa's comparative advantage 
sector, basic metal manufacturing, due to its capital-intensity and forward linkages to the 
booming sector. 
In the case of Nigeria, given the importance of oil, this sector will be taken as the booming 
sector. Agriculture and manufacturing are the lagging sectors while services is the non-
tradeable sector. Figure 4.1 points to an inverse pattern of changing shares between oil and 
agriculture and services (the latter two moving in the same direction). There is a somewhat 
direct relationship however between movements in oil and manufacturing GDP shares. 
Appendix 2 shows that the rate of change in the oil price was on the rise from 1990-2003, 
thus indicating an (international) oil boom period. Comparison of the longer-tenn sectoral 
change in the 1990-2002 period in Table 4.3 shows in the lagging sectors, while the growth in 
agriculture was relatively the strongest compared to manufacturing. Growth of services, 
although also stronger than that of manufacturing, was slower in 1980-90 compared to 1990-
2002. 
Analysis of the Dutch disease in Nigeria takes into account that the oil sector is an enclave 
(Stijns, 2003). What will be considered here are the sectoral changes in growth rates in the 
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two periods looked at above rather than comparing growth rates between the sectors. 
Therefore, the resource effect (labour mobility) is assumed to take place only between the 
lagging and non-tradeable sectors through the mechanism of real appreciation (see Section 
2.6). Hence, in Nigeria's case, it is possible that labour is mobile between agriculture, 
manufacturing and services and thus, direct de-industrialisation may not be expected. 
However, through the spending effect, a boom in the oil sector may raise demand for services 
thereby increasing its price relative to manufacturing and agriculture (real appreciation). The 
hypothesis suggests that in this case, a fall in wage in terms of services and a rise in wage in 
terms of tradeables may cause a shift of labour from the latter into services (indirect de-
industrialisation and de-agriculturalisation). Instead however, Table 4.3 suggests that, 
compared to 1980-90, in the oil boom period coinciding with the 1990-2002 GDP growth 
analysis period, industrialisation (albeit very slow) and agriculturalisation seemed to have 
taken place. However, growth in services fell from 3.7% in \980-90 to 2.8% in 1990-2002. 
A possible interpretation could be that wage in terms of services was sticky downwards. The 
argument for a Rybczynski effect between capital-intensive and labour-intensive 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors and between services and the two latter sectors may 
also be considered. Therefore, labour-intensive agriculture might have drawn some of the 
excess labour leading to an increased growth rate . Also, given that favourable price policy 
has been initiated in this sector, as mentioned earlier, the profitability of agriculture may have 
risen. It is plausible that the capital-intensive manufacturing sectors' output increased as a 
result of the effect of real exchange rate appreciation (Le., rise in the price of non-tradeable 
goods relative to the price of traded goods) during an oil boom. To explore this, further 
effects on production of the exchange rate movements will be presented in Chapter Five (see 
Section 5.1). 
The outcome of the structural changes that take place is dependent on interpretation of 
reliable data, which for Nigeria differ dramatically between the sources, and variability of the 
figures also seems questionable. Nevertheless, what is unambiguous is that the size of the 
manufacturing sector is constantly smaller relative to all other sectors. 
To extend this analysis to agriculture as a booming sector in Cote d'[voire, it can be assumed 
that a boom in agriculture draws labour away from the services and manufacturing sectors 
during a period of increasing prices in agricultural raw materials from 1990-99 (Appendix 2). 
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Table 4.3 shows growth in all the sectors in the ten-year period between 1990-2002. Total 
industry grew the fastest (4.2%) in 1990-2002, with similar rate of growth in manufacturing 
(3.4%) and agriculture (3.4%). The slowest growth was shown to be in services (2.0%) in the 
same period. Thus from Table 4.3, it can be seen that in 1990-2002 compared to 1980-90, 
the growth change that took effect saw the largest change in agriculture followed by services. 
The growth change in manufacturing was the slowest, while total industry declined. Again, 
resource movement is possible between services, capital-intensive agro-industry and 
manufacturing. Therefore, there might have been augmented capital usage in the capital-
intensive sectors of manufacturing due to labour movement out of this sector (see Figure 2.6 
in Section 2.6) . Thus, agriculture output increased due to the resource effect of the boom; 
services could have become more profitable with the spending effect and wage in terms of 
this sector fell leading to higher output; capital-intensive agro-industries could have benefited 
from decreased labour employment that are drawn to agriculture and services. The 
hypothesis suggests however, that de-industrialisation may occur in those sectors of 
manufacturing that are labour-intensive as a result of decline in profitability brought about by 
increased wages when labour demand in the economy is raised by the boom. This makes for 
the argument that profitability is rather the main explanation for labour-intensive 
manufacturing exports in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Subsequently if the possibility of a 
spending effect is considered in Cote d'Ivoire, the increased income from agriculture may 
have generated higher demand for services that led to increased output in the latter. This is 
expected due to real appreciation when price and profitability of services rise relative to the 
tradeable sector. 
Insights from the Dutch disease model therefore imply that structural dynamics tied to 
resource endowments and external demand for these resources determine the pattern of 
growth. Sector profitability is likely to be the invisible hand guiding the choice of 
production. Thus, if the capital-intensive manufacturing sectors become more profitable as a 
result of growth in the natural resource sector, the demand for physical capital and perhaps 
the demand for human capital in these sectors may increase. As Chapter Three alluded, if the 
economy could source these demands internally, then linkages will aid the spill over of 
growth to other industries. However, as the previous chapter showed, historically the 
alternative for most sub-Saharan countries is to import intermediate goods, which is 
dependent on the availability of foreign exchange. 
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Table 4.4: Manufacturing value added ('Yo of GDP at 1995 prices) 
CountrY 
Year 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
Cote d'Ivoire 
19.43 
19.07 
18.5 
16.47 
17.22 
18.21 
21.30 
19.55 
20.48 
19.11 
18.83 
Mauritius 
24.3 
23.85 
23.55 
23. 19 
22.78 
23.21 
23.46 
23 .75 
24.10 
23.97 
23.48 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank,2004) 
Nh!eria 
5.9 
4.32 
4.00 
4.94 
5.36 
4.84 
5.08 
5.24 
4.89 
4.12 
South Africa 
22.86 
21.83 
21.14 
20.92 
21.22 
20.16 
19.92 
19.25 
18.79 
18.75 
18.9 
In tenns of this explanation, it is anticipated that a fall in profitability and decreased labour 
demand in the relatively labour-intensive sectors will shrink the latter's output since the 
alternative is to augment capital usage. Therefore, this culminates in the argument that labour 
(skill) demand is as important a cause ofSSA's manufacturing export drive as its supply (see 
Figure 3.1, Chapter Three). Thus, one could grasp the idea that a land abundant country may 
have a low incentive to develop its skill in its initial development path since the capital-
intensive manufacturing sectors are preferred over the relatively labour-intensive ones 
(Leamer et aI., 1999). 
This section has therefore highlighted some relevant economic structural features and trends, 
particularly with respect to three main sectors, i.e., the manufacturing, agricultural and 
services sectors. 
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Figure 4.2: MVA (%GDP) D Cote d'Ivoire 
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4.4 Narrow manufacturing: structure and exports shares 
The analysis of the previous sections was based on the ISIC classification and therefore, the 
manufacturing sector was defined as broad and consisted of primary product processing in 
addition to other manufactures. Based on this, the analysis of sectoral structure in the 
countries under study suggested that growth in agriculture in Cote d'Ivoire and mining 
industry in Nigeria (oil) and South Africa (minerals, metals and ores) are likely to have a 
significant impact on the structure of other sectors of their economies. 
In this section however, distinction is made between the SITC and the ISIC manufactures so 
as to differentiate narrow manufactures and processed primary products. As in Wood and 
Mayer (1998, 1999), this is to consider the hypothesis that skill endowment reflected in 
narrow manufactures is the determinant of SSA performance in manufacturing exports. The 
SITC thus defines manufacturing activity as that which produces final goods of the category 
5 to 8 less 68. All other products, whether processed or unprocessed are primary products. 
This is different from the broader ISIC definition, which in addition to the SITC definition 
includes goods produced using large inputs oflocal raw materials (Wood and Mayer, 
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Table 4.5 Manufacturing value added (annual % growth) 
Year Cote d'lvoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
1990 -5.41 7.72 7.62 -2.25 
1991 0.12 4.61 9.31 -4.57 
1992 2.02 6.53 -4.83 -3.28 
1993 1.0 I 4.75 1.16 -0.18 
1994 0.35 4.63 1.64 2.67 
1995 0.80 5.86 4.59 6.49 
1996 8.54 6.20 2.38 1.38 
1997 11.00 6.35 1.30 2.42 
1998 11.00 6.65 -5.43 -1.63 
1999 1.80 3.01 2.14 -0.15 
2000 -8.90 8.27 4.93 3.61 
2001 -1.67 6.55 2.00 
Average 1.80 6.46 2.25 0.59 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) 
1998:6). For example, the ISIC categories "Food, beverages and tobacco" and "Other 
Manufacturing" are called manufactures by ISIC. However, these are categorised here, 
according to the SITC and similarly by Wood and Mayer (1998), as processed primary. 
Since both the ISIC definition and MY A refer to production, they will be used to assess the 
specific economic sectors in South Africa, Mauritius, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. 
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2 introduce the overall shares in manufacturing for the four countries. 
Mauritius in 1990-2000 had the highest MV A percentage share of GDP as noted in Section 
4.3.2 followed by South Africa. Cote d'Ivoire had the third largest MY A, and Nigeria the 
lowest. 
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Figure 4.3: MVA annual % growth 
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Source: Based on data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004). 
Therefore, there seems to be a correlation between higher shares of MY A to GDP and annual 
rate of growth in MY A with relatively higher shares of manufactures in total 
exports.Mauritius has the highest annual growth rate of MY A that appears to be the most 
steady, varying from 3% to over 8% MY A (Tables 4.5 and Figure 4.3), with no negative 
growth between 1990-2000. South Africa's annual growth rate of MY A ranged from -4.59% 
to 6.49% and has often been negative. Nigeria's MY A growth has been mostly weak by 
comparison to Mauritius since 1992, but varies a lot relative to South Africa' s. C6te 
d'Ivoire's -8% to II % rate of MY A growth seems to show the most instability followed by 
Nigeria's and South Africa's. However, one observation stands out. Cote d'Ivoire and 
Nigeria surpass South Africa in their average annual growth rates in MY A. To understand 
the performance of manufacturing, the structure of the countries' narrow manufactures will be 
the next focus below. 
4.4.1 Structure and export shares of manufactures: South Africa 
Manufactures, according to Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999), can be distinguished as narrow 
manufactures (NM) or processed primary (PP). For instance, South Africa's non-ferrous 
basic metal (SITC 667), pulp (SITC 246) and part of some wood sectors are processed or 
non-processed primary products. The other manufactures group (see Table 4.6 and Figure. 
4.4), consists of wood and related products, paper and related products, petroleum and related 
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products, basic metals and mineral products, fabricated metal products and professional 
goods, machinery, and chemicals. This group contains NM, PP and NP categories. 
Table 4.11 depicts South Africa's specialisation in this order: basic manufactures (NM), 
minerals (NP), wood products (PP and NP), fresh foods (NP), and processed foods (PP). To 
focus on basic manufactures, according to the factor intensity classification of the Empirical 
Trade Analysis Center (ETC, 2004), the latter is human-capital intensive in contrast to 
textiles and clothing. How then does this fit in with the W-M (1998,1999) analysis of skill 
per land endowment, given that South Africa's skill endowment is relatively lower than that 
of Mauritius? This type of Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) analysis thus, fails to explain 
South Africa's high share of narrow manufactures in total exports due to its skill proportion 
relative to land (resources). 
In Chapter Three, however, it was argued that land abundant resource rich countries have a 
capital intensity bias towards the processing of their resources as we see in South Africa. In 
addition, the Dutch disease analysis suggests that natural resource booms (metals, ores and 
minerals in the case of South Africa) create resource re-allocation in the economy and that 
tends to shift profitability to the capital-intensive sectors, basic manufactures in the case of 
South Africa. This is also Leamer et al.'s hypothesis, that such a country will by-pass labour-
intensive sectors in the early stage of development. Thus, it is expected that due to the 
production bias, other manufacturing sectors such as the labour-intensive ones may lag 
behind in South Africa. 
Nonetheless, South Africa's "good performance", with regard to its relatively higher shares of 
manufacturing in total exports according to Wood and Mayer (1998: 26-40), could be 
explained by the nature of its basic metal industry being linked to the mining booming sector 
and the MEC (see Chapter Three). Further, this forward linkage to the MEC and the financial 
service sector may have aided the manufacturing sector, leading to the gradual upgrading of 
skill requirement. This points to a distinction in economic structure from Nigeria's oil sector 
enclave. 
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Table 4.6 Other manufacturing' (%MV A) 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Cote d'Ivoire 
42.7 
36.68 
34.22 
32.93 
2000 45.72 
Mauritius 
17.36 
16.82 
16.45 
17.57 
17.89 
16.63 
17.3 
15.27 
2001 15.3 
Nigeria 
21.64 
17.69 
31.16 
45.28 
27.79 
25 .21 
Source; World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) 
South Africa 
49.98 
47.67 
46.52 
47.07 
47.8 
48.02 
48.67 
48.9 
48.89 
48.55 
49.53 
58.4 
• Other manuractures (ISle) includes wood and related products, paper and related products, petToleum and 
related products, basic metals and mineral products, fabricated metal products and professional goods, 
machinery, and chemicals. 
Therefore, the same effect of resource booms as far as manufacturing performance is 
concerned does not seem to manifest. 
4.4.2 Structure and export shares of manufactures: Nigeria 
It was mentioned (Section 4.3) that from broad manufacturing, Nigeria's significant sectors 
were the textile industry (NM), wood (NP), paper (PP), food and beverages (PP), cigarettes 
(PP), detergent (NM), and the chemical sector (NM). 
It would be expected that given Nigeria's booming oil sector, the country would specialise in 
narrow manufacturing linked to crude oil such as petrochemicals. However, specialisation as 
we see is only in minerals (Table 4.11) and is reflected by the large share of oil in total 
exports (Table 4.10). 
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Also, Nigeria's sectoral shares of MVA (see from Table 4.6-4.9 and Figures 4.3-4.6 below) 
appear as the most variable from 1990-2000 compared to the other countries, either due to 
data inconsistency or other effects of economic fluctuations as a result of the Dutch disease 
phenomenon. Chapter Five will look into this variation to try to understand this performance 
further in Nigeria. For example, shares of "other manufactures" fluctuated from as low as 
just over 17% to over 45% of MV A in two years (see Table 4.6). Nevertheless, the broad 
product group, "other manufactures", has the highest share of MVA in Nigeria as in South 
Africa probably due to biased production in capital-intensive processing activities. Also, 
textiles and clothing, a narrow manufacture group, fluctuates from 52% in 1992 to 8% of 
MVA the next year (Table 4.7). Chemicals went from more than 1% ofMVA in 1994 to 
25.71 % in the next year (Table 4.8), while the share of the food, beverage and tobacco group 
went to 46.6% in 1993 from 14% in 1992 (Table 4.9). The variability ofMV A in textiles and 
clothing, also a narrow manufacturing group but of low-skill intensity demonstrates 
instability in this sector. 
Further, in Nigeria, despite total MV A being very small, fluctuations to high levels in 
chemicals, and textiles and clothing show potential competitiveness. However, studies on 
Nigeria's manufacturing sector have shown that the narrow manufacturing categories textiles 
and the chemicals sectors are relatively capital-intensive and more so than the food sector; 
clothing is the most labour-intensive sector (Soderbom and Teal, 2002). Here again, however 
small MV A is, there seems to be a choice of capital-intensive over labour-intensive 
production. 
However high MY A shares fluctuate to, when the average of the annual growth rate of MY A 
is considered, manufacturing performance as a whole is still relatively modest compared to 
Mauritius but surprisingly higher than South Africa's average (see Table 4.5). Nigeria's case 
suggests a less straightforward explanation than lack of skill since its skill per worker is 
within the South African range (Wood and Mayer, 1998: 31). 
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Table 4.7 Textiles and clothing (% MVA) 
Year Cote d'l voire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
1990 45.69 8.38 
1991 45.64 46 .07 8.16 
1992 45.37 52.28 7.634 
1993 45.53 8.08 7.94 
1994 8.89 47.24 13.87 8.03 
1995 10.95 46.15 12.59 8.04 
1996 13.23 48.19 11.09 7.43 
1997 10.08 47.64 7.54 
1998 7.17 
1999 7.15 
2000 17.212 6.63 
2001 47.6 3.7 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) 
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81 
Table 4.8: Chemicals (% MV A) 
Year Cote d'lvoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
1990 4.2 9.44 
1991 4.57 4.14 10.31 
1992 4.11 5.7 9.95 
1993 4.31 1.9 9.89 
1994 11.22 4.03 1.76 9.67 
1995 10.82 4.63 25.47 9.47 
1996 11.88 4.26 25.71 9.48 
1997 12.02 4.52 9.45 
1998 9.56 
1999 9.57 
2000 9.38 
2001 4.5 9.8 
Source: Based on the World Development Indicators data (World Bank, 2002) 
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Figure 4.6: Chemicals (% MY A) 
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Therefore, further analysis of the micro economic factors in later sections of this chapter as 
well as the macroeconomic effect of the Dutch disease in Chapter Five will need to be 
considered. 
4.4.3 Structure and export share of manufactures: Cote d'Ivoire 
The pattern of capital-intensive production in processed foods is also expected in the case of 
Cote d'Ivoire. This is intuitive because the country has abundant cropland and agricultural 
raw materials are available. It was noted in Section 4.3 that wood, textiles, chemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals of the narrow manufacturing category were significant in Cote d'Ivoire. The 
relatively high share of MY A in the "other manufactures" group (Table 4.6) also depicts the 
country's specialisation in wood. However, the share of MY A in textiles and clothing is 
relatively small (Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.9: Food, beverages and tobacco (% MV A) 
Year Cote d'Ivoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
1990 30.36 
1991 30.07 15.15 
1992 32.34 14.29 
1993 31.1 46.6 
1994 34.71 28.56 22.06 
1995 37.85 30.4 25.43 
1996 36.86 27.99 30.27 
1997 42.01 30.58 
1998 
1999 
2000 27.33 
2001 30.6 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) 
Figure 4.7: Food, beverage, and tobacco (% of MV A) 
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Overall, the narrow manufacturing sector (category 5-8), nonetheless, was 14.3% of the total 
value of exports compared to 0.4% in Nigeria in 2000 (see Table 4.10). Cote d'Ivoire's export 
structure depicts machinery and transport equipment export shares at a significant level 
relative to Mauritius. This sector, according to the ETA classification, is technology-
intensive and thus, human capital-intensive. Also, world competitiveness as reflected in its 
RCA in transport equipment (see Table 4.11), also places Cote d'Ivoire even ahead of 
Mauritius in this sector. This is unexpected given Cote d'Ivoire's low skill to land ratio 
according to the Wood and Mayer (1998,1999) model. It is possible that profitability could 
direct capital employment to this capital-intensive sector. In addition, from Table 4.5, as with 
Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire 's annual growth average in MV A is relatively higher than that of one 
of the "good performers" of manufacturing exports, i.e. , South Africa. 
The question that arises then is, does skill ratio, as the W-M (1998, 1999) thesis indicates, 
also explain Cote d'Ivoire's higher shares than Mauritius, of machinery and transport 
equipment (at least for 2002) of the NM category (Table 4.10). 
With regard to processed primary, data for Cote d'lvoire, where available, indicate that the 
country has relatively a higher percentage share of MV A in the food, beverage and tobacco 
category (Figure 4.7). This is backed by Cote d'Ivoire's world competitiveness with an RCA 
of 2.07 for processed foods, its third strength after fresh foods and wood products (Table 
4.11). African Business (1999) regards Cote d'Ivoire as one of the top ten African countries 
with respect to MV A. The MY A referred to, however, as seen above, is that of processed 
primary production. For instance, all food items' share of total exports was 55.6% in 2003 
(Table 4.10). This is expected as it conforms to Cote d'Ivoire's endowment in cropland. 
4.4.4 Structure and export share of manufactures: Mauritius 
Manufactures in Mauritius originates mainly from the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and 
contribute 36.1 % of domestic exports (African Business, 2003c). EPZ manufactures were the 
largest foreign exchange eamer and account for 12% of GDP and bring in almost three-
quarters of export eamings. In Table 4.11, Mauritius' specialisation index places it with a 
RCA in clothing (RCA 19.48), processed foods (RCA 4.50), and textiles (RCA 2.03), of 
which clothing and textiles are narrow manufactures. This is reflected in Mauritius' 
consistent relatively high MVA shares in these sectors (Figures 4.5 and 4.7). 
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Table 4.10: Export structure by main categories (SITe) 
Country Year Total All Agric Fuels Ores and Mfg. Chern. Other Machinery, 
value of food raw metals Goods Prod mfg. transport 
exports items materials goods equipment 
(constant 0+1+2 21ess 27+28+68 5 to 8 5 (6+8) 
1995 2+4 (22+27+28) 3 less 68 less 68 7 
SUS. NP NP NP NP NM NM PP.NM NM 
millions) 
Percentage share of total export value 
Cote 1995 3032 62.8 19.7 9.5 0.2 6.5 2.4 3.7 
d'Ivoirc 1999 4314 66.0 10.0 12.6 0.1 21.3 4.4 10.6 
2000 3628 1M 13.8 20.3 0.2 14.3 3.9 9.4 
2003 5493 55.6 9.2 12.8 0.2 20.0 4.0 6.2 
Mauritius 1980 420 72.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 27.4 0.5 24.0 
1990 1221 31.9 0.5 1.4 0.2 65.8 0.9 63.5 
1995 1538 28.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 70.2 0.8 67.1 
2000 1490 17.8 0.5 0.0 0.2 80.8 0.9 76.6 
2001 1521 24.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 74.2 0.8 71.7 
2003 1839 24.8 0.4 0.1 0.3 73.6 1.7 67.5 
Nigeria 1999 21331 0.3 0.1 98.9 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.2 
2000 39016 0.1 0.0 22& 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 
1 South 1980 25585 8.7 2.5 3.8 7.0 18.1 2.2 13.9 
Africa 2000 26075 8.5 3.8 10.2 10.7 53.9 7.8 28.6 
2003 30897 9.9 3.3 9.8 19.0 57.3 7.5 29.1 
2 South 1995 28226 7.9 4.1 8.9 8.0 43.1 7.0 27.4 
Africa 1999 23189 10.2 3.6 9.8 21.2 54.4 8.0 29.0 
(SACUl 
Source: UNCTAD (2004). 
Mauritius' case is straightforward in that the unavailability of natural resources focuses 
profitability in relatively more labour-intensive sectors such as clothing compared to other 
land abundant, resource rich countries. If Mauritius' endowment in higher worker to land 
(high population density) is considered as in the Wood and Mayer (1998,1999) model, then 
this lends support to the choice of labour-intensive production. Leamer et al. (1999) argue 
that the lack of natural resource endowments sets an incentive for a relatively quicker 
emergence of manufacturing due to the demand for labour. 
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Table 4.11: Specialisation index (2002) 
Cote d'lvoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa Sectors Wood and 
RJ R R R Mayer2, 
0' 19.48 1 0 0.29 Clothing NML 
0.55 2.03 3 0 0.40 Textiles NML 
0.20 0.78 0 0.28 Misc. meg NML 
0.29 0.11 0 2.70 1 Basic mfg NML 
2.07 3 4.50 2 0 1.34 5 Processed foods PP 
2.96 2 0 0 1.62 3 Wood products NML 
0.75 0 0 0.72 Leather products NML 
0.04 0 0 0.81 Transport equipment NMH 
0 0.06 0 0.70 Non-electric NMH 
Machinery 
0.39 0.09 0 0.95 Chemicals NMH 
0 0 0 0.15 Construction NMH 
electronics 
0 0 0 0.16 Electronic NMH 
components 
1.76 4 0.22 8.39 1 2.27 2 Minerals NP 
11.92 1 0.32 0 1.47 4 Fresh food NP 
Source: Revealed comparative advantage statistics from ITC (2002); Wood and Mayer classification (Appendix 1, 
1998) 
2 Sec Figures 2.3a and b, where NML is low-skill narrow manufacturing (NM) and NMH is high-skill NM. 
lRanking R compares the four countries in that export category: 1-4, most important to least. 
4Specialisation index is the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of a country: I and above shows a country's 
comparative advantage in global exports in that category. 
Thus, we see that textile and clothing manufacturing were the basis of growth in Mauritius. 
That Mauritius' success in narrow manufacturing and processed primary product exports rests 
largely on its high skill to land ratio is debatable since the clothing and textile sectors, the 
basis on which Mauritius has grown, are sectors that are low-skill intensive. It has been 
pointed out previously that in South Africa, which has relatively lower skill to land ratio has a 
comparative advantage in a relatively more human-capital intensive sector,i.e., basic 
manufactures. However, intuitively, the absence of resource endowments in Mauritius and 
the profitability in the labour-intensive sectors could explain augmented labour employment 
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in such sectors. Nonetheless, from its stable annual and sectoral MV A, it appears that 
Mauritius' manufacturing sector does not go through intense economic cycles that seem to be 
the case especially in Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire. 
4.4.5 Summary 
Output share of GDP of the economic sectors of the four countries under study pointed to 
each sector's significance and contribution in the economy. The countries with a high share 
of manufacturing in total exports, South Africa and Mauritius, have relatively higher shares 
ofMVA as a proportion ofGDP. Also, high proportions of narrow manufactures constitute 
the two countries' total manufacturing exports. This is expected for Mauritius given her low 
land per worker ratio in accordance to the W -M (1998, 1999) model. The model extends this 
explanation to South Africa where its high land per worker explains its high share of primary 
products. In both countries the W-M (1998, 1999) model explains their relatively high shares 
of narrow manufactures due to their high skill to land ratio. However, the structure of narrow 
manufactures points to a more human-capital intensive specialisation in South Africa in basic 
manufactures, while Mauritius' clothing and textiles specialisation is based on low-skill 
labour. Nonetheless, using these measures to explain Mauritius' export performance seems 
straightforward. 
Unlike Cote d'ivoire and Nigeria, the relatively steadier MV As in Mauritius and South Africa 
also depict the sustainability of their manufacturing sectors over time. When connection is 
made with their GNI per capita, it conforms to theory that resource-based industrialisation 
may not sustain development. South Africa's high land per worker ratio cannot explain her 
higher GNI per capita but the economic structural changes suggested by the Dutch disease 
hypothesis point to production bias in profitable basic metal industry. This industry's 
characteristic economic linkages may have permitted the development of other sectors such 
as services, thus making it possible for South Africa to diversify into narrow manufactures. 
In the "poor performers" where land per worker is high and skill to worker is low in Cote 
d'ivoire, competitiveness in food products reflects its endowment of cropland. With 
relatively low skill to labour, however, narrow manufacturing exports in machinery and 
transport equipment are seen to emerge. This is supported by Cote d'ivoire's specialisation 
index that is very low in this sector but relatively higher than Mauritius'. However, given that 
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MY A is relatively low and highly variable over the period 1990-2000, thus, this suggests that 
Cote d'lvoire has the greatest variability in technical efficiency and investment rates (see 
Soderbom and Teal, 2002) in its manufacturing sector. 
The case of Nigeria is even more complex as its low land per worker does not explain its low 
manufacturing output. However, Chapter Three already characterised Nigeria as a land 
abundant country like South Africa even though it has a low land per worker ratio. In 
addition, skill to worker in Nigeria, also in the South African range (see Chapter Three), does 
not explain the country's poor MY A. What is clear, as with Cote d'lvoire, is that MY A varies 
considerably annually in Nigeria indicating some instability in production of manufactures. 
When dominant sectors are identified as in the Dutch disease hypothesis, it appears that 
production in oil, agriculture and metals and ores in Nigeria, Cote d'lvoire and South Africa 
respectively, may shape the re-allocation of resources. Thus, this confirms that economic 
development is significantly influenced by resources endowments. However, South Africa's 
relative success at manufacturing diversification when compared to Nigeria's "poor 
performance" leads to the following analysis of endogenous factors. 
4.5 Reasons for the discrepancies in economic performance 
Section 4.2 debated the use of land per worker (popUlation density) as a factor endowment 
measure because "land" is a poor proxy for natural resource endowment. It was shown that 
correlating Mauritius' economic performance with low land per worker, depicted by its high 
share of narrow manufactures is straightforward. High land per worker ratios that are 
expected to explain the low shares of manufactures are similarly straightforward in 
explaining Cote d'lvoire 's poor performance but not South Africa's better performance in 
manufacturing exports. However, using low land per worker to explain Nigeria's economic 
performance has already been dismissed due to large natural resource abundance. Therefore, 
explaining economic performance in these countries along Wood and Mayer 91998, 1999) 
lines may be complicated 
The argument above also follows with skill per land and skill per worker, and thus with skill 
endowment. When the shares of manufacturing products in total exports are considered in all 
four countries, South Africa and Mauritius had relatively the highest shares especially of 
89 
narrow manufactures, considered to constitute relatively higher skill than other products. The 
W-M (1998,1 999) model attributed this to the countries' relative differences in skill. 
However, the previous discussion pointed out that the types of skills in South Africa and 
Mauritius' specialisations are different. Therefore, even though Mauritius' skill endowment 
is higher than South Africa's, its specialisation in textile and clothing is low skill labour-
intensive compared to South Africa's relatively human capital-intensive basic manufactures. 
This suggests that the demand for skill is probably biased in particular sectors and could be 
deficient in the manufacturing sectors of Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. 
Connecting demand for skill to the Dutch disease hypothesis that natural resource-based 
industrialisation adversely affects manufacturing profitability linked to wages, it is possible 
that the demand for skill in land abundant countries is low (Learner et aI., 1999). This is 
intuitive since a land abundant and resource rich country is specialised in the extraction of 
these resources or the harvesting of crops, which uses low skill labour. However, the issue 
that arises is that industrialisation in a land abundant country is expected to develop forward 
linkages to natural resource processing, which requires investment in capital as well as 
human capital. 
Additionally, the development path, and thus the skill path of a country itself may be 
endogenous . This could have political implications in the form of political Dutch disease. 
Therefore, in the cases of two of the natural resource abundant countries, i.e., Nigeria and 
Cote d'Ivoire, political Dutch disease which influences public decisions through rent-seeking 
activities (see Section 2.6.5) will be considered. South Africa, also natural resource 
abundant, before diversification, may have had similar political features . 
In addition to skill demand, other endogenous factors such as those reflected in the economic 
freedom indices, the corruption index, and human development factors (Tables 4.l2a, 4.l2b, 
4.13) will be compared. Alongside this comparison particular issues of the countries under 
study will be highlighted. These are government intervention in Mauritius, biased production 
and skill demand in South Africa, the political Dutch disease constraints to manufacturing 
and war in Nigeria and Cote d'ivoire. 
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4.5.1 Endogenous factors 
The indices in Table 4.12a and 4. 12b are based on variables that" are identified to contribute 
to, or hinder the freedom of production and distribution of output. They compare the extent of 
corruption and some components of market and government failure as well as some measures 
of incenti ves. For example, informal markets, wages and prices, and trade openness; 
government intervention and regulation; differences in property rights, foreign investment 
and institutions of banking and finance . The year 2000 has been chosen to connect with the 
MV A analysis that extends to that year, and it is compared to more recent indices for 2004. 
All four countries, according to the Heritage Foundation (2004), were assessed as mostly 
"unfree" in 2000 (see Table 4.12 for scores and ranking of indices). 
Thus in general, a set of economic conditions common to these countries, i.e., government 
policies, trade barriers, etc., have been shown to influence South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius 
and Cilte d' lvoire within more or less the same range in 2000. Compared to 2000, Mauritius 
and South Africa have improved to become "mostly free" in 2004. However, the above 
variables do not explain the specific effects in each country, whereas the human development 
factors indicate the type of development path associated with endowments. For instance, 
they do not explain how in 2000 "unfree" trade, wages and prices, and government 
intervention have affected Mauritius nor do the variables explain how the "mostly free" 
economy of South Africa in 2004 aided manufacturing diversification especially toward non-
labour absorbing sectors despite relatively "good performance" in manufacturing. 
4.5.2 Selective intervention in Mauritius' EPZs 
The economic freedom indices may not explain the effect of policy on industrial outcomes in 
the specific countries. Mauritius, with an overall score of 3 in 2000, has been ranked as 
repressed or less open in terms of trade, as with wages and prices, while government 
regulations and monetary policy are mostly "unfree". Consider policy in Mauritius for 
instance. Chapter Three pointed out that policy bias toward specific sectors to promote 
certain industries played a key role in Mauritius' success (OECD, 2002b). The EPZs' textile 
manufacturing exports had been supported by the quota-free and duty-free access into the 
European market and is a major factor in the sector's development. There has been selective 
intervention therefore in Mauritius, rather than trade liberali sation toward exploiting its 
natural comparative advantage (labour) as neoclassical theory would suggest (Section 2.2). 
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Table 4.12a Index of economic freedom (2000, 2004) 
Year Country Overall Overall Trade Fiscal Government Monetary 
Rank Score Burden Intervention Policy 
2000/4 Cote 180/89 3.45/3.18 5.0/4.0 3.5/4.3 3.0/1.5 2.012.0 
d'Ivoire 
2000/4 Mauritius 58/71 3.00/2.99 4.0/5.0 3.5/2.9 2.0/3.0 3.012.0 
2000/4 Nigeria 94/142 3.60/3.95 5.0/5.0 2.0/3.5 2.0/4.5 5.0/4.0 
2000/4 South 61 /60 3.0012 .79 4.0/4.0 4.0/3.9 2.012.0 3.012.0 
Africa 
Year Country Overall Foreign Banking Wages/ Property Regulation Informal 
Rank lnvestmen t / Prices Rights Market 
Finance 
2000/4 Cote 180/89 3.0/3.0 3.0/2.0 2.0/3.0 3.0/4.0 4.0/4.0 4.0/4.0 
d'ivoire 
2000/4 Mauritius 58/71 3.0/3.0 2.0/2.0 4.0/4.0 2.0/2.0 3.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 
2000/4 Nigeria 941142 2.0/3.0 4.0/4.0 2.0/3.0 4.0/4.0 4.0/4.0 3.0/4.5 
2000/4 South 61/60 2.012.0 3.0/3.0 2.012.0 3.0/3.0 2.0/3.0 4.0/3.0 
Africa 
Free: 1.95 or less; Mostly Free: 2.00 to 2.95 ; Mostly Unfree: 3.00 to 3.95 ; Repressed: 4.00 or 
higher. 
Source: The Heritage Foundation (2004). 
Table 4.12b: Corruption perception index (2004) 
Country Score Ranking 
South Africa 4.6 44 
Mauritius 4.1 54 
Cote d'i voire 2.0 133 
Nigeria 1.6 144 
HIghly clean: 10; HIghly corrupt: 0 
Source: Transparency International (2004) 
Thus, attempting to explain Mauritius' success in narrow manufacturing exports largely by its 
skill endowment relative to land is debatable because its success sectors are really just low 
skill labour-intensive. 
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However, considering that if the endogenous growth theorists' argument presented in Chapter 
Two is correct, the conditions above may have aided Mauritius even though policy was said 
to be the driving force behind the EPZ exports . Such factors within an economy that aid in 
the acquisition and adoption of technology necessary for sound economic performance such 
as industrial capabilities, entrepreneurial abilities and technological capabilities enable 
manufacturers to penetrate the global market (Lall, 1992; ILO, 2000). One might add that 
without the capacity and capability, even with policy bias toward these sectors, Mauritius 
could not have succeeded to increase its export shares in the textile and clothing sector. In 
this regard, restructuring and improved productivity in the clothing and textile sectors lends 
support to the sector's competitiveness (ILO, 2000). In the paint industry as well, new 
technology was obtained usually from overseas visits to suppliers or trade fairs. Research 
and development (R&D) are also invested in heavily. Depending on the industry, the role of 
foreign partnership provided technology, technical assistance and marketing services . Local 
partners of prominent and long established local firms managed production and 
administration (Larnusse, 1997). All these are imperative for technical efficiency, reflected in 
Mauritius' relatively high MY A. In addition, exporting success suggests product 
development, continuous product improvement, customer services and management and 
business know-how (ILO report, 2000). This unaccounted learning-by-doing make Wood and 
Mayer's (1998, 1999) schooling per kilometre ofland not so precise a measure of skill. 
Mauritius' low land per worker, thus, its high popUlation density (see Table 4.1), as pointed to 
in Section 4.2, might have made a positive contribution to economic performance. 
Transportation costs may be low, making markets relatively integrated. One such advantage 
of low land per worker (hence high population density) mentioned in Section 4.3, is 
Mauritius' network of fixed telephone lines. It had the greatest density of telephone lines at 
270 per 1000 people in 2000 (Table 4.13). These aspects are said to lower the transaction 
costs of doing business (Collier and Gunning, 1999a). 
Human development factors in Table 4.13 below indicate also that, after South Africa, in the 
period between 1990-200 I , Mauritius had an average of 360 researchers in R&D per million 
people. Secondary school enrolment ratio in Mauritius in 2000-2002 was the second largest at 
77%, while public spending on education in 1988-2001 was at 3.7% of GNI, smaller than 
Cote d'lvoire and South Africa. Along with Mauritius' policy bias toward the labour-
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intensive sectors, school enrolment and government's commitment to education indicate the 
country's relatively high demand for skill. The relatively lower corruption perception along 
with these social factors suggests that these incentives could attract investments utilising 
social capital in Mauritius. 
It is this that Leamer et aJ. (1999) argue, will lead to a gradual accumulation of skill as well 
as the learning-by-doing, that may hasten the emergence of manufacturing in labour abundant 
countries compared to land abundant countries. 
When all these aspects are linked, i.e., Mauritius' endowment and the endogenous factors, it 
seems to suggest that Mauritius' development reflected by its GNI per capita is on a growth 
path. It is debatable however, whether Mauritius' growth relies just on an enclave type 
growth based on cheap labour or whether the country is on a long-term path to development. 
The indication from the significance of services in the information, communication and 
technology (lCT) sector and finance (Section 4.4) seems to 'point to the sustainability of 
growth. 
4.5.3 Skill demand in South Africa 
Despite its land and resource abundance, South Africa is a "good performer" in SSA, in terms 
of shares of manufacturing exports in total exports based on the W -M (1998, 1999) model. 
However, it has been shown that South Africa's main manufacturing in basic metals is 
nonetheless natural resource-intensive. Section 4.4 .1 described this sector as relatively 
capital and human-intensive compared to Mauritius' textiles and clothing for example. In 
addition to these characteristics, the measures in Table 4.12a rate South Africa in 2004 as 
"mostly free" in factors that enable the production and distribution of goods in the economy. 
In terms of human development indicators, Table 4.13 also shows South Africa to fare 
relatively better than the other three countries Mauritius, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, except 
with respect to fixed telephone lines where Mauritius fares best. Coupled with a 
comparatively high standard of infrastructure and financial sector in the African context, 
South Africa also provides an investor-attractive environment for value added manufactures 
(ILO, 2000). 
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Education expenditure and school enrolment is the highest of the four countries in South 
Africa, which seems to point to a demand for skill that is comparatively higher. Therefore, 
one may argue that South Africa possibly could be on a more skill-intensive growth 
development path compared to Mauritius, even though the ratio of skill to land is relatively 
higher in Mauritius . 
The point to make about South Africa is that the country's seemingly higher demand for skill 
and the deduction that this indicates a growth development path cannot be generalised. This 
statement is based on the difference in the type of labour demanded between basic 
manufactures, finance, insurance, real estate and business services sectors (FIRE), and that 
required in textile and clothing for instance. For example the demand for skill in South Africa 
may tend more towards those profitable sectors pointed out in Section 4.4. 
The challenge facing manufacturing productivity in the labour-intensive sectors has been 
argued to be mainly due to the scarcity of skill in South Africa (Moll', 1991; Joffe et aI., 1993; 
the South African Foundation, 1996). However, the highly skiHed labour-intensive FIRE had 
a labour force only one third of that of manufacturing between 1993-97. Further, its increase 
in employment of higher skilled workers was two thirds greater than in manufactures (Bell 
and Madula, 200 I). This seems to conform to the notion that generally the problem with the 
South African manufacturing sector with regards to skill is not in its supply but rather in the 
labour-intensive sectors' demand for skill (Bell and Madula, 2001). Thus, the possibility of 
skill mismatch and investment preference should not be ruled out. 
For instance, in the Industrial Strategy Project (1993), comparative evidence of sectors 
showed that a number of firms in the apparel sector then had increased their exports but 
lacked substantial modification of their work organisation and production processes. 
Increased exports instead just allowed firms to work at a higher capacity or move to areas of 
lower wages (Joffe et aI., 1993: 18). This seems also to infer that demand for low skill labour 
is the most significant in the labour-intensive sectors of South Africa. 
The low skill demand in labour-intensive manufactures forms an interesting point linking to 
Leamer et ai's (1999) hypothesis in Chapter Three, that a resource abundant country, like 
South Africa, is characterised by low demand for raw labour in labour-intensive 
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manufacturing sectors. Also, mechanisation in the labour-intensive sectors is preferred in 
order to compete with labour-intensive countries that are already in the market (see Section 
3.2). 
Therefore, a comparison between South Africa and Mauritius can be made on the basis of 
employment, in that the former faces a job creation challenge with unemployment rising as 
capital-intensive production is favoured over the latter (see Fedderke, et aI., 2003). Mauritius 
selected the labour-intensive textile and clothing sector to boost economic growth while 
economic growth in South Africa is generated through basic manufactures. This goes back to 
the characteristics of export manufactures discussed in Chapter One such as the advantage of 
surplus labour absorption, especially in the labour-intensive sectors that could translate into 
economic growth. 
Nonetheless, given these endogenous factors in South Africa and its GN! per capita similar to 
Mauritius', demand for skill in the former appears to point to the direction of growth and 
development when compared to Nigeria and C6te d'lvoire. This is probably because the 
structure of the profitable sectors, i.e., basic metals and services are relatively labour 
absorbing at least, more so than the oil sector in Nigeria, for example. 
4.5.4 Constraints to manufacturing in Nigeria 
Simply put, Nigeria's domestic environment can be shown as being controlled by its natural 
endowment, oil. Section 4.4 already illustrated the possibility of Dutch disease effects on 
production in Nigeria. It was found that in the case of Nigeria, profitability in the oil sector is 
possibly the cause of low production in manufacturing concentrated mainly in capital-
intensive sectors. Against the background of the brief history given in Chapter Three, in 
addition to factors considered in Tables 4.12a and 4.12b, this section will argue that political 
Dutch disease has also caused a low domestic demand and investment in human capital (skill) 
and infrastructure as a result of Nigeria's path dependency along oil export growth. Thus, the 
endogenous factors from Tables 4.12a and 4.l2b clearly demonstrate the strained economic 
environment in the country. Government intervention, policy, bank.ing and finance, property 
rights among others, was assessed as mostly un-free or repressed in 2000, and has further 
worsened in 2004. 
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Table 4.13 Human development indicators 
Public Cote d'ivoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
Education 
Expenditure 
(%GN!) 
1980 7.2 5.3 6.1 -
1985 6.3 3.8 1.2 4.2 
1988-200 I 4.9 3.7 0.7 5.9 
Secondary Cote d'!voire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
School 
enrolment 
Ratio (%)' 
1985 20 49 34 54 
2000-2001 23 77 - 87 
Fixed Cote d' Ivoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
telephone per 
1000 people 
1990 6 52 3 93 
2002 20 270 5 I07 
Researchers in Cote d'Ivoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
R&D per 
million 
people 
1990-200 I - 360 15 (1989 data) 992 
Source: Human Development Indicators (African Development Bank, 2004) 
5 RatiO 01 enro][ed children of the OlllCI3I age for education level to the lotal proportIon of thaI age. 
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Further assessment of Nigeria's domestic condition could best be explained through its 
system of federalism and political control over oil, a cause of civil unrest and political Dutch 
disease (Lam and Wantchekon, 2003; Gylfason, 2001; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Ross, 
2003). Therefore, the focus here will be on governrnent allocative power. Since a large part 
of the rent in the booming sector goes to the government through taxes, the magnitude and 
direction of government spending becomes important (see Section 2.6.5). 
Government allocative power in Nigeria emanates in public decision that is centralised, and 
spending that goes unchecked. This has probably been possible due to the huge oil and 
mineral wealth, that makes up three-quarters of total governrnent revenue, all accruing to the 
federal government (Johnson, 2005) . Very little of this wealth is however committed to 
developing human capital such as in education and health care. The following discussion 
illustrates Nigeria's public decision with skewed spending that does not generate growth with 
development. 
Historically the Nigerian government has lagged behind other countries (including some Sub-
Saharan countries) in spending on health and education (African Economic Report, 2002). In 
1994- 98 the federal government spent on average around 2.5% of GOP a year on health, 
compared with an average of 3.9% for Ghana, 6.9% for South Africa, and 4.0% for Sub-
Saharan Africa (African Economic Report, 2002). However, the caveat is that the three-tier 
government (federal, state and local) in Nigeria is responsible for health and education and 
data is not always available from all three levels of" government. Therefore, data 
interpretation may not be accurate if government spending is not aggregated (African 
Economic Report, 2002). 
The commitment to education in Nigeria mirrors the declining demand for skill. For instance, 
public education expenditure was 6.1 % of GNI in 1980 and 0.7% of GNI in 1988-2000 
(Table 4.13). Between 1985- 87 and 1995- 97 the Nigerian government's spending on 
education fe ll from 1.7% of GOP to 0.7%, while education spending rose in most other Sub-
Saharan countries, including Cote d 'Ivoire, Ghana, and South Africa (African Economic 
Report, 2002). Nigeria, for example had 15 researchers per one million people in 1989. It is 
conceivable that Nigeria's low demand for skill will culminate in a lack of investment in 
skilled labour-intensive manufacturing. 
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Under-development of infrastructure evidenced from a low number of telephone lines, i.e., 3 
and 5 fixed lines per 1000 people in 1990 and 2002 respectively (Table 4.13), indicates 
investment problems since one would expect that Nigeria's relatively high population density 
(in the Mauritian range) would be advantageous for lowering the cost of infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, the land to worker ratio has already been ruled out as a good measure applicable 
to Nigeria to assess manufacturing performance due to the country's huge natural resource 
abundance. Notwithstanding, the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) relates the 
declining contribution of the manufacturing sector to such factors, among others, as the high 
cost of transportation due to poor and inadequate infrastructure support services (UNIDO, 
2002). 
Trends in Nigeria's government expenditure appear to escalate, skewed towards 
administration and defence (Ayodele, 2003; Ayittey, 1995). In administration, there has been 
an increase in spending on wages to administer projects or' monitor the many government 
organisations. Also, expenditure has been on the rise to increase the size of internal defence 
against ethnic clashes and to protect oil regions like the Bakassi'Cameroon region, and for 
peace keeping operations in Africa (Ayodele, 2003). 
Domestically, expenditure is proposed on development plans often aimed at improving 
infrastructure and increasing welfare for its citizenry but none have materialised. Historically 
large projects with long gestation periods are started when oil prices move up. However, 
often these projects become redundant when oil revenues dry up (U.S Library of Congress, 
2003). Nigeria's development plans reflected its desire for improving economic welfare, 
however, 
"Economic reasoning gave way before economic enthusiasm, and the necessary co-
ordination and implementation were ignored" (U.S Library of Congress, 2003). 
These economic plans designated substantial oil funds for prestige projects and projects 
toward industrialisation that required imported capital technology and foreign skilled labour 
(Forest, 1993: 26). Based on thi s, exchange rate appreciation was welcomed by the 
government as this facilitates the growth of imports as well as easing demand pressure on the 
domestic market (Chapter Five will look further into the effects of exchange rates in Nigeria). 
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Development plans also came with various policies such as the technology policies for 
foreign technology transfer (UNlDO, 2002). Domestic technology development was to be 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) and joint ventures employing considerable foreign 
labour. In all cases however, the resulting conceptualisation of technology capacity 
acquisition was totally deficient and hence, capacity failure was the result (Forest, 1993). 
This hindrance to the acquisition, adaptation, improvement and functioning of technology in 
the economy forms the basis of endogenous growth theorists' argument for government 
intervention. 
However, it appears that Nigeria also faces government failure. At the firm level, the 
unchecked power of government, inconsistent policies and extended corruption by 
government officials deters from sustaining businesses (UNlDO, 2002). In addition, under-
invoicing of imports and dumping, the harassment of companies by some state and local 
government authorities over unauthorised mUltiple levies and charges, all serve as 
disincentives to manufacturers (UNlDO, 2002). 
At the societal level, discontent over the government revenue sharing formula coupled with 
mistrust stirs civil unrest. Nigeria's system of revenue sharing changed to a census-based 
formula for allocating revenue by region or state after 1960, where before regions retained 
their revenues from agriculture and mineral products. However, when the federal government 
opted to retain all revenues from oil and minerals, eventually by the 1970s, allocation of 
resources to various states in the country, apart from being based on popUlation, relied on 
states' needs as well as the social services they provided (Ahmed and Singh, 2003). 
For example, federal revenues to the states constitute up to 80% of oil revenue in 2000, 
making the states in Nigeria rely mainly on the federal government, itself highly dependent 
on oil revenue (Ahmed and Singh, 2003). This system of resource allocation is however 
rigged with political patronage along ethnic groups. Chapter Three already pointed out the 
problems of rent-seeking activities, first during the agricultural boom (cocoa exports) period, 
then after with oil dominance. 
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In addition, due to incomprehensible, non-transparent revenue sharing, an inconsistent 
reporting system and because the oil cost structure like anywhere else is complicated, there is 
growing mistrust of the government and suspicion of multinationals for tax evasion in 
collusion with government officials (Emmanuel, 2004). Evidence from investigations points 
to navy officials suspected of working with criminals in the theft of oil from tankers and 
pipes (Johnson, 2005). Worsening the matter is that evaluation of oil revenue expenditure is 
not independent of the government. For instance, the National Petroleum Investment 
Management Service (NAPIMS), a subsidiary of the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), is both equity partner and regulator of joint venture companies 
(Emmanuel, 2004). 
Also, Nigeria's unbalanced tax structure, because of its heavy reliance on foreign trade 
(mainly in the oil sector), causes problems for development (Forest, 1993). Initially, the 
government did not require taxation of personal incomes and incomes from private property, 
perhaps due to large revenues from oil (Forest, 1993). However,-eventually personal income 
tax collection, which is irregular and unchecked, went to the state governments (Ahmed and 
Sing, 2003). It is li kely that this has led to the political ana economic significance of 
taxpayers being reduced. As a result, there is limited or no democratic process to check 
federal government expenditure. 
In response to resource allocation issues, corruption in government, and abuse of power, civil 
unrest erupts instead of problem resolution using democratic political channels. This can be 
traced to economic hardship and a fight for resources. However, to make matters worse, 
because states and regions are along ethnically divided boundaries, issues that have their 
roots in the dispute over federal government revenue often turn into ethno-religious conflicts 
that may appear as the main source of the problem. For instance, going back in history, the 
civil war that occurred in 1967 was due to demand for autonomy and authority to retain tax 
and oil revenue by the people in the Eastern region (PBS, 2003). Nigeria has also experienced 
several coup d'etats under thirty years of military rule and a few civilian governments, all 
scrambling for government power (PBS, 2003). 
Further instability in Nigeria's economy is seen in declining security within the oil producing 
areas as ethnic groups fight for compensation from the federal government, for the 
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deterioration of their environment. The oil producing regions also experience youth 
vandalism in retaliation for not obtaining employment they perceive as their right (Johnson, 
2005). 
Intuitively, the political and social instability in Nigeria coupled with poor institutions and 
infrastructure raises the cost of transaction in Nigeria's business environment. It is apparent 
that high transaction costs in Nigeria create a very low return on skill (human capital) 
investment and subsequently on manufacturing. According to Collier (2002: 12), 
manufacturing and primary resource processing have a share of non-factor cost in total cost 
of about 65%-68% and 72% respectively, in contrast to the non-factor cost ofraw agriculture 
(44%) and natural resource extraction (37%). 
The high cost of manufacturing is further illustrated in UNIDO's (2002) study that found that 
the main preoccupation of manufacturers in Nigeria is how to source raw materials, spare 
parts and human resources. For example, the study found that most firms import raw 
materials because of the non-availability of local alternatives and due to the low quality of 
local substitutes. There is a concern over the availability of machinery and equipment as well. 
This is not surpris ing since imports depend on consistent availability of foreign exchange. 
Also, capacity utili sation, a significant determinant of productivity in manufacturing, is 
hampered by the aged machinery used in firms, the problems of finding replacement parts 
and deficiencies in the public provision of electricity which lead to output reduction (World 
Bank, 2002). This fits the explanation for the relatively low MVA in Nigeria shown in earlier 
tables in Section 4.4. 
4.5.5 Civil war in Cate d'lvoire 
Cote d'Ivoire's ranking has been third place in almost all areas of comparison with the other 
countries under study. With a comparative advantage in raw agricultural products due to its 
relative land abundance, the country's "poor" performance in manufacturing exports, 
according to Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999), could be explained by its land abundance 
relative to skill supply. However, going further than the supply explanation, endogenous 
conditions indicated in Tables 4.12a, 4,12b and Table 4.13 lead the discussion to the Dutch 
disease problem of land abundance in Cote d'Ivoire. This section argues in particular that 
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Cote d'Ivoire's poor economic performance is attributable to its dependency on agricultural 
exports. 
Cote d'Ivoire had enjoyed economic growth and political stability since its independence in 
1960, at least unti l the 1990s. Chapter Three pointed out that the industrial and institutional 
linkages and a fairly good transportation infrastructure that existed after Cote d'Ivoire's 
independence aided agricultural development. Migration policy also attracted the required 
labour from neighbouring countries. The close tie between the agriculture business elite and 
the government discussed in Chapter Three, brought about policies to serve the latter in 
favour of agricultural development. 
The large dependence on agriculture has, however, been attributed to the common 
fluctuations of exports earnings (OECD, 2004a; Trade and Development Centre, 2002). For 
example, coffee production fell in 2003 soon after its price rose in 2002 (OECD, 2004). 
Given Cote d'Ivoire's large dependency on agriculture, this economic instability is likely to 
destabilise the social and political arena of the country. 
Human capital reflected partly by government expenditure on education is seen to have 
declined from 7.2% in 1980 to 4.9% between 1988-2002 (Table 4.13). School enrolment was 
stagnant at 23% in 2001 from 20% in 1985. This suggests that Cote d'Ivoire's growth is low 
skill-intensive, possibly because the country is set on a development path that does not create 
demand for skill (see Figure 3.1). 
Despite Cote d'Ivoire's apparent success at economic and political stability compared to other 
sub-Saharan African countries, war has exposed the economic conflict in the country. The 
recent political instability is also a pointer to the political Dutch disease in Cote d'Ivoire that 
is eroding social capital where government corruption, ethnic and religious rivalry, and 
property rights among other conditions are made worse (Bannon and Collier, 5: 2003; Ross, 
2003: 32). This in itself limits the capacity to accumulate human capital as well as hindering 
production. Section 4.4 discussed the shortage of inputs and the inaccessibi lity of certain 
production areas such as the conflict-ridden cotton region and the shortage of seeds that have 
adversely affected agriculture as well as food processing. 
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Unsustainable economic growth could possibly have triggered the civil war in 2002. It is 
suggested further, that this has its roots in the coup of 1999 against extensive government 
corruption (The Columbia Electronic Encyclopaedia, 2003). In the 1990s the country was 
also recovering from an economic slump since the 1980s (Bax, 2004). It has been suggested 
that the war has been promoted by those who stand to benefit from it (Wible, 2004). Further, 
since the first coup of 1999, the growing tension is believed to be worsened by politicians 
that use the nationalisation ideology as a solution to uplift the economy (Wible, 2004). This 
sentiment stems from forty years of rapid economic growth based on land and migration 
policies that have stirred local sensitivities in such a way that some political reaction was 
almost inevitable once the boom ended (Crook, 2002). Also, the clash between peoples from 
the predominantly Christian south, where the dominant cash crop, cocoa, is found, and the 
migrant labour from the predominantly Muslim north and neighbouring countries has blurred 
the cause of the crises. It appears that the war stems from ethnic and rel igious conflicts rather 
than economic strife focussed on cropland in the absence of other sources of income. 
Thus, due to the extensive reliance on unstable export earnings from agriculture, it is also 
expected that poor endogenous conditions will be manifest in Cote d'lvoire. For instance, 
similar to Nigeria, the index of economic freedom (Table 4.12a) ranks Cote d'Ivoire mostly 
un-free. Likewise, perceived government corruption is relatively high (Table 4.12b), and 
infrastructure development such as the number of fixed telephone lines per 1000 people is 
relatively low in Cote d'lvoire (see Table 4.13). 
Although the war is more recent, the historic data on the commitment to education, and 
school enrolment ratios since the 1980s stand out as indicators of the long term low demand 
for skilled labour. 
It therefore seems plausible to explain the low manufacturing exports of a land abundant 
country such as Cote d'[voire, as stemming from its natural endowment that has set it on a 
growth path to under-development. This type of growth path frustrates diversification efforts, 
thereby retarding the emergence of relatively stable sectors in manufacturing. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
It has been shown in this section that relatively higher shares of manufacturing exports in 
South Africa and Mauritius coincide with higher MV A. Endogenous factors such as those of 
the economic freedom index were also investigated and it appears that all four countries in 
2002 were within the same scoring range. It was thus suggested that it was possible these 
factors have country specific effects contrary or coinciding with what the index terms "free" 
or nunfree". For instance, government intervention although ranked as un-free in Mauritius, 
was found to have aided the establishment of the EPZs . In 2004 however, the ranking of the 
countries had changed to Mauritius and South Africa being mostly free while Cote and 
Nigeria were ranked as mostly un-free. 
It was found that large divergences in the levels of public commitment to education, fixed 
telephone lines per 1000 people and R&D existed between the "poor performers" (Nigeria 
and Cote d'lvoire) and the "good performers" in manufactures, viz. South Africa and 
Mauritius. Although public commitment to education had declined slightly in Mauritius, its 
secondary school enrolment ratio had significantly increased since 1985 . South Africa 
experienced increased both in public expenditure and school enrolment since the 1980s. 
Although Cote d'ivoire and South Africa are somewhat similar in land per worker ratios, 
public commitment to education and school enrolment ratio in the former is significantly 
lower. In this regard, Nigeria had the least favourable figures for school enrolment and 
public expenditure on education. 
The suggestion that Nigeria and Cote d'ivoire have not raised their demand for skilled labour 
because they are set on a path of natural resource dependency, and thus low skill-intensive 
growth appears valid. For instance, the difference in secondary enrolment ratios between 
South Africa and Mauritius, and Cote d'ivoire was 50%-60%. While the number of 
researchers in R&D is not available for Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria, the number of researchers 
per million people is in the hundreds in South Africa (992 researchers) and Mauritius (360 
researchers). The comparison of the commitment to education, school enrolment ratio and the 
number of researchers per million people between Mauritius and South Africa also seem to 
point that the development path of the latter is relatively more skill-intensive than the former. 
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Although no one factor entirely explains the difference in manufacturing performance in the 
countries under study, what this chapter has attempted to do is to look into the structures of 
the countries' specific sectors (Section 4.4) and to consider the endogenous elements (Section 
4.5), non-market and government factors. Along with indicators of human development, 
these have partially refined the measure of manufacturing shares in exports and thus, 
economic performance based on ratios of land per worker and skill per land used in the Wood 
and Mayer (1998, 1999) model, particularly between the "good performers" and the "poor 
perfonners rt • 
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CHAPTERS 
MANUFACTURING DIVERSIFICATION AMID TERMS OF TRADE 
SHOCKS: POLITICAL DUTCH DISEASE 
5.1 Introduction 
In refining the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) model, Chapter Four established that land 
abundance does not correlate with ONI/per capita probably because using land/worker ratio is 
a crude measure. Thus, while ONI per capita is relatively higher in a land abundant country 
such as South Africa that diversified into narrow manufacturing, it is relatively low in land 
abundant C6te d'i voire and Nigeria. 
Further, in Chapter Four, major structural fealnres and trends of the countries under study 
were highlighted, and based on their economic structure it was pointed out that oil and cocoa 
have been Nigeria and C6te d'lvoire's major exports. Nigeria and C6te d'lvoire are still 
dependent on single commodity exports, evidenced from oil and cocoa exports recently 
making up 96% and 41% of Nigeria and C6te d' ivoire's total exports in 2003 (UNCTAD, 
2004; Intracen, 2005). Coupled with the high fluctuation shown in their terms of trade (TOT) 
and real effective exchange rates (RER), these two countries make interesting cases of the 
adverse influence of external shocks given the nature of commodity exports. 
Mauritius could have had similar structural problems in the past when for instance, sugar was 
more than 70% of its total exports prior to 1990, likewise South Africa before the fall of gold 
production in the 1970s (Datamonitor, 2004). However, recently, while sugar exports in 
Mauritius accounted for 17% in 2002, in South Africa in the same period, the highest export 
contribution from commodities was from the precious and semi-precious stones group at 
about 13% of total exports (UNCTAD, 2004). Both countries have relatively diversified into 
manufacturing exports that accounted for more than 57% and 67% respectively in 2003 (see 
Table 4.1 0). 
The difference between the two pairs of countries lie in one principal consequence of the 
Dutch di sease phenomenon due to high dependence on single commodity exports . This is 
highlighted to be the probable case for Nigeria and C6te d' Ivoire (Section 4.3.4), which in 
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summary works indirectly through the appreciation of the real exchange rate I (see Stijns, 
2003; Section 5.2.3). This process is initiated when a boom in commodity exports brings 
about an excess flow of foreign currency. Everything else constant, this will tend to raise the 
value of the domestic currency relative to a basket of foreign currencies and thus lead to an 
appreciation of the real effeclive exchange rate (RER). The latter term will interchangeably 
be referred to as exchange rate, denoting relative currency value. Therefore, it is argued that 
in the Dutch disease mechanism a boom could cause changes in the relative domestic prices 
of goods as well as cause relative domestic currency changes. 
Further, the problem of single cOlrunodity dependence raises the need to compensate for the 
loss of foreign income, or to maintain a relatively higher exchange rate to facilitate 
government transactions. As a result, poor exchange rate management could adversely affect 
the RER in the short term. 
In the long term, high commodity prices could benefit the capital import dependent sectors ' 
industrialisation due to relatively cheaper imports. However, inflation and over-valuation of 
the RER could erode the profitability and competitiveness of non-booming sectors, a 
potential benefit for diversification. On the other hand, with sustained low prices for 
commodity exports, foreign exchange shortage may lead to de-industrialisation of import-
intensive sectors. Although the long-term low commodity prices might curtail government 
spending, ceteris paribus, investments in social capital and infrastructure for example, could 
suffer. 
Furthermore, because foreign reserves are depleted by the time a bust sets in soon after a 
boom, these cycles in the long run may lead to "permanent" foreign exchange and balance of 
payment (bop) constraints that will cripple or maintain a sluggish growth in the lagging 
sectors. 
I The real exchange rate here refers to the price of non-tradeables to tradeables (see Cordon and Neary, 1982) 
and nol to the real effective exchange rate that is a price-deflated measure of the value of a currency against a 
weighted average of several foreign currencies. 
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Another repercussion of single commodity dependence is on the political economy where the 
government opt for biased policies in favour of excessive spending that is not always 
productive. Social and political unrest arise to this effect. 
Given this backdrop, this chapter will attempt to establish that Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire are 
subjected to significant price changes of their major exports. This is due in part to internal 
effects, in the case of Cote d' lvoire; however, the focus is on external price instability leading 
to relatively high fluctuations in their TOT and RER. Thus, the question asked is whether 
commodity price instability created the external shocks that in turn led to bad policy 
implementation and political insecurity in Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria. 
Furthermore, in addition to external shocks, the chapter will also look at possible internal 
shocks due to Cote d'lvoire's large global market share for cocoa. Cote d' lvoire makes a 
likely case for the Rybczynski effect caused by over-production and trade of cocoa. 
First, based on the countries under study, a comparative data analysis of commodity price 
instability with regard to the countries' TOT and RER data fluCtuations will be undertaken. 
This is in order to establish that Cote d' I voire and Nigeria are more susceptible to commodity 
price instability than Mauritius and South Africa. Next, specific booms and busts in Cote 
d' lvoire and Nigeria will be analysed to see if the relationship between the RER and TOT 
movements are as the Dutch disease predicts. Some policies targeted to the exchange rate 
will also be highlighted. Subsequently, the discussion will point to the long run effects of 
external TOT movements in Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire which include problems of political 
Dutch disease linked to the shocks previously discussed. Subsequently, with respect to 
internal shocks, further discussion will show that Cote d'lvoire, in addition, possibly 
experienced the Rybczynski effect with immiserising growth. 
5.2 Commodity price instability, the TOT and the RER 
5.2.1 Commodity price instability: 1980-2003 
Table 5.1 depicts a time series of commodity price indices of the export products that are 
currently, or have been, the major exports of the countries under study. Thus, crude 
petro leum (oil) for Nigeria; cocoa for Cote d'lvoire; minerals, ores and metals for South 
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Africa; and sugar for Mauritius. Accordingly, price instability2 is measured as the percentage 
deviation ofthe commodity prices concerned from their exponential price trend levels for a 
given period (UNCTAD, 2004). 
Table 5.1: Commodity price instability and price trends 
Price Pricea Price Price Price Price 
instability trend instability trend instability trend 
Time Series 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 
All food 22.2 10.9 14.5 -3.7 10.7 0.7 
Cocoa 22.5 22.9 14.8 -4.9 12.3 2.6 
Sugar 58.1 7.9 50.6 -7.5 19.5 -2.7 
Minerals , ores and meLals 12 8.1 16.4 1.7 9.2 -2.1 
Gold 22.9 21.6 14.3 -2 .6 8 -2.6 
Crude petroleum 25.8 28.2 12.8 -10.7 15.2 -1.6 
Source. UNCTAD (2004) 
• Average rate of change per cent (current U.S dollars). 
The price trend is the average rate of change in price of a commodity per cent (U .S dollars) in 
the g iven periods. Reference will be made to the commodity price instability in the relatively 
recent periods from 1980-1989 and 1990-99. 
The terms of trade (TOT) is an index that reflects the ratio of a country's price of exports to 
its price of imports. This ratio is affected by the world prices of exports and imports and thus, 
their relative demand and supply. Higher prices of a country's exports means an improvement 
in the TOT. Therefore, everything constant, this implies higher real income for the country, 
increased purchasing power, especially for producers of the booming exports. In the case ofa 
single commodity-dependent country, there could be increased spending that adversely 
affects the economy as in the Dutch disease. 
2 There are other definitions of price instability, however, to compare with the countries in the study, the 
definition used from UNCTAD captures the events under study. 
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Figure 5.1: TOT comparison (2000=100) 
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Sources: TOT and RER data are based on the World Development Indicators (Quantec Research, 2004; World 
Bank, 2005). 
For the RER, the World Bank's definition will be used. It is a measure of the value of a 
currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies (nominal exchange rate) 
divided by a price deflator or index of costs. The RER is a trade-weighted exchange rate 
expressed as an index. This is differentiated in the thesis from the real exchange rate 
(nominal) that refers to the relative price of non-tradeables to that of tradeables (see Section 
5. 1). 
Given the argument that commodity dependent countries' macroeconomies are vulnerable to 
the external price changes of their major primary exports, this section will attempt to link 
commodity price instability with the TOT and RER fluctuations in the countries under study. 
A higher price instability index at a given period is thus expected to show relatively more 
fluctuations in the TOT and RER with respect to the base year in that period in a country 
highly commodity dependent as the data range will point out. 
5.2.1.1 1980-89 
Looking at Table 5.1 above, there was a sharp fall in the instability of commodity price 
indices (except for minerals, ores and metals) in the 1980s as the trend in prices declined 
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markedly in the same period. For this period, the price instability indices were in the 
descending order for the commodities under study: sugar (Mauritius), minerals, ores and 
metals (South Africa), cocoa and all foods (Cote d'Ivoire), gold (South Africa), and crude 
petroleum (Nigeria). Thus, according to the data, it can be inferred that comparatively, the oil 
price was the most stable in the 1980s in contrast to those for sugar, minerals, ores and 
metals, and cocoa. It would thus be expected that the relatively higher price instability for 
sugar, mineral, ores and metals, and cocoa in the 1980s to be reflected in higher fluctuations 
in the TOT and RER in Mauritius, South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire. 
In Figure 5.1 and 5.2 above, however, Mauritius and South Africa had stable TOT and RERs 
movements in the 1980s compared to Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria (data for Mauritius RER for 
the 1980s is unavailable however). Their range of data suggests this where for example, in 
Mauritius and South Africa, the TOT ranged from indices of 97-78 and 121-97 respectively 
from 1980-89. In contrast, Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire's TOT indices range from 192-61 and 
203-165 respectively in the same period (UNCTAD, 2004). Again, this is possibly due to the 
former pair of countries having relatively more diversified economies. On the other hand, 
from the range of their data, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire's TOT and RERs greatly fluctuated 
(less so for Cote d'lvoire) from the base year denoting relative instability in their data. 
5.2.1.2 1990-99 
In the 1990-99 period, while the price instability for sugar remained the highest, indices for 
all other commodities further decreased from their 1980s points except crude petroleum price 
instability that increased. Therefore, it is possible that the indices ranges in the TOT and 
RERs for the countries experiencing lower price instability of their major commodity exports 
would have been lower in this period relative to 1980-89. In Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the TOT, 
and RER curves for Mauritius and South Africa, and to a lesser extent, COte d'Ivoire appear 
smoother and closer to the base year in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s thus depicting 
comparatively less price instability. However, in conformity with the increased price 
instability of oil in this period the TOT and RER in Nigeria fluctuated relatively more. 
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Figure S.2: RER Comparison (2000=100) 
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In summary, the TOT and RER fluctuations, in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, shown by the range of 
indices from one period to the other seemingly reflect Nigeria and Cote d'ivoire as being 
relatively more subjected to commodity price instability over the long term. However, as the 
latter decreased from the 1970-79 level to 1980-89 onwards, the RERs and TOT of the 
countries under study appear closer to the base year, though, to a lesser extent in Nigeria. 
5.2.2 TOT and RER assessments in Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria 
In the previous section, commodity price instability was highlighted as a likely cause for 
relatively higher fluctuations of the TOT and the RER in especially Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire 
from 1980-1990. The purpose of this section is to identify specific booms caused by Cote 
d'ivoire and Nigeria's major exports. This is in order to find the relationship between the 
TOT and RER movement as predicted by the Dutch disease and to highlight other probable 
factors such as policy that affect the RER. Further effects of boom-bust cycles will link to 
the political Dutch disease problems in Cote d'ivoire and Nigeria. 
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In the Dutch disease theory, due to export booms of commodities, excess flow of foreign 
currency, if un-sterilised, leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency relative to its 
trading partners ' currencies. In addition, through the spending effect (see Section 2.6) the 
relative appreciation of non-tradeable goods real exchange rate (see Section 5.2.1) indirectly 
affects the RER. In this case, the relationship between the RER and the TOT is such that an 
export boom in natural resources would raise Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire's TOT. 
Consequently, with a possible spending effect an RER appreciation occurs. The latter in tum 
implies that domestic exports will be relatively more expensive than foreign goods. 
Therefore, since there is a particular emphasis put on the competitiveness of non-boom 
exports and the challenges to diversification, the RER thus becomes an appropriate variable 
to look at. 
A country's RER depend on the value of its trading partners' currencies. Another factor that 
also affect the RER is whether a country is operating in a fixed or floating exchange rate 
regime as well as policies toward the nominal exchange rate. 
The issue of policy brings the discussion to political Dutch disease. While policy, as will be 
seen later, often depends on the economic situation, the motive of governments could take 
over. Resource rich countries have governments that are perhaps sti ll politically immature 
with politicians of different backgrounds with different agendas. However, the intense 
dependence on resource wealth coupled with consolidated access to resources, the lack of 
democracy and the government's low "bequest motive" is what conceivably gives the latter 
control on national wealth that is mismanaged (Lam and Wantchekon, 2003). There is, thus, 
unchecked spending and often personal aggrandisement aided by their choice of policies. 
However, at periods of down turns when the society is most hurt, more often than not, the 
means for society to induce redistribution is to resort to the use of force. This applies also to 
the ousting of undesirable governments through coup d'etats. 
In addition, since political Dutch disease refers to the skewed control of natural resource 
wealth, another political dimension, to mention briefly, is international politics concerning 
export price regulation of commodities where industrialised countries control production 
prices. This includes developed countries supporting their agricultural sector by large 
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subsidies that shift the cost to producers in developing countries (Global Forum, 2003). The 
price regulation of sugar by the EU is one example where, although a country such as 
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Figure 5.3: The TOT, RER, and oil export prices for Nigeria (1980-2004) 
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Bank, 2005). 
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Mauritius has benefited, the cost has shifted to other countries like Brazil, Colombia, and 
Guatemala (Global Forum, 2003). 
Further, there are difficulties with respect to price negotiation between producers and 
consumers of agricultural produce, like cocoa, due to available cocoa substitute to consumer 
nations. Hence, Cote d'Ivoire' s membership of the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) 
has not capacitated it to exploit fully the rents trom commodity exports, as did Mauritius. 
Instead, the flow of foreign exchange earnings has remained volatile. 
5.2.3 Export booms and the TOT in Nigeria 
The export prices of oil, the TOT, and RER curves are represented in Figure 5.3 for Nigeria 
from 1980-2004 above. It appears that the TOT movement was congruent with that of oil 
export prices in the period of study from 1980-2004 shown in Figure 5.3. However, the 
significant cycles suggested by the peaks and troughs that appear in the TOT curve of Nigeria 
point to 1980 (boom)-1986 (bust); 1990 (boom)-1995 (bust); 1996 (boom)- 1998 (bust); 2003-
4 (boom). 
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For the price of oil exports, external events (OPEC, 2005) could explain some of the changes 
in the curve corresponding to the signifi cant point on the TOT curve. For instance, in 1979-
1980 the Iran-Iraq war led to the increase in the price of oil exports thus, corresponding to a 
boom in Nigeria in 1980. Further, the rise in the price of oi l exports in 1990 was when the 
1990-1 Persian Gulf War disrupted production from Iraq and Kuwait, and its decline in 1998 
was due to the Asian crises (OPEC, 2005). These can be seen also to coincide with an 
increase and decrease in the TOT in 1990 and 1998 respectively. The increasing price ofoil 
exports from 1999 into 2000 is reflected by Nigeria's TOT curve rising into the 2000s. 
Furthermore, another boom cycle should be expected with the unfolding global political 
upheaval since the United States attack in 2001 , and the latter's invasion of Iraq in 2004. 
5.2.4 Boom-bust cycles, the RER, and political Dutch disease in Nigeria 
5.2.4.1 1980 -1986 
During a boom-bust cycle, the RER movement in Nigeria is not straightforward like that of 
the TOT. For instance, although in the boom of 1980 the RER appreciated as predicted by 
the Dutch theory, it however continued to do so even with declining export prices of oil. It is 
possible that the RER appreciation was also related to some adverse effects of excessive 
spending that carried on after the 1980 boom. This is seemingly evident from the rate of 
change of inflation (over 20%) and the balance of payments position in 1981. The latter was 
overdrawn by N3 billion, in the same year, from a surplus of over N2 billion the previous 
year (Table 1.2, Central Bank of Nigeria: 2004). 
Further evidence of this problem was the tighter exchange rate control measures of the 
Economic Stabilisation Act in 1982 due to the shortage of foreign reserves (Egwaikhide, 
1999). It is likely also that Nigeria's exchange rate fixed to the dollar at the time' possibly 
contributed to the continued RER appreciation from early-mid 1980s. 
It was not until the mid 1980s that decreasing RER reflected the bust when oil export prices 
fell and the TOT significantly declined in 1986, as the Dutch disease theory would predict. A 
factor to consider however is that the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) implemented in 
3 Nigeria operated a fixed exchange rate regime from 1960-1986, under which the value of the naira was 
essentialIy tied to the U.S. dollar and to gold (lyoha and Dickson Oriakhi). 
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1985 aimed at depreciating the RER. In addition, 1986 ended the fixed exchange rate regime 
where the naira was fixed to the dollar (Iyoha and Oriakhi, 2002). This might explain the 
RER moving significantly downwards from 697 in 1985 compared to 784 in 1984. By the 
end of the fixed exchange rate period in 1986, it had decreased to 381. 
On the political front, during the bust, the economy was hit by a downturn (Table 1, CBN: 
2004) and the adversities of excessive spending during the previous boom. There was 
increased disgruntlement with the economic situation and extensive corruption in the 
government that led to a military coup in 1985 (Egwaikhide, 1999). It is the absence of 
economic diversification and thus Nigeria's lack of foreign revenue that could have "forced" 
the new government into an IMF type SAP in exchange for financial assistance. 
5.2.4.2 1990-1995 
Figure 5.3 shows the RER depreciating into the boom period of 1990 contrary to the Dutch 
disease theory. This fell to an index of 79 in 1993 with the continued bust. This period was 
still characterised by the continued SAP and its objective to depreciate the RER. While the 
boom brought temporary relief, the bust was longer, the effect of which brought about the 
fourth change in military government, i.e. , the Sani Abacha regime from 1993-1997. 
Contrary to the Dutch disease theory, the RER rose to 146 in 1994 as oil export prices and the 
TOT fell. The rise in the RER in the mid 1990s might explain the political Dutch disease 
problem that has mushroomed and was surfacing at the time (see Section 5.5). During this 
period, the Abacha regime had ended the SAP in 1994 and implemented a dual nominal 
exchange rate (Ekwaikhide and Isumonah, 2001). This comprised of a fixed official rate for 
government transactions and an autonomous foreign exchange rate (AFEM) (Ekwaikhide and 
Isumonah, 2001). 
5.2.4.3 1996-1998 
By the boom of 1996, the RER index of Nigeria was 153, stabilisi ng into the 2000s. 
However, the second part of the 1990s in Nigeria, the RER remained at high levels as the 
bust ensued the 1996 boom. During the Abacha rule, the government's control over oil 
revenues escalated as the fore ign exchange rate was fixed and interest rate capped (EIU, 
2005). Expenditure and revenue from oil had increased from more than N 11.4 billion and 
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NIO.9 billion at the start of the SAP in 1985 to N 487 billion and over N 324 billion 
respectively in 1998 at the end of Abacha's regime (Table 3, CBN: 2004). 
Further, corruption has been an ongoing problem in Nigeria; the Abacha period was 
characterised by immense embezzlement of national wealth to the tune of about £5.5 billion 
(Egwaikhide and Isumonah, 200 I). There appears little doubt that the direct supervision of 
the Central Bank by the president, and the federal government's complete control over the 
sharing of fiscal revenue between the federal, state and local levels of government might have 
paved the way for mismanagement of funds (Egwaikhide and Isumonah, 200 I). 
Political repression and assassinations of political opponents during the Abacha period, as 
well as the non-payment or irregular payment of workers served to fuel social unrest whereby 
work stoppage and academic strikes generated further uncertainties in Nigeria's economy 
(Egwaikhide and Isumonah, 200 I). 
Meanwhile, internationally, Nigeria had become a pariah due to human right abuses. This 
caused the sanctioning of Nigeria by the Commonwealth in 1995, and the European Union 
(EU) following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others (Human Rights Watch, 1995). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a recent boom cycle in Nigeria started in the 2000s. It will 
be interesting in the future to analyse this boom's effect on the macroeconomic variables, as 
well as the type of policy choice affecting the political economy. 
S.2.S Export booms and the TOT in COte d'lvoirc 
Figure 5.4 shows the export prices of cocoa and the TOT indices in Cote d'lvoire. From the 
TOT curve likely boom and bust periods appear to be: 1984 (boom)-1994 (bust); 1995 
(boom)-2000 (bust); and 2001 (boom). One interesting feature of Cote d' Ivoire's cycles is 
that they are less frequent and longer with gradual booms and busts. Unlike N igeria's, the 
cycles are shorter with booms that tend to suddenly spike and wane (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). 
It can be noted that both the TOT and export prices of cocoa moved together suggesting a 
positive correlation. Export prices of cocoa themselves are said to be, for the most part, 
affected by structural oversupply in the global market where a boom leads to over-production 
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Figure 5.4: The TOT, RER, and cocoa export prices for Cote d 'Ivoire 
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and thus a bust in the cocoa price. Structural oversupply occurs because of the waiting time 
between planting the cocoa tree crops and harvesting the fruits. Thus, current supply due to 
the time lag will be mismatched with the previous high demand that has now waned. Other 
than the time lag, weather and diseases playa major role in the volatility of the price of 
cocoa. 
Cote d'lvoire ' s TOT, similar to Nigeria, perhaps, could be understood through world 
production events according to the International Cocoa Organisation. For instance, in the 
second half of the 1980s world production of cocoa beans grew strongly and seven successive 
years of production surpluses from 1984/85 to 1990/9 1 led to a build-up of world stocks of 
cocoa beans (ICO, 2000). Cote d'lvoire's TOT can be observed thus, to, increase during this 
period to peak at an index of 260 in 1986. However, as world prices remained depressed, by 
1993 the TOT had deteriorated to a low level (ICO, 2000; Figure 5.4). 
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However, the RER movement interestingly before 1994 demonstrates an inverse relationship 
with the cocoa export prices and the TOT movements. 
5.2.6 Boom-bust cycles, the RER and political Dutch disease in COte d'Ivoire 
5.2.6.1 1984-1994 
Interestingly, rather than showing booms and bust of cocoa markets as do the other two 
variables, the RER moved in the opposite direction for most of the 1980s. The significant 
drop in the RER in 1994 was when the CFA was devalued. It is then that the three variables 
subsequently moved together. This is likely due to Cote d'lvoire's fixed exchange rate 
regime that pegged the CFA franc to the French franc, and now the Euro. Therefore, even 
though the TOT rose in the late 1984 as the export price of cocoa increased, the RER 
continued to decline, and vice versa in the second part of the 1990s. Therefore, the RER 
movement in Cote d'Ivoire could mainly be explained by the value of the French franc rather 
than cocoa boom. 
However, due to Cote d'Ivoire's large dependence on cocoa revenue, the collapse of the 
international price of the country's major export in the late 1980s led to a downturn. 
Subsequently, social unrest and a failed coup in the late 1980s took place (see Kouassy, 
Pegatienan and Bamba, 2005). This latter event had been associated with the society's 
dissatisfaction towards the unexplained windfalls from the 1970s and the unaccounted 
government expenditure and massive expansion of state owned enterprises (Answers.com: 
2005). The economic situation later called for structural reform of the SAP and political 
opening up that continued in the 1990s. 
5.2.6.2 1995-2000, and 200 I 
This boom-bust cycle is characterised by the improvement of the TOT due to recovered 
global market prices of cocoa in 1995 (ICO, 2000). As expected, with no other sectors to fall 
back on the cocoa bust that followed carried with it civil unrest and an attempted coup 
concerning resource control in 1999 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2004). 
Issues of resource control and the skewed access to resource wealth may best be understood 
through the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before privatisation in 1994. For example, SOEs 
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had enjoyed three quarters of the public sector turnover, jobs and value added especially 
where government had the most stakes in the agro-industry (OECDf, 2004). This is 
evidenced from public investment going to the most favoured sector, i.e., agriculture, where 
government had 100% shares (lMF, Table 26: 2004). For instance, over CFA franc 99 billion 
in 1998 was invested in the agro-industry of Cote d' lvoire, an increase from CFA franc 67.4 
bill ion in 1997. On the other hand, investment in the tertiary sector continued to fall at CFA 
franc 5.3 billion in 1999 compared to CFA franc 9.8 and 10.3 billion respectively in 1998 and 
1997 (IMF, 2004). In addition, current expenditure on salaries and wages also shows an 
escalation to CFA franc 523.5 billion in 2002 compared to CFA franc 408.1 billion in 1997 
(IMF, Table 19:2004). There are indications, thus, that government employment was more 
profitable. Like Nigeria, the beginning of a more recent boom cycle in 200 I seems likely in 
2002 . 
The above discussion ofthe relationship between the RER and the TOT has shown that while 
a congruent movement between the two might suggests Dutch disease mechanism, other 
factors such as the political economy also point to the importance of exchange rate regimes, 
thus the role of RER management in altering its movement. In Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria 
therefore, the RER was rather more susceptible to changes in the value of the foreign 
currency than in the TOT movements. In this case, the RER may appreciate during a 
commodity bust, and therefore the opportunity for non-booming domestic exports to gain 
competitiveness in the global market could be lost. Most significantly, it appears that single-
commodity-dependence created bad policies and societal conflict in Nigeria and Cote 
d'Ivoire. 
5.3 External effects 
5.3.1 Long-run TOT effects 
An interesting link to make is that between the external TOT movements and the RER in the 
long run. This section will limit the discussion directly to the long-term RER effects 
associated with external TOT shocks. As pointed out in the previous section, given that 
natural resources make up most of Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire's exports, cycles of booms (rise 
in the TOT) and busts (falling TOT) due to commodity prices instability are expected to 
cause volatility in both the TOT and RER. Subsequently, two arguments are presented here. 
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First, while there are likelihoods of Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire experiencing undesirable TOT 
shocks, there is a potential benefit of a long-term low price of commodities that could allow 
diversification away from major primary resources. However, there is a balance of payment 
constraint on diversification, and government investment during periods of low commodity 
export prices. Therefore, the two issues concerning long-term TOT effects emanate from the 
adverse effect of spending and balance of payment constraints. 
Second, a TOT shock that appreciates the RER could increase growth of some import-
dependent industries in manufacturing during boom periods but may hamper it in the long 
term if manufacturing exports become uncompetitive due to the appreciation. 
In the first case, sustained low commodity prices during a bust with a depreciating RER, 
everything else equal, could translate into competitive exports bringing in needed foreign 
income. For instance, a sustained poor price of cocoa might lead to diversification in Cote 
d'Ivoire. However, because a commodity export boom is short lived, a typical primary 
exporting country soon faces a balance of payment constraint due to increased spending of 
foreign reserves when commodity prices were high. The caveat is that prolonged low 
commodity prices may lead to "permanent" foreign exchange and balance of payment (bop) 
constraints that will cripple or maintain a sluggish growth in the lagging sectors limiting the 
import-dependent sectors. As inputs become unavailable the alternative export sectors of 
manufacturing and agriculture are squeezed further restricting diversification. It is, hence, 
expected that the import dependent non-commodity exporting sectors of Nigeria and Cote 
d'Jvoire may not benefit from a falling RER. Consider this through manufacturing capacity 
utilisation for instance. The latter, taken as a measure of efficient production, suggests also 
that during booms the availability and access of imported inputs and perhaps also the 
availability of machinery utilised in manufacturing is increased. For example, in Nigeria in 
the short term, manufacturing capacity utilisation had increased a year after the boom of 
1980, and during the booms of 1990, 1996, and in the 2000s (see CBN, Table 1.2: 2004) but 
decreased in the follow ing years. As Section 4.3.4 established, in the long term in both 
Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire, comparison between 1980-1990, and 1990-2002 showed that 
manufacturing lagged behind other sectors. 
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The persistently low shares of manufacturing exports experienced in both Nigeria and Cote 
d'Ivoire might be a manifestation of this. For instance, Cote d'Ivoire's share of 
manufacturing exports in total exports in 2003 was about 20% while foods and raw materials 
stood at over 55%. The latest data for Nigeria's manufacturing exports share is for 2000 at 
0.2%, compared to over 99% of fuel exports in the same period (UNCTAD, 2004; Table 
4.10). 
In addition to these limits to diversification, there are further long term adverse welfare 
considerations linked to the balance of payment constraint for primary export dependent 
countries when currency devaluation disrupts the development of heavily invested projects 
that had begun during commodity export booms. This occurs because often than not, 
governments in this situation opt for loans, exacerbating their debt situation. This is highly 
likely to be the case for Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, given that both countries are classified as 
severely and moderately indebted countries respectively (see the World Development 
Indicators, 2005). For example, 90% and 76% of GNI respectively in Cote d'Ivoire and 
Nigeria goes to interest rate paymenst toward debt servicing rather than toward development 
spending. 
5.3.2 Commodity price stability (sustainability of revenues) 
This section argues that the problem for commodity exporting countries is that highly volatile 
prices of their major commodity exports deter them from sustaining a flow of revenue for 
diversification. This goes to say that the problem is as much to do with high prices as it is 
with low prices. Perhaps this is due to the time lag for markets and agents to react to 
commodity price and macroeconomic changes . Consequently, economic diversification is 
more challenging. 
Previously in Section 5.2.3, Table 5.1 illustrated that all four countries experienced instability 
in commodity prices. However, export revenues were relatively more effectively sustained in 
Mauritius and South Africa probably due to other reasons. The issue raised in this section is 
that, unlike Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, historically, Mauritius and South Africa experienced 
commodity price instability differently and were able to sustain revenue for diversification. 
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Therefore, with regard to price instability for all commodities, the latter has decreased over 
time (see Section 5.2.3 and Table 5.1). However, although sugar was consistently most 
unstable relative to the other commodities, it is striking that since the 1970s Mauritius was 
able to maintain a relatively steady macroeconomy as depicted by her RER and TOT. 
Mauritius was formerly dependent on sugar that made up 70% of total exports. South Africa, 
also highly dependent on the mineral-energy-complex (MEC) developed around gold, 
minerals, ores and metals, the prices of which fluctuated as well, has relatively diversified. 
However, both countries have relatively higher shares of manufacturing exports in total 
exports compared to Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. 
In addition, since independence when sugar was 70% of Mauritius' exports, the country 
benefited from the Sugar Protocol (see Sections 3.3.2 and 4.3.1). This was an agreement with 
the then European Community (EC) for Mauritius to supply Europe with sugar at an agreed 
quota at three times its world price (African Business, 2004; OECDe, 2004). Had Mauritius 
been lucky to benefit from international sugar price regulation? In addition to the Sugar 
Protocol, Mauritius' textiles and clothing exports also enjoyed protection, since the 1980s. 
The latter were included in the Multifiber Arrangement with pre ferential access into the 
U.S.A and the EU. 
There are suggestions thus, that based on the "rent extraction", and infant industry arguments 
(see Section 2.5), continuous revenues from sugar exports were used to diversify a protected 
textiles and clothing sector in Mauritius. Therefore, in the long term the country did not face 
the adverse effects of fluctuations from world sugar prices as did Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. 
In South Africa, on the other hand, while the importance of gold has been on the decline, 
hence suggestive of the decline of the impact of gold price instability on South Africa's 
economy, other metals, ores and minerals still carry great importance. Nonetheless, price 
instability from th e latter group is still comparably lower than the other countries' 
commodities as has been shown in Section 5.2. 
However, there is the issue of sustained capital flows in the case of South Africa as opposed 
to volatile flows. This goes back in history before the 1970s. Capital flows from Britain and 
foreign investment attracted by the oppressive wages and huge profits in the apartheid era 
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(Southall, 2005) could partially account for South Africa's source of capital for 
diversification. This has likely supplemented gold revenue, although sanctions later deterred 
this. 
Perhaps, it could be argued also that South Africa's diversification was politically driven by 
economic rivalry with profit incentives. Fine and Rustomjee (1999) explain well the 
disjunction between English (mining) capitalists and Afrikaner nationalists, as already 
touched on in Chapter Three. The integration of the two interests, thus, encouraged 
government steel (ISCOR), electricity (ESCOM), chemicals and petroleum (SASOL) 
companies to form the highly protected MEC (see Chapter Three, as well as Lewis, Reed and 
Teljeur, 2005). These industries along with other sectors also enjoyed protection from import 
substitution industrialisation (lSI) between 1925 and 1973 (Schneider, 2000). Therefore, 
based on the infant industry argument, the country had years to build on its manufacturing 
sector, despite the controversial circumstances. 
Unlike the development of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria (see 
Chapter Three), economic rivalry could have been directed toward relatively more diversified 
investment in South Africa. To this effect, the next section will discuss the political Dutch 
disease that appears prevalent in Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. 
5.4 The Rybczynski effect and internal TOT effects 
5.4.1 Effect on growth and welfare 
So far, the discussion has linked Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire's comparative advantage with 
unfavourable external shocks. Subsequently, the following discussion will also argue that an 
internal TOT effect due to the production and trade mixes of Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, based 
on their comparative advantages, exposes them to internal shocks due to the over production 
of their major exports. The problem that arises from over production often stems from much 
needed national revenue. The distinction with the TOT change here, in contrast to earlier 
discussions where there is an external shock, is that it is internally driven. 
The focus is on Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria because they have relatively higher shares of 
primary products in total exports and have relatively high dependence on single commodities 
(see Chapter Four). The argument is that the two countries could be subjected to the 
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Rybczynski and the immiserising growth effects. However, it is questionable that Nigeria 
alone without the cartel of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) it 
belongs to could influence the world price' of oil (see below, Section 5.4). Thus, the small 
country assumption of the Rybczynski effect could apply to Nigeria since the latter' s world 
share of oil market is relatively small. This also may apply to Cote d'lvoire with regard to 
other agricultural raw material and food commodity exports rather than coffee or cocoa, the 
prices of which Cote d'lvoire could influence in the world market. It seems fitting thus to 
apply the big country case of the Rybczynski theorem with immiserising growth in Cote 
d'Ivoire. 
Therefore, to re-iterate from Section 2.2, returns to scale, relative prices, commodity world 
price, and technology are assumed constant and apply to a small country case such as 
Nigeria. Thus, if the converse of Figure 2.1 is considered in the case of Nigeria for example, 
an increase in one production factor, capital, could cause a biased production and ultra-
protrade of the commodity intensive in that factor which the country has comparative 
advantage, i.e., oil (see Section 4.3.2). However, since technical change is assumed constant, 
to maintain the equilibrium when capital increases, the other sectors must give up some 
labour for the new capital in the oil sector. The significance of this is that in the absence of 
technological change or innovation to redress this change in production requirement the 
output of the other sector(s) should decline. 
Further, with the assumption of constants return to scale, which both Nigeria and Cote 
d'Ivoire are assumed to be characterised (see S5derbom and Teal, 2002a), one factor growth 
only results in less than proportionate increase in output. Therefore, employment and income 
growth would be less than if both factors (capital and labour) have grown in Nigeria. In 
addition, the non-labour-absorbing characteristics of the oil sector, and the surplus labour 
from the declining sectors coupled with population increase above national income could 
" N igeria has been a member of the cartel OPEC since 1971 and the latter has about 40% share of the global 
market (OPEC, 2005). On the other hand, Cote d'Ivoire alone has a 40% share of the world market for cocoa 
and is the third coffee producer in the world after Brazil and Columbia (American University, 2005). 
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intensify the poor welfare condition. The benefit of growth is, therefore, counteracted for 
such a country. 
Likewise, in Cote d'Ivoire, labour force growth (see Figure 2. 1) in the comparative 
advantageous labour-intensive agricultural sector could lead to a production bias and an 
increased trade in this sector, everything else constant. It follows that at the new equilibrium, 
some capital (physical or otherwise) must be released from the relatively capital-intensive 
sectors for the new labour employed in the agricultural sector. As a result, output and income 
from other sectors will be lost. In addition to increased population, Cote d'Ivoire could 
experience lower per capita income than if both labour force and capital increased. 
In this regard, Appendix I (Figure b) suggests a link between welfare (income per head) and 
annual population growth. It points to the annual growth rate of income per head slower than 
population growth in Cote d'ivoire, Nigeria and South Africa. The three countries being 
land-abundant also suggest an implicit correlation with welfare. This is in contrast to 
Mauritius that has experienced relatively the highest income per head (Appendix I , Figure a). 
In the case of South Africa, this is probably due to the importance of other metals and ores 
exports even as the relevance of foreign earning from gold declines (see Section 4.3). 
5.4.2 Immiserising effects 
For this discussion, Cote d'Ivoire, rather than Nigeria, will be considered as it is large enough 
to affect the international market price of cocoa and coffee. Therefore, the former may 
probably be subject to immiserising growth when its coffee and cocoa sectors grow. 
Therefore, since Cote d'Ivoire could affect world prices through the quantity supplied of 
commodity exports (cocoa or coffee) in the world market, the excess supply of these export 
goods is anticipated to lead to the fall in the prices they receive. In the early 1980s for 
instance, Cote d'Ivoire's export driven strategy of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
based on increasing major commodity exports is viewed to have contributed to the fall ing 
price of the country's commodity export in that period, with a consequential manufacturing 
output compression (Kouassy et aI., 2005). 
Combined with a decline in the output of non-competitive sectors (e.g. manufactures) as 
explained in Section 5.3.1, a rise in their demand could therefore increase the demand for 
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import substitutes. These two effects, i.e., a fall in the prices of major exports and a rise in 
the volume of imports, could result in the deterioration of Cote d'Ivoire' s TOT leading to 
immiserising growth. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, examination ofthe terms of trade and the real effective (currency) exchange 
rate of the countries from 1980 to 2003 reveals South Africa and Mauritius' macroeconomic 
variables to be relatively steadier than those of Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Overall, the 
variability of the TOT and the RER seemed controlled in Mauritius and South Africa. 
Therefore, there is indication that relatively more steady and regular foreign earnings and 
investment possibilities benefited South Africa and Mauritius. On the other hand, given the 
high dependence of Nigeria and Cote d' Ivoire on commodity exports, a link was established 
between commodity price instability and their TOT and RER fluctuations around the base 
year. This suggested conformity with the notion that their macroeconomies with respect to 
the TOT reflect the external price shocks from the global market. 
It was suggested that while both Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria could be subjected to the 
Rybczynski effect, the former may further be made worse off if by oversupplying the world 
market with cocoa it experiences immiserising growth. 
It was also highlighted that during prolonged commodity busts, there seemed to be changes in 
the government, along with political and social upheavals in Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. The 
RER did not always conform to the TOT movement as would be expected, perhaps due to 
policies geared towards fixing the nominal exchange rate. Such government response seemed 
to coincide with worsening TOT and RER appreciation soon after. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, the TOT seemed to move inversely with the RER. Reforms in the country 
such as market liberalisation and RER stabilisation seemed linked with a rising RER 
(currency overvaluation) and the strengthening of the French franc. However, the 
devaluation of the CFA was reversed in 1994. To increase the country's exports, the SAP of 
the 1980s was biased toward cocoa and other major agricultural exports. However, since this 
strategy has been argued to have an adverse effect (immiserising growth) on the country, 
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retrospectively and intuitively, it may have worsened the economic downturn experienced at 
that period. 
Further, historical events, dispensations of the countries with their main trading partners, and 
internal political and economic rivalry were pointed out as having greatly influenced the 
emergence of industries. For instance, while economic and political rivalry seemingly 
initiated manufacturing diversification in South Africa, Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire, however, 
had all the signs of political Dutch disease. Social unrest in Nigeria and war in Cote d'[voire, 
have been traced to political discontent over their corrupt governments and skewed access to 
natural resource wealth (see Sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4). Historically, South Africa also once 
experienced political upheavals based on its biased access and control of national wealth 
around the MEC. However, perhaps due to manufacturing diversification and the improved 
political environment, external shocks tied to ores, metals and minerals in the country have a 
relatively less destablised the macroeconomy. The country is still challenged by the societal 
inequality caused by its past growth direction which limited greater worker participation of 
the populace. 
Nonetheless, external effects of politics tied to resources have also had undesirable effects on 
Nigeria and Cote d'l voire in that consumers of the more industrialised importing regions still 
dictate world prices of commodities. Perhaps Mauritius was just lucky in its sugar price 
negotiation. Combined with such a strategic policy of protection to develop its textile and 
clothing industry, the economic and political struggle was less of a challenge in Mauritius. 
Finally, it is realistic to say that commodity exports are necessary for Nigeria and Cote 
d' ivoire despite their associated adverse effects. It is the chicken or the egg problem that 
arises when primary export dependent countries need to diversify away from their primary 
resource sectors; but however are tied to rely increasingly on their comparative advantage in 
commodity exports as the source of income for investment. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
It is commonly believed about sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that the region has a comparative 
advantage in primary resources as reflected by its high share of primary exports to total 
exports. Figures of the region's poor economic performance and declining world market 
shares, even for their commodity exports, lead to findings that competitiveness and supply 
side factors among other endogenous reasons are to blame. Further, given the characteristics 
of manufacturing, it is a common notion that SSA's solution to economic performance lies in 
diversifying into manufacturing exports. 
However, in studies such as those by Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999), the region's 
comparative advantage is due to high land per worker and low skill per worker, opposite to 
the requirement for manufacturing exports. This would mean that SSA does not have a 
competitive edge in manufacturing exports. They further suggest that, even if SSA plays 
catch-up with their skill supply, it is likely that other countries could move further ahead 
since the acquisition of skill is dynamic. Wood and Mayer (1998, 1999) therefore conclude 
that SSA should rather extensively increase its global share of primary good exports. 
Increasing its skill supply however, will serve to acquire comparative advantage in processed 
primary products. 
Unlike other research however, the argument of this thesis was not whether SSA has a 
comparative advantage in primary resource exports as such. Rather, in acknowledging the 
region's comparative advantage, the study tries to put the determinants from the W-M (1998, 
1999) model in the context of two relatively diversified countries (South Africa and 
Mauritius) and two commodity-export-dependent countries of sub-Saharan AtTica. In this 
respect, the question posed was, while natural comparative advantage in commodity 
exporting is a feature of the SSA region, does primary export industrialisation offer an escape 
from underdevelopment? 
Hence, the thesis first considered various theories of trade, such as the neoclassical 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory and its Wood and Mayer (1998 , 1999) (W-M) extension, the 
endogenous growth and new trade theories and the Dutch disease hypothesis, for their 
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implications. While the neoclassical theories, including the W- M model, explain the type of 
trade in SSA, they also suggest poor welfare and internal TOT effects due to the Rybczynski 
effect and immiserising growth (Section 2.2). This latter seemed to be the case, particularly, 
in Cote d'ivoire (Section 5.4). 
Endogenous growth theory and its reference to domestic factors also added insights on 
growth and development strategies. For example in Section 4.5, findings showed that the 
more diversified countries in the study, South Africa and Mauritius, had relatively higher 
researchers per million inhabitants, education enrolment, as well as higher commitment to 
education. Whereas in Nigeria and Cote d'ivoire, the sarne factors mentioned above, together 
with relatively high corruption levels and poorer infrastructure may considerably hinder their 
economic activity. 
While the application of the new trade theories to Africa was questionable, still the set of 
presumptions, among others, of non-perfect competition, international mobility of capital and 
skill. and economies of scale gives argument for Hrent extraction" or "import-protection-as-
export-promotion" strategies (Section 2.5). These suggest that, Africa 's diversification effort 
may be supported to limit oligopoly and for government to protect infant industries. 
On the other hand, the Dutch di sease hypothesis was deemed more applicable and suited to 
explain the economic structure and the development of mineral and oil abundant economies, 
as well as other primary resource dependent ones, e.g., agriculture dominated countries. 
South Africa, Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire thus fit this category. 
To attempt to answer if resource led industrialisation offered an escape from 
underdevelopment in SSA, with Nigeria, Cote d'ivoire, Mauritius and South Africa as 
comparative cases, the thesis, in Chapter Three, first assessed the measures of comparative 
advantage, i.e., land per worker and skill per land, based on the W-M (1998,1999) model. It 
appeared that Nigeria is an example that land, as a measure, does not explain the country's 
low shares of manufacturing exports as in the case of Mauritius. Skill measure does not also 
explain why Nigeria, having similar levels of skill per worker ratio to South Africa, has not 
diversified. The skill ratio, in addition, does not consider the quality of skill. For instance, 
with relatively the highest skill per worker and per land, Mauritius' growth was based on 
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textiles and clothing manufacturing. This sector is low-skill compared to South Africa's 
specialisation in relatively more human-capital intensive basic manufacturing. 
Further in Chapter Three, the demand for skill was also considered, where it was established 
that there seems to be a positive correlation between the demand for skill and land abundance 
and a correlation with the latter and the development path. In land abundant countries, skill 
demand may be low in the initial stages of development, thus explaining the delay in 
manufacturing. However, capital-intensive processing was expected to emerge relatively 
earlier. Therefore, a historic perspective demonstrated that in all four countries, the stages of 
development differed according to whether the country was land abundant or scarce. 
This perspective also pointed out that South Africa's diversification was based on the mineral 
energy complex (MEC), which reinforced the notion that land abundant countries will first 
invest in capital-intensive natural resource processing before the labour-intensive 
manufacturing. Also, the history of Nigeria' s development around oil illustrated that its 
classification as land scarce in the W-M model diverged from expected findings because of 
its natural resource abundance. Therefore, the consideration shifted to resource abundance 
rather than land abundance. 
The implication of delayed manufacturing in land abundant countries thus suggests that, 
rather than laissez-faire, government intervention in land abundant countries is even more 
significant at the critical initial development stage of the country. This was shown to be the 
example in the relatively resource abundant countries of the NICs of South East Asia, as it 
was in Mauritius when sugar export dominated . These countries employed selective 
industrial policy that targeted the development of both processed primary products and 
manufacturing along with significant investment in human resources. 
Subsequently, Chapter Four established a link between the economic structure and 
endogenous features of the four countries . Manufactures and services grew faster in South 
Africa and Mauritius. In contrast to Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Endogenous factors such as 
government expenditure on education (a proxy for the demand for skill) among others, was 
shown to be low in the land abundant countries in Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. On the other 
hand, although the type of government intervention prior to 1994 makes it a controversial 
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example, South Africa, a land abundant country, showed relatively higher government 
expenditure. 
The W-M model was refined in Chapter Four. It was argued that population density, the 
inverse of land per worker, does not correlate with per capita gross national income (ONI). 
For instance, while population density is similar between Mauritius and Nigeria, and between 
South Africa and Cote d' lvoire, Mauritius had over twelve times greater ONI per capita than 
Nigeria, and South Africa had six times the ON! per capita of Cote d'lvoire in 2002. Low 
ONI per capita in Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire appeared also to be correlated to land abundance 
and primary resource dependence. 
Therefore, there are implications about generalising measures of comparative advantage, for 
the reason that, doing so could reinforce the inherent nature of comparative advantage by 
making it self-fulfilling. Th is could also deter from emulating successful strategies used in 
similar countries. In this regard, what could have been the story of Mauritius if it went along 
with the Meade's Report (1961) based on the pessimistic possibilities of manufacturing due 
to the country's adverse inheritance (Subramanian and Roy, 10: 2001)? 
In Chapter Five, the Dutch disease hypothesis indicated the challenges of raising the 
economic and welfare standard in resource-dependent Nigeria and Cote d ' lvoire. Due to 
single commodity reliance, these countries experience commodity price instability tied to the 
global market. This seemed to create external shocks through booms and bust of commodity 
export prices that translated into short-term TOT effects at the given periods. In the 
hypothesis, TOT changes may also influence the RER positively, thus appreciating the RER 
when the former rises and vice versa. 
In the long term, external shocks could have adverse effects on diversification when a boom 
and RER appreciation renders non-booming manufacturing and/or agricultural exports 
un competitive, or, when a bust and RER depreciation makes imported inputs for import-
dependent sectors relatively expensive. Unambiguously, output in manufacturing will 
decl ine. This might explain the consistently poor and slow manufacturing growth in, 
especially, Nigeria. 
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It was found however, that the link between the TOT and RER and boom-bust cycles might 
be influenced also by unfavourable nominal exchange rate policies in both Nigeria and Cote 
d'Ivoire. For instance, it appeared that during periods of busts the RER did not depreciate 
always. There is a possibility that high RER levels are maintained to aid government 
transactions when national income and foreign reserves are low. Huge government spending 
with low investment in infrastructure and human capital, coupled with high perception of 
corruption in government, seem to indicate that huge inefficiencies in the allocation of natural 
resource wealth exist in Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. This highlights the incidence of political 
Dutch disease and government failure. 
Further political instability is apparent during busts when prolonged periods of falling 
commodity prices and economic downturns seemed to coincide with social unrest, and 
military coups or their attempt. For example, in Nigeria, after the oil boom of 1980, a 
mil itary coup occurred in the subsequent economic bust in the late 1980s (Section 5.2.4). [n 
Cote d'[voire also, the decline of cocoa prices in the late [980s led to an attempted coup 
(Section 5.2.6). It seemed that simi lar events in both countries that were repeated in the late 
[990s were also linked to the falling prices of the countries' commodity exports and the 
economic downturn at the time. 
Given the relative stabil ity of the RER and the TOT of South Africa and Mauritius, it was 
discussed in Chapter Five that external shocks due to commodity export price instability 
immensely challenged one group of countries more than the other. The issue thus turned to 
the role of sustained national income flows for domestic investment. 
In this respect, it was argued that, for Mauritius to diversify while the price instability index 
for sugar was consistently the highest, other factors must have been more significant for 
Mauritius to experience a steady TOT. To this, the study pointed out that the role of 
international price regulation of sugar with the European Union (EU) must have had a 
significant impact on stabi lising national income and enabling rents for reinvestment in 
Mauritius' diversification efforts. It was also shown that Mauritius' strategic export 
processing zones (EPZs) along with trade policy connected to the Multi-fibre Agreement 
played a major role in attracting foreign investment in manufacturing. It is highly likely that 
lower costs faced by producers in its textiles and clothing sector in Mauritius enabled rent 
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extraction from this sector and benefited domestic reinvestment. However, the non-tariff-
barriers (NTB) employed in international sugar agreements also point to the nature of 
imperfect competition that the new trade theory has highlighted in Section 2.5 . 
On the other hand, in South Africa, sustained national revenue might be explained 
historically on the basis of its past apartheid system. There were huge profits to be made by 
foreign and domestic investors from cheap labour in a highly protected economy during the 
controversial apartheid system (Southall, 2005). 
However, manufacturing diversification appears also to have emanated from competing 
political and economic interests. It could be said that South Africa's domestic protectionism 
together with the use of mining rent to re-invest domestically contributed to build a relatively 
longer term learning-by-doing in manufacturing (see Krugman, 1989 for the "rent extraction" 
argument in Section 2.5). However, the price of prolonged domestic protectionism and the 
exclusion of the majority from participate in the economy come with the consequences of a 
dual economy inherited from the past system. Hopefully, South Africa is continually 
undergoing positive changes towards this. 
In summarising this study, what stood out was that all the countries followed their 
comparative advantage in commodity exports but Mauritius and South Africa have been able 
to diversify relatively into manufacturing exports indicating that comparative advantage is 
dynamic. However, Cote d 'Ivoire and Nigeria have for decades been stuck with primary 
export comparative advantage. 
While the Wood and Mayer (1998, 1990) model can be used to show regional comparative 
advantage, when applied to individual countries in SSA economic growth performance seems 
to differ between countries due to a host of other factors. Comparative advantage attempts to 
determine the possibilities for regions and countries as well as implies laissez-faire policy and 
free trade. However, the Dutch disease hypothesis suggests that this may "permanently" 
leave countries to lag behind in their efforts to diversifY. 
It is likely that Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire's comparative advantage in oil and cocoa may 
persist for a long time as long as these resources are in abundance. Moreover, global demand 
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for oil to fuel industrialisation will possibly be increasing with globalisation surges, and the 
demand for chocolate is also likely to continue rising. However, unstable macroeconomic 
environments in Nigeria and Cote d'ivoire could greatly undermine manufacturing 
diversification as long as national income remains highly volatile. In addition, anecdotal 
evidence from recent world events tied to oil, as seen in Iraq, the Middle East and Latin 
America today, where it is argued that external political interests are entangled in oil-rich 
countries due to their interest in the commodity, gives the impression that the problems of 
political Dutch disease could increasingly become external. 
In the short term both countries could channel their efforts in the processing of oil and cocoa 
respectively, and exporting the products. However, adding value to Cote d'Ivoire's cocoa is 
highjacked by international trade barriers. Moreover, both Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire also 
face imperfect outcomes from their membership of OPEC and the ICCO respectively. 
Recently, the political and social environment in Nigeria has a mixed one, with frequent 
social unrest tied to oil resource disputes in the oil-producing region. However, the change to 
a new elected democratic government since 1999, as opposed to the military rule, brings 
optimism. On the other hand, the bouts of civil unrest in Cote d'Ivoire since 2000 remain a 
concern. 
This study stresses important policy questions about how developing commodity- dependent 
countries such as Nigeria and Cote d'!voire should adopt a harmonious blend of exchange 
rate policy, multilateral and bilateral trade agreements as well as tackle political Dutch 
disease. This will be aimed at stabilising, and sustaining national income, which in turn 
would increase the opportunity to diversify into less volatile manufacturing exports to 
maintain economic growth. 
The efforts to diversify whether in manufacturing or in processed primary exports 
nonetheless point to human and social capital development, institution building and 
government failure as key issues for Cote d'!voire and Nigeria. 
The suggested policy direction with regard to political Dutch disease, particularly in Nigeria 
and Cote d' Ivoire, is to minimise problems of excessive spending through transparency and 
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democratic leadership. Interventions, as in the infant industry argument, toward lagging 
sectors in manufacturing and agriculture may then work better as transparency checks 
government failure. 
African countries need to confront international trade barriers with excellent international 
trade negotiation skills to benefit from multilateral and bilateral agreements for market access 
for their goods. In addition, with carefully negotiated trade agreements and market 
incentives, African countries could reap the opportunities that the global trans-national 
companies offer so that they can increase labour force participation rather than 
industrialisation skewed towards capital-intensive growth. 
One possible solution to stabilise commodity export prices for Cote and Nigeria is for these 
countries to lock future prices of their commodity exports on a medium term basis. Such 
attempts at multilateral trade agreements through the ICCO, for example, are however fraught 
with transaction costs as disagreements drag on between the supplier and the consumer 
nations. However, bilateral trade agreements could be an alternative. 
The goal to stabilise commodity exports through international trade agreements would 
however, have to work with an exchange rate that is flexible to respond to the appropriate 
economic changes. While the effect of booms, through the excess flow of foreign currency, 
on RER appreciation calls for the latter to be sterilised, this calls for greater government 
discipline. 
This comparative study of South Africa, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritius showed that an 
integrated management of the economy rather than biased growth is beneficial. However, the 
solution for economic growth focused on increased manufacturing exports alone should be 
taken as an auxiliary to augmenting the economic participation of the population at large . 
This, together with increased investment in infrastructure, human resources, health, and 
education will aid in realising the potential for improved economic performance along with 
development. 
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Appendix 1 
Nigeria sector contribution to GDP (%total) at current national prices 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
OilGDP 30.9 48 .2 42.9 38.3 44.7 
Non-oil 69.1 51.8 57.1 61.7 55.3 
GDP 
Agriculture 34.2 26.4 30.7 31.3 26.4 
Secondary 5.4 4.4 4.7 5.4 4.7 
Tertiary 29.5 21.0 21.6 25 .0 24.4 
sector 
Source: IMF (2004) 
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Appendix 2 
Commodity price trends in current U.S. dollars (Average rate of change per cent). 
Year 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-03 
All food 10.9 -3. 7 0.7 0.6 
Agriculture 12.5 0.6 -1.9 1.5 
raw 
materials 
Cocoa 22.9 -4.9 2.6 23.8 
Sugar 7.9 -7.5 -2.7 -5.0 
Minerals, 8.1 1.7 -2 .1 -0.5 
ores and 
metals 
Gold 21.6 -2 .6 -2.6 9.1 
Crude 28.2 -10.7 -1.6 1.0 
petroleum 
Source: UNCTAD (2004). 
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Appendix 3 
South Africa: mining production index (% change), 2000=100 
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Mining 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -1.5 1.4 0.8 4.0 4.5 
Production, 
gold included 
(weight+ I 00) 
Mining 4.6 -1.4 5.9 0.6 4.8 0.8 7.2 7.9 
Production, 
gold excluded 
(weight+ 100) 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Annual Indicators (TIPS, 2005) 
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Appendix 4 
Figure a: Population growth and income per head 
Annual population Cote d'Ivoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
growth rate (%) 
1975-2002 3.3 1.1 2.9 2 
1990-2002 3.2 1 2.8 2 .3 
Figure b: GDP pcr capita annual growth rate (%) 
Cote d'ivoire Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
1975-2002 -2 4.6 -0.6 -0.7 
1990-2002 -0.1 4 -0.3 nat 
Source: UNDP (2004); World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) 
I na: not available. 
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